

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT (EMAC)

SEPTEMBER 19, 2006



Path of Hurricane Katrina
Louisiana & Mississippi

2005 HURRICANE SEASON RESPONSE

AFTER-ACTION REPORT





TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary	EX-1
Background	EX-1
Purpose	EX-2
Methodology	EX-2
Validation	EX-3
Organization	EX-3
EMAC Improvements Since 2004 Hurricane Season	EX-3
Major Accomplishments and Opportunities for Continued Improvement	EX-4
Major Accomplishments	EX-4
Opportunities for Improvement	EX-5
Best Practices	EX-8
Summary	EX-9
Section 1 – The Monster Storm.....	1-1
Introduction	1-1
U.S. Gulf Coast.....	1-1
Cause and Effect.....	1-2
Nature at Work	1-3
Human Contribution	1-4
Catastrophic Results	1-5
Impact	1-5
Regional Impact	1-5
Environmental Impact	1-6
Impact on New Orleans.....	1-7
Evacuation	1-9
Sheltering	1-10
Debilitated Response Resources.....	1-10
Section 2 – EMAC Background, Operational Systems, and Resources Deployed.....	2-1
Background	2-1
National Emergency Management Association	2-1
EMAC Leadership	2-1
National Coordination Group.....	2-2
EMAC Administrative and Operational Resources	2-3
EMAC Assistance	2-4



Levels of EMAC Operations	2-6
Resources Deployed in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita	2-7
Urban Search and Rescue	2-7
Public Health and Medical Services	2-8
Human Services	2-9
Fire and Hazardous Materials	2-10
Public Works and Engineering	2-11
Law Enforcement	2-12
Animal Rescue	2-13
Emergency Management	2-15
The National Guard	2-15
Section 3 – EMAC Leadership, Coordination, and Advance Team	
Operations	3-1
Introduction	3-1
Lessons Learned	3-2
Category 1 – Operations	3-2
Positive Accomplishments.....	3-3
Issues for Improvement.....	3-3
3-1 – A-Team Composition	3-3
3-2 – A-Team Training	3-3
3-3 – A-Team Certification	3-4
3-4 – A-Team Checklists and Job Aids	3-4
3-5 – Electronic Request for Assistance.....	3-4
3-6 – Integration of EMAC System Components.....	3-5
3-7 – Resource Request Feedback	3-5
3-8 – Education and Training	3-5
3-9 – Member State Contact Information	3-5
Category 2 – Command and Control	3-6
Positive Accomplishments.....	3-6
Issues for Improvement.....	3-6
3-10 – NCT and RCT Operations	3-6
3-11 – NCT and RCT Roles and Responsibilities	3-7
3-12 – Initial A-Team Operations.....	3-7
3-13 – Field Communications.....	3-7
3-14 – National Guard Deployments	3-8
3-15 – National Guard and NCT Interaction	3-8
3-16 – Federal Agencies and Other Partners.....	3-8
3-17 – Self-Dispatched Resources.....	3-9
3-18 – EMAC Information Control	3-9
3-19 – Deploying Teams Versus Individuals.....	3-9
3-20 – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)	3-10



Category 3 – Logistics.....	3-10
Positive Accomplishments.....	3-10
Issues for Improvement.....	3-10
3-21 – Catastrophic Event Logistics.....	3-10
3-22 – A-Team Work Space.....	3-11
3-23 – A-Team Administration.....	3-11
3-24 – Resource Requirement Tracking.....	3-11
3-25 – Synchronized Resource Tracking.....	3-11
3-26 – Enforce EMAC Deployment Provisions.....	3-12
3-27 – Resource Accountability.....	3-12
3-28 – Reliance on Facsimile Devices.....	3-12
Category 4 – Finance.....	3-13
Positive Accomplishments.....	3-13
Issues for Improvement.....	3-13
3-29 – Cost Estimating.....	3-13
3-30 – National Guard Cost Estimates.....	3-13
3-31 – Definition of Reimbursable Costs.....	3-14
3-32 – Unallowable Administrative Costs.....	3-14
3-33 – Reimbursement Process Compliance.....	3-14
3-34 – “Single Check” Reimbursement Policy.....	3-14
Category 5 – Resource Management.....	3-15
Positive Accomplishments.....	3-15
Issues for Improvement.....	3-15
3-35 – Resource Typing.....	3-15
3-36 – Defining the A-Team.....	3-15
3-37 – Qualifications Verification.....	3-16
Section 4 – EMAC Administration and Management.....	4-1
Introduction.....	4-1
2005 Requesting States.....	4-1
Katrina.....	4-1
Katrina – Florida.....	4-1
Katrina – The Gulf Coast.....	4-2
Rita – Florida and the Gulf Coast.....	4-2
2005 Assisting States.....	4-2
Findings.....	4-3
Lessons Learned.....	4-3
Category 1 – Executing Deployment.....	4-3
Positive Accomplishments.....	4-4
Issues for Improvement.....	4-4
4-1 – Intra-State Mutual-Aid Agreements.....	4-4
4-2 – EMAC Broadcast Requests.....	4-5
4-3 – Requirement Definition.....	4-5



4-4 – Communications with Deployed Personnel	4-5
4-5 – EMAC A-Team Composition	4-6
4-6 – National Guard Representation	4-6
4-7 – EMAC A-Team Training	4-6
4-8 – Request State Internal Protocols.....	4-7
4-9 – Illegible EMAC REQ-A Forms.....	4-7
4-10 – EMAC REQ-A Content.....	4-7
4-11 – EMAC Database.....	4-7
4-12 – Self-Sustainment.....	4-8
4-13 – External Encroachment.....	4-8
4-14 – Cost Estimating.....	4-8
4-15 – Incomplete Cost Data.....	4-9
4-16 – Self-Deployed Resources.....	4-9
4-17 – Reconciling Estimated and Actual Costs	4-9
4-18 – Timely Emergency Declarations.....	4-9
4-19 – Civil/Military Coordination.....	4-10
4-20 – Staging Area Coordination.....	4-10
4-21 – National Guard Law Enforcement Support	4-10
Category 2 – Mobilization and Demobilization	4-10
Positive Accomplishments.....	4-10
Issues for Improvement.....	4-11
4-22 – National Response Resource Inventory	4-11
4-23 – Credential Verification	4-11
4-24 – Mobilization Briefing.....	4-12
4-25 – Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD)	4-12
4-26 – Expense Documentation	4-12
4-27 – Duration of Deployment.....	4-13
4-28 – Predesignated Deployable Resources.....	4-13
4-29 – Reimbursement for Local Purchases.....	4-13
4-30 – Operating Cost Documentation.....	4-14
Category 3 – Logistics.....	4-14
Positive Accomplishments.....	4-14
Issues for Improvement.....	4-15
4-31 – Operational Environment	4-15
4-32 – Situational Awareness.....	4-15
4-33 – Safety and Accountability	4-15
4-34 – Life Support Items.....	4-16
4-35 – Immunizations	4-16
4-36 – Large Team Deployments	4-16
4-37 – Base Camp Logistics	4-16
Category 4 – Field Operations	4-17
Positive Accomplishments.....	4-17
Issues for Improvement.....	4-17
4-38 – Joint Field Office Liaison.....	4-17
4-39 – NIMS Incident Action Plans.....	4-18
4-40 – Automated Teller Machines (ATMs)	4-18
4-41 – Managing Expectations	4-18



4-42 – Continuity of Operations	4-18
4-43 – Local Acceptance	4-19
Category 5 – Coordination and Control.....	4-19
Positive Accomplishments.....	4-19
Issues for Improvement.....	4-20
4-44 – Mission Numbers	4-20
4-45 – Disjointed Coordination.....	4-20
4-46 – Resource Tracking	4-20
4-47 – EMAC Coordination Teams	4-21
4-48 – National Guard Coordination	4-21
4-49 – Personnel Rotations	4-21
4-50 – Conference Calls	4-22
4-51 – Technology Failures	4-22
4-52 – Response Versus Recovery	4-22
4-53 – Delegation of Authority.....	4-22
4-54 – Multiple Command Structures	4-23
4-55 – Public Information Officer (PIO)	4-23
4-56 – Lead State Representatives (LSRs).....	4-23
4-57 – EMAC Leadership Transition	4-23
Section 5 – Resources Deployed Under EMAC.....	5-1
Introduction	5-1
Findings	5-2
Lessons Learned	5-2
Category 1 – Executing Deployment.....	5-2
Positive Accomplishments.....	5-2
Issues for Improvement.....	5-3
5-1 – Familiarity with EMAC.....	5-3
5-2 – Alert and Notification (#1).....	5-3
5-3 – Alert and Notification (#2).....	5-4
5-4 – REQ-A Analysis and Preparation	5-4
5-5 – Weekend REQ-A Response.....	5-4
5-6 – EMAC Support from Local Jurisdictions	5-5
5-7 – Mission Definition	5-5
5-8 – EMAC Mission Authorization	5-5
5-9 – REQ-A Form	5-6
5-10 – Resource Typing	5-6
5-11 – Self-Deployed Resources.....	5-6
Category 2 – Mobilization and Demobilization	5-7
Positive Accomplishments.....	5-7
Issues for Improvement.....	5-8
5-12 – Predeployment Information	5-8
5-13 – EMAC Knowledge and Understanding.....	5-8
5-14 – Arrival Information (#1).....	5-8
5-15 – Arrival Information (#2).....	5-9



5-16 – Deployment Scheduling and Team Transitions	5-9
5-17 – Cost Tracking	5-9
5-18 – Personnel Debriefings	5-9
5-19 – Personal Safety and Decontamination.....	5-10
5-20 – Law Enforcement Response Planning.....	5-10
5-21 – Mission Completion	5-10
5-22 – Command Structure.....	5-11
Category 3 – Logistics.....	5-11
Positive Accomplishments.....	5-11
Issues for Improvement.....	5-12
5-23 – Definition of Self-Sufficient	5-12
5-24 – Replenishing Supplies.....	5-12
5-25 – Item Ownership	5-13
5-26 – Base Camp Support.....	5-13
5-27 – Base Camp Security.....	5-13
5-28 – Base Camp Preparations.....	5-13
5-29 – Lodging Locations	5-14
5-30 – Communications with Base Camps	5-14
5-31 – Cost of Donated Supplies	5-14
5-32 – Operating Authority	5-14
5-33 – Personnel Accountability	5-14
5-34 – Area Maps	5-15
Category 4 – Field Operations	5-15
Positive Accomplishments.....	5-15
Issues for Improvement.....	5-16
5-35 – Community Interaction	5-16
5-36 – Delegation of Authority.....	5-16
5-37 – Mission Adjustments	5-16
5-38 – Identification and Access Control	5-16
5-39 – Total Resource Integration.....	5-17
5-40 – Organizational Integrity	5-17
5-41 – Staging Areas	5-17
5-42 – Situational Awareness.....	5-17
5-43 – Cost Tracking and Accountability	5-18
5-44 – Information Flow	5-18
5-45 – Building Inspection Documentation.....	5-18
Category 5 – Coordination and Control.....	5-18
Positive Accomplishments.....	5-18
Issues for Improvement.....	5-19
5-46 – Federal Agency Coordination	5-19
5-47 – Operational Coordination	5-20
5-48 – Information Sharing	5-20
5-49 – Local Area Knowledge.....	5-20
5-50 – National Guard Deployment.....	5-20
5-51 – Incident Management Team Typing	5-20
5-52 – EMAC Training for Non-A-Team Members	5-21
5-53 – Resource Demobilization	5-21



5-54 – NIMS Adherence	5-21
5-55 – Double Counting Resources	5-22
5-56 – Freelance Volunteers	5-22
5-57 – Overqualified Responders	5-22
5-58 – Post-Deployment Costs	5-22
5-59 – Problem Resolution	5-22
5-60 – REQ-A Consolidation	5-23
5-61 – Fax Transmissions	5-23
5-62 – REQ-A Changes	5-23
5-63 – Deployment Status	5-23

Annexes

Annex A	Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale	A-1
Annex B	2005 EMAC Post-Deployment Survey Results	B-1
Annex C	EMAC Deployments to Louisiana and Mississippi	C-1
Annex D	Acronyms and Definitions	D-1



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1	EMAC 2005 Organizational Structure	2-2
2	Sample Request for Assistance (REQ-A) Form	2-4
3	EMAC 7-Step Process	2-5
4	EMAC Operational Components	2-6

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1	EMAC Statistics on the Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita	EX-1
2	EMAC Deployment Survey Comparison, 2004 and 2005	EX-3
3	Top 10 Most Costly U.S. Atlantic Hurricane Disasters	1-4
4	Summary of EMAC Responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, NCT, and RCT)	2-18

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Executive Summary





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

Since its inception, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) has become an increasingly familiar component of the Nation's emergency response portfolio as governors look to one another for the resources best suited for State and local operations. The 2004 hurricane season, with four powerful hurricanes striking in a period of 48 days, saw the largest EMAC implementation in history, with more than 800 persons from 38 States deployed to Florida, Alabama, and West Virginia. In retrospect, this was only a modest representation of things to come.

Calendar year 2005 disasters in the United States created the largest demand for nationwide mobilization of emergency resources in the country's history. Throughout the year, EMAC was activated 10 times (in response to one wildfire, one flood, one tropical storm, two winter storms, and five hurricanes), which cumulatively stressed and tested EMAC's capabilities. These events generated a total of 2,241 mission requests, resulting in the deployment of 66,207 personnel and massive amounts of equipment. The total cost for the 2005 EMAC events is expected to exceed \$840 million. Hurricane Katrina made landfall for the first time on August 25, 2005, in Florida before making its second and third landfalls on August 29 in south-east Louisiana. Katrina was followed by Hurricane Rita on September 24, resulting in EMAC personnel deployments that exceeded the combined deployment of all previous [EMAC] activations several times over. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita together generated a total of 2,181 mission requests resulting in 65,929 personnel deployed from 48 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (see **Table 1**). Hurricanes Katrina and Rita accounted for 97.3 percent of the missions and 99.6 percent of the personnel assigned during 2005. Therefore, this 2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report (AAR) focuses principally upon the situations, activities, and EMAC deployments associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Table 1. EMAC Statistics on the Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Quick Stats by Event	Louisiana – Katrina	Louisiana – Rita	Mississippi – Katrina	Alabama – Katrina*	Texas – Rita*	Texas – Katrina*	DC – NCT	R4 – RTC	Florida – Katrina*	Florida – Rita*	TOTAL – Katrina & Rita
Date Event Opened	08/27/05	09/21/05	08/26/05	09/04/05	09/20/05	09/13/05	08/27/05	09/03/05	08/24/05	09/18/05	
First Deployment "Start Date"	08/28/05	09/22/05	08/27/05	09/04/05	09/22/05		08/27/05	09/03/05	08/26/05	09/19/05	
Last Demobilization "End Date"	03/31/06	02/03/06	03/05/06	09/28/05	10/11/05		10/12/05	09/17/05	09/10/05	09/26/05	
Duration of Event (Days of Deployments)	215	154	190	24	19	0	46	14	12	7	
Total Number of Missions Worked	1,028	180	911	5	38	1	11	2	3	2	2,181
"Fulfilled/Completed" REQ-A Missions	700	111	743	5	23	0	11	2	2	2	1,599
Total Number of Personnel	37,466	4,155	23,973	51	234	0	12	3	3	32	65,929
Total Dollar Estimated Cost	\$426,123,084.29	\$56,074,378.99	\$345,543,804.33	\$209,761.94	\$2,021,146.00	\$0.00	\$22,888.15	\$6,612.13	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$830,001,675.83

*Not cost tracking actuals



Purpose

Following the 2004 hurricane season, the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), conducted a comprehensive assessment of EMAC operations. The resulting report contained valuable lessons learned and recommendations, many of which were quickly implemented. The 2004 hurricane season also increased substantially the number of personnel with operational EMAC experience and, even more important, expanded familiarity with EMAC and its administrative procedures throughout the emergency management community and beyond.

To sustain the momentum begun with improvements implemented as a result of the 2004 assessment, NEMA and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/FEMA again contracted with L-3 Communications Titan Group. The purpose of this report is to describe the effectiveness of EMAC administrative, management, and operational activities in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and to suggest ways to improve the delivery of essential support. The response of other organizations under their own authority, including Federal, State, and local government agencies, is not the subject of this report.

Methodology

To produce a useful document, EMAC operational data must be gathered and analyzed. The EMAC database serves as a repository for daily EMAC situation reports, Request for Assistance (REQ-A) transactions, and other electronic materials. Recommendations included in the 2004 Hurricane Response AAR to better organize the EMAC database produced faster and easier access to essential information for this effort.

After demobilization, individuals deployed to the areas of operations are encouraged to complete a post-deployment survey to gather immediate feedback on EMAC operations. Survey results provide useful first-impression insights to compare with the information gathered during subsequent facilitated forums and with a similar survey conducted following the 2004 hurricane season EMAC response (see **Annex B** for a summary of post-deployment survey results).

For this AAR, two important facilitated focus group breakout sessions were conducted to gather observations from specific constituencies. In January 2006, 60 individuals who served as EMAC Advance Team (A-Team) members in Louisiana and Mississippi and also persons who worked on the EMAC National Coordination Group (NCG), National Coordinating Team (NCT), and Regional Coordinating Team (RCT) met for 2 days in Lexington, KY. In March 2006, 150 individual operations and management personnel from most of the 48 Assisting States and representatives of the thousands of practitioners in a variety of support disciplines engaged in a similar facilitated debriefing in Atlanta, GA. Representatives of Federal Government agencies and the National Guard Bureau also participated in the March program. These sessions yielded a first-hand critical view of areas of support that worked well, others that caused some difficulties, and some that require remediation.





Validation

A multi-tiered validation process ensured information in the final report represents a fair and accurate depiction of EMAC administration, management, and operations. Representatives from all of the respective EMAC constituencies participated in the validation process, which concluded with a review by a steering group organized specifically for that purpose by the Chair of the EMAC Operations Subcommittee.

Organization

This report contains an executive summary and five major sections along with four annexes. **Section 1, The Monster Storm** contains detailed information on the cause, effect, and catastrophic results of Hurricane Katrina. **Section 2, EMAC Background, Operational Systems, and Resources Deployed** provides information on the background of EMAC, its operational procedures and systems, and the resources deployed in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. **Section 3, EMAC Leadership, Coordination, and Advance Team Operations** presents the perspective of members of the NCG, NCT, and RCT and persons deployed under EMAC to serve as A-Team members at the Louisiana and Mississippi Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). **Section 4, EMAC Administration and Management** presents the perspective of officials from the Requesting States (Louisiana and Mississippi) and from the Assisting States that dispatched resources under the auspices of EMAC to aid the victims of Katrina and Rita. It also includes the views expressed by members of some of the participating organizations external to EMAC. **Section 5, Resources Deployed Under EMAC** presents the perspective of those who deployed to, and worked in, the disaster area.

Sections 3, 4, and 5 include a brief introductory description, followed by a discussion of areas that worked especially well and those requiring improvement. Each of these sections includes positive accomplishments as well as detailed information on the lessons learned and recommendations formulated by the participants.

EMAC Improvements Since 2004 Hurricane Season

The improvements achieved in EMAC operations since the 2004 hurricane season are substantial (see **Table 2**). For example, the data collected during the 2005 hurricane season post-deployment survey reveals that 70 percent of responders understood their assignments before deploying; 74 percent reported that living and working conditions were adequately described in advance; 77 percent stated that mobilization instructions were clear; 84 percent were briefed upon arrival in the area of operations; and 91 percent regularly reported to a supervisor. All of these show significant improvements over the preceding hurricane season. More important, 92 percent of respondents to the 2005 survey indicated they would deploy under EMAC in the future.

Table 2. EMAC Deployment Survey Comparison, 2004 and 2005

	2004	2005
Were assignments made clear before employment?	Yes (56%)	Yes (70%)
Were you adequately briefed upon arrival?	Yes (67%)	Yes (84%)
Did you regularly report to a supervisor?	Yes (88%)	Yes (91%)
Were you debriefed prior to demobilization?	Yes (47%)	Yes (60%)



Dramatic improvements have been achieved with regard to the EMAC database. While the database contained a wealth of deployment-related information in 2004, it was necessary to extract and manipulate the data manually to analyze various aspects of the EMAC deployment. This was time-consuming and burdensome. Now the database is readily accessible and ad hoc reports can be quickly created to amplify the expansive file of standard reports that are also available.

Major Accomplishments and Opportunities for Continued Improvement

This report describes 157 operational, administrative, and managerial issues and more than 250 related recommendations to improve EMAC processes. These issues and recommendations reflect the views of the EMAC community members who participated in the facilitated focus group breakout sessions. In some instances, due to the composition of the breakout group and varying levels of experience of the participants, recommendations emanating from one group conflict with those of another group. Moreover, there is a predictable degree of repetitiveness where different groups arrived at similar conclusions. This repetitiveness underscores the validity of those observations. *All of the items are presented here according to direction so that every voice is heard and the EMAC leadership has the benefit of all concurring and contrasting points of view. Some of the observations and recommendations will prove inappropriate upon critical review by the EMAC leadership.*

The report also points out many noteworthy accomplishments. All of the recommendations are important and will be reviewed by EMAC leadership. A few overarching accomplishments and opportunities for improvement are presented below because of the consensus and widespread passion they evoked among the various EMAC constituencies. To acquire a full understanding of the scope of this AAR, a full review of all issues and recommendations contained in **Sections 3, 4, and 5** is recommended.

Major Accomplishments

1. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact works. It delivered valuable resources quickly and in unprecedented quantities to Member States engulfed in a disaster of catastrophic proportions. A-Teams were in place in Louisiana and Mississippi before Katrina made landfall. Within 36 hours, 6,335 personnel were deployed to the embattled States. That number grew to more than 65,900 in just 80 days. The EMAC deployment of approximately 20,000 civilian personnel was over 23 times larger than the deployment of resources under EMAC during the 2004 hurricane season. The additional deployment of more than 46,500 military personnel makes a clear statement that EMAC is both effective and scalable.
2. The NCG acted aggressively and without delay to ensure all of the Member States were primed for EMAC activation and to recruit personnel for A-Team assignments. Communications between the NCG, threatened Gulf Coast States, and other Member States was established well before landfall. In the midst of the response operations, EMAC leadership was transferred seamlessly from New York to New Mexico. Incoming EMAC Operations Subcommittee Chairs assume responsibility in early September each year, during the heart of the Atlantic hurricane season. In 2005, the transition occurred on September 6, 2005, 1 week after Hurricane Katrina struck. A similar situation occurred in



2004 when Washington State yielded responsibility to New York during the Hurricane Frances response and with Hurricane Ivan approaching the Gulf Coast. Given the recent history of active hurricane seasons, consideration should be given to shifting the annual EMAC leadership change to a less tumultuous time period.

3. The EMAC staff and leadership were flexible, responsive, and fully committed to supporting the deployed A-Teams. When additional capabilities were needed in the Broadcast and resource tracking systems, which enables electronic information distribution to key personnel, the EMAC Coordinator implemented the changes online, in real time, and on the live operating system while taking directions over the telephone from the A-Team. EMAC operations were efficient and responsive. At the January facilitated debriefing of A-Team members and representatives of the Requesting States, one of the attending Louisiana officials expressed gratitude for this dedicated support, and all of the participants extended a standing ovation to the EMAC Coordinator.
4. Organizing deploying resources into large teams or task forces with an established command and control structure and then retaining those teams largely intact during operations proved to be highly effective. Safety and accountability were improved, and logistical support was easier to manage, particularly when such organizations followed the National Incident Management System (NIMS) precepts. This structure also allowed deployed resources to fit more quickly into the evolving command structure in the operations area.
5. The use of base camps to house deployed personnel worked very well. Base camp locations and operations were, for the most part, preplanned and well thought out so that responders were not simultaneously tasked to provide their own security, administration, and logistical support when not working on shift. Properly organized and operated, base camps provided weary responders a brief respite under secure and reasonably comfortable conditions.
6. NEMA should be recognized for its efforts to support the need for enhanced communications and education of EMAC's mission, policies, and procedures. NEMA recently elevated the EMAC Operations Subcommittee to full committee status within the NEMA organization. NEMA, with the support of FEMA, has developed EMAC train-the-trainer courses, which are held at Emmitsburg, MD. More than 140 individuals from State and local government and other organizations have been trained on how to present the critical elements of EMAC and are now providing training in their home States, local jurisdictions, and parent organizations. Focused EMAC process briefings have been developed and are being presented at major emergency management, association, and discipline national conferences. An EMAC Multi-Disciplinary Advisory Group was recently formed with representatives from a broad base of individual organizations, agencies, and response disciplines. The Advisory Group is working to promote a better understanding of EMAC among multi-discipline emergency response entities and mutual-aid partners.

Opportunities for Improvement

1. Funding should be considered to facilitate the acquisition of a small full-time professional staff to provide continuity and capitalize on the phenomenal progress that has been achieved over the past decade. While there are advantages to having a primarily informal structure, EMAC is at a point where it needs a small full-time core support staff to carry on between emergencies and to serve as the foundation for sustained future operations.



EMAC has demonstrated its usefulness. It is a proven and valued component of the Nation's response and recovery capabilities. Outside organizations are increasingly partnering with EMAC as the logical and primary conduit for State-to-State mutual aid. For example, during the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, for the first time, the National Guard Bureau chose to use EMAC as the primary conduit for supporting Louisiana and Mississippi. This increased acknowledgement portends a similar increase in reliance on EMAC. NEMA and DHS/FEMA should also establish a base funding level to enable multi-year EMAC forward planning. It is time to make an investment in a proven successful venture—the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

2. Accountability of personnel deployed under EMAC must be improved. Accounting for deployed resources is both difficult and necessary. It is imperative that deployed personnel are contacted quickly and warned of impending danger from changing conditions in the area of operations. They must also be notified of family emergencies or other circumstances warranting their attention. Deployed resources are instructed to check in and maintain contact with the EMAC A-Team at the Requesting State EOC. In a smaller, more manageable situation, such as a Level 3 or Level 2 EMAC operation, this may be adequate. However, officials were not prepared to deal with accountability in the wake of a disaster of Katrina's magnitude, with more than 65,900 people dispersed across a 90,000 square mile area of operations. About 46,500 of the responders belonged to National Guard units deployed under EMAC. The unit commanders are responsible for the welfare of National Guard personnel and have a well-established chain of command to disseminate information and exercise control. That still left nearly 20,000 civilian responders to account for, which is simply beyond the current capabilities of an EMAC A-Team, even with support from Assisting State EMAC Coordinators.
3. A major educational and public awareness campaign is needed to ensure all relevant parties are fully cognizant of EMAC's purpose, restrictions, and operational parameters. Key emergency management personnel in the Member States, and others who work routinely with EMAC, are generally knowledgeable of the Compact provisions. Others are less familiar or, in many instances, have serious misperceptions about EMAC. This includes Federal agency personnel working at FEMA's National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs), commanders and senior staff in the National Guard, representatives of charitable and humanitarian organizations, State and local government employees, and members of the various disciplines that deploy in response to a disaster. Member States need to take an active role in educating their agencies and organizations on EMAC capabilities and operational procedures.
4. EMAC needs a fully synchronized automated system that incorporates the database, the Broadcast system, and an electronic REQ-A Form. The EMAC support system now has both hard copy and electronic components. They are not well synchronized, resulting in considerable duplication of effort and redundant data entry. While great strides have been made in improving the usefulness of the Broadcast system and access to the EMAC database, they must also be linked to an electronic version of the REQ-A Form. With an electronic REQ-A Form, Broadcast system, and database fully integrated, information will be automatically available to authorized personnel throughout the EMAC community. Standard checklists, templates, and spreadsheets, as described elsewhere in this report, will still be required in paper form for remote site operations and for use when electronic access is limited or unavailable. These too must be fully synchronized so that the data is easily merged into the automated system when it is available.



5. EMAC A-Teams deployed under catastrophic or near-catastrophic conditions must be larger, more robust, and adequately equipped to meet the requirements of sustained, intense operations. The composition and size of the A-Teams initially deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi was inadequate given the magnitude of the task confronting them. The special circumstances of a catastrophic or near-catastrophic event require a larger, more robust A-Team able to implement EMAC operations under the most extreme and demanding conditions. A-Team members, as well as individuals who provided administrative and management support to the deployed A-Teams during the Katrina response, expressed strong opinions favoring a larger team with skills aligned with the Incident Command System (ICS) model. In each of the past two hurricane seasons, there was sufficient information available to anticipate circumstances that could not be well met simply by adding incrementally to the initial two-person A-Team module.
6. EMAC leaders should consider defining a new operational level to explicitly address the unique requirements of catastrophic and near-catastrophic events. An EMAC catastrophic emergency operational level could trigger actions designed specifically for the intensity and urgency of these special circumstances. Thus, the current Levels 1, 2, and 3, as described in this report, would become operational Levels 2, 3, and 4. A new Level 1 would address large-scale and catastrophic events requiring a much more robust immediate response. For example, when the new EMAC Level 1 is activated, a reinforced A-Team (as described in **Section 3, Issue 3-12** and **Section 4, Issue 4-5**) could automatically deploy in response to a REQ-A from the affected Member State. In 2004, successive powerful storms (i.e., Charley, Ivan, Frances, and Jeanne) aligned themselves off of the coast and then struck Florida. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina achieved Category 5 strength just 24 hours before landfall. Scientists are projecting continued extreme weather events in the years ahead. Additionally, catastrophic earthquakes, tsunamis, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist incidents could produce even more horrific results. Given recent history and current projections, EMAC must be prepared for events of continuing extreme severity. If a catastrophic threat happens to dissipate after deployment, resources can easily be withdrawn. Historic, current, and predicted circumstances clearly justify erring on the side of safety while having systems in place that ensure the ability to stay ahead of operational requirements.
7. Financial accountability, cost tracking, and reimbursement continue to be problematic. While the requirements are clearly defined in the EMAC Operations Manual, there were far too many instances when poor recordkeeping resulted in undocumented expenditures and unduly delayed reimbursement. Because of the chaotic conditions initially encountered in the area of operations, it was not always possible to obtain a standard printed receipt for emergency supplies and other items acquired locally; however, a hand-written record of the transaction should have been created and signed by both parties. Similarly, the need for operational flexibility frequently requires mission adjustments and resource changes to meet shifting priorities. To qualify for reimbursement, these changes must be documented on a properly amended REQ-A Form. Ultimately, the responsibility for financial accountability rests with the Assisting State. It is imperative that deploying personnel are equipped with both the knowledge and the wherewithal to maintain records within the parameters of Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP), even under austere field conditions.



Best Practices

In addition to uncovering specific areas requiring improvement, the extensive discussions among participants in the EMAC process also produced many “best practices;” that is, particular approaches to common challenges that others might choose to adopt. Some examples of these “best practices” follow:

- The North Carolina Division of Emergency Management established a Web page so that family members could maintain contact with deployed personnel.
- The Indiana Task Force included mental health professionals deployed ostensibly to support task force members. Their work quickly expanded to meet the needs of other responders and hurricane victims, providing counseling to nearly 12,000 persons.
- Faced with a severe shortage of area maps, one group of responders gathered maps from car rental agencies, which proved very useful because they often included references to landmarks in addition to street signs.
- Anticipating the shortage of functioning automated teller machines (ATMs), North Carolina issued each EMAC responder a cash advance to cover out-of-pocket expenses.
- Some deploying task forces conducted team training at designated base camps en route to the area of operations. For example, the Indiana Task Force had many members who had never engaged in field operations and were unfamiliar with the necessary structure such operations entail. Classes were presented in NIMS and ICS.
- In the absence of a standard identification badge, some deploying organizations issued responders a copy of the REQ-A Form, which served as a “passport” throughout the operations area.
- The Fire Department of New York initiated “Operation Chainsaw,” recruiting off-duty firefighters to help clear debris and clean up the homes of their New Orleans Fire Department counterparts. Firefighters from Illinois and Maryland soon joined in the effort, eventually working on 320 homes after putting in 12- to 14-hour duty days.
- Mississippi brought representatives of all State licensing agencies to the staging areas and implemented a one-stop credentialing process.
- A creative building inspector deployed from California used his laptop computer to teach other responders how to ascertain minimum structural safety.
- Communications through parallel counterpart channels or through professional associations concurrent with formulating EMAC REQ-As reinforced the response process.
- The Commonwealth of Virginia briefed deploying personnel on the culture, demographics, politics, and socio-economic environment of the area of operations. This aided the interaction of deployed forces with local authorities and residents.
- States with intra-State mutual-aid agreements for resource sharing among local jurisdictions in an emergency easily and quickly implemented EMAC procedures.



Summary

The EMAC process worked and delivered significant valuable resources to those in need. The nationwide EMAC members responded and the EMAC staff and States exhibited leadership and flexibility. The increased use of NIMS proved itself. The country's emergency management community, first responders, military, and non-government organizations all made significant contributions. A full review of all of the positive accomplishments and the development of a system of prioritization to address the issues for improvement will result in improved capabilities, faster response, and a general improved efficiency for mass mobilizations of emergency resources.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Section 1

The Monster Storm





SECTION 1 THE MONSTER STORM

Introduction

At daybreak on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southeastern Louisiana, bringing to the U.S. Gulf Coast a catastrophic experience unparalleled in modern history. In spite of improvements in communications, transportation, weather forecasting, warning systems, and emergency management planning gained from decades of experience responding to scores of deadly violent storms, Hurricane Katrina still claimed more than 1,300 lives. Louisiana and Mississippi sustained the most catastrophic damage, although neighboring Texas, Alabama, and Florida were also severely impacted.



As the region reeled from Katrina's powerful winds and deadly storm surge, Hurricane Rita struck just west of New Orleans on September 24. As a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, more than 1,500,000 residents evacuated the region, some more than once, seeking refuge in 44 States and in the District of Columbia. Many have not yet returned. An estimated 600,000 households were displaced, drawing comparisons to the great human upheavals at the end of the Civil War and during the Depression era "Dust Bowl" exodus.

All of this occurred in an area of the United States known as the Gulf Coast. Its colorful history and unique character will henceforth forever be viewed through a prism defined by the 2005 hurricane season.

U.S. Gulf Coast



The U.S. Gulf Coast consists of the coastal areas of the five States bordering the Gulf of Mexico—Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. It is a diverse region rich in history, culture, and tradition and blessed with an abundance of natural resources. It is also an area subject to the frequent violent storms spawned over Gulf waters. Between 1900 and 2005, the Gulf States have suffered the effects of 73 major (i.e., Category 3 to 5) hurricanes.

The Gulf Coast is a critical component of the U.S. national economy. More than 800 manned and 1,000 unmanned oil and gas drilling platforms dotting the Gulf transfer their valuable



products via undersea pipelines to area refineries, which represent nearly 50 percent of the total U.S. refining capacity. It is the centerpiece of the petroleum industry. The Gulf Coast is also the gateway for goods from around the globe. The Port of South Louisiana is the largest volume shipping port in the United States and the fourth largest in the world. It is the main receiving terminal for supertankers from Saudi Arabia. The Port of South Louisiana, along with the Port of New Orleans, processes 15 percent of all U.S. cargo.

The Mississippi Delta, rich in silt deposits from the Mississippi River, is a traditional habitat for a wide variety of flora and fauna, as well as birds, waterfowl, and wildlife. Because of its fertile soil and temperate climate, the land area of the Delta has traditionally produced rice, soybeans, sugar cane, and cotton. Coupled with coastal fish, shrimp, and oyster production, the region supplies much of the Nation's most valued commodities. Gulf fishermen provide nearly 30 percent of the Nation's seafood and shellfish.

The Gulf Coast has long been a tourist mecca. Before Katrina's visit, the \$18 billion tourist-related industries of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama generated an estimated \$50 million each day in revenue. In 2004, more than 10 million visitors spent over \$5 billion in New Orleans alone. New Orleans' Mardi Gras, Sugar Bowl, and Jazz Fest are fixtures on America's leisure scene. Its well earned, if unofficial, motto "*Laissez le bons temps rouler*" or "*Let the good times roll*" kept tax dollars rolling into city and State coffers. With 80,000 people employed in the hospitality and leisure industry, New Orleans is one of the country's top 10 business convention destinations. In Mississippi, a dozen floating casinos employed thousands of workers and produced hundreds of millions of revenue dollars annually. Sparkling white beaches, upscale resorts and spas, and world-class golf courses in Mississippi, Alabama, and along the Florida Panhandle are winter magnets for those living in colder climates. Gulf Coast barrier islands, such as Padre and Galveston in Texas, are traditional spring break destinations for partying college students.



Hurricanes Katrina and Rita not only decimated the industrial, agricultural, petrochemical, shipping, marine food products, and tourist industries in Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Gulf Coast region, they also had significant national and international economic implications. The massive evacuation and the destruction of private, commercial, and public facilities, as well as the majority of all infrastructures, significantly debilitated the State and local capacity to respond to and recover from this catastrophic event.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita not only decimated the industrial, agricultural, petrochemical, shipping, marine food products, and tourist industries in Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Gulf Coast region, they also had significant national and international economic implications. The massive evacuation and the destruction of private, commercial, and public facilities, as well as the majority of all infrastructures, significantly debilitated the State and local capacity to respond to and recover from this catastrophic event.

Cause and Effect

Scientists attribute the unusual intensity of Florida's 2004 hurricane season to a 1-degree warming of the waters where Atlantic storms form and grow, coupled with a rigid set of atmospheric conditions...According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) Hurricane Research Division, these conditions might well continue for the next decade.

*Emergency Management Assistance Compact
After-Action Report for the 2004 Hurricane Response*



Nature at Work



Hurricanes at sea gain energy from warm surface water drawn from an ocean depth of up to 100 feet. Beyond that depth, cooler waters tend to temper and moderate a storm's intensity. A well-documented and continuing gradual rise in water temperatures is an important contributing factor to the dramatic increase in Category 4 and 5 hurricanes, which have doubled over the past 30 years (see **Annex A** for a description of hurricane categories). These warming trends and other natural phenomena produced Hurricane Katrina, which was quickly followed by Rita, Wilma, Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Epsilon, pushing the 2005 hurricane season into early December and into an unprecedented Greek alphabet naming protocol.

Some hurricanes, as was the case with Katrina, also encounter the Loop Current—a stream of warm water originating in the Caribbean that cycles through the Gulf and warms the ocean's waters to a much greater depth. As a result of encountering the warm Loop Current waters, Katrina experienced two successive intensification episodes in one 24-hour period, growing from a Category 3 to a Category 5 hurricane on August 28. By then, it was both powerful and massive. After passing over the Loop Current, Katrina weakened at its core; yet, as it approached landfall in southeastern Louisiana, it retained extensive and powerful winds estimated at or near Category 4 strength.



The Loop Current funnels warm water from the Caribbean into the Gulf of Mexico, creating a "loop" before exiting around the Florida Panhandle.

Hurricane Katrina Heats Up in the Gulf



Maximum winds speeds of Hurricane Katrina increased dramatically as that storm passed over the warm waters of the Loop Current in the Gulf of Mexico in late August 2005. The storm evolved quickly from a Category 3 to Category 5 event in a matter of 9 hours as it drew heat from the Loop Current and a large warm core eddy evident in the sea surface height derived from merged TOPEX/Poseidon, Jason-1, GFO, and Envisat altimeter data processed by the University of Colorado's CCAR group.

(R. Leben, G. Born)

Human Contribution

In the case of the Gulf Coast, it is clear that man-caused factors have increased the danger from powerful storms by weakening natural defense systems. Dredging the ocean bottom to construct thousands of miles of underwater oil and gas pipelines and to create and maintain shipping channels has eroded barrier islands. Some Louisiana barrier islands are disappearing at a rate of more than 30 feet each year as replacement silt and sand flowing from the



About 85 percent of forested wetlands have disappeared.

Mississippi River is dredged from shipping channels and dumped far out to sea. Each succeeding storm further adds to the damage. Katrina herself washed away nearly 2 miles of Louisiana’s Dauphin Island. According to data compiled by National Geographic, as a result of decades of erosion, 1,900 miles of Louisiana territory now resides beneath the Gulf of Mexico.

Similarly, much of the Gulf Coast region once contained hundreds of miles of marsh and wetlands, which served as a natural buffer, soaking up some of the storm surge waters before they reached populated areas. After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, scientists estimated that each linear mile of wetlands reduced the height of storm surge by approximately 3 inches. Louisiana’s wetlands have been steadily disappearing for years, stripped of natural foliage and drained to make way for developers and agricultural expansion. Over the past several decades, about 85 percent of the forested wetlands of the Mississippi Delta have disappeared.

All of these natural and man-caused factors created the unique conditions that produced the single costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States—Hurricane Katrina (see **Table 3**).

Table 3. Top 10 Most Costly U.S. Atlantic Hurricane Disasters

Costliest U.S. Atlantic Hurricanes			
Cost refers to total estimate property damage.			
Rank	Hurricane	Season	Cost* (2005 U.S. Dollars)
1	Katrina	2005	\$81.2 billion
2	Andrew	1992	\$44.9 billion
3	Wilma	2005	\$16.8 billion
4	Charley	2004	\$15.4 billion
5	Ivan	2004	\$14.2 billion
6	Hugo	1989	\$12.6 billion
7	Agnes	1972	\$11.6 billion
8	Betsy	1965	\$11.1 billion
9	Rita	2005	\$9.4 billion
10	Frances	2004	\$9.1 billion

*Listed by 2005 inflation adjusted cost.

Source: NOAA



Catastrophic Results

Impact


Regional Impact

The storm that became Hurricane Katrina began in the western Atlantic Ocean as Tropical Depression Twelve, so designated on the afternoon of August 23. Turning westward toward southern Florida, it reached hurricane strength at approximately 5:00 p.m. EDT on August 25. By 6:30 EDT that evening, Hurricane Katrina made its first landfall on Florida's southeastern coast on the Miami-Dade/Broward county line at Category 1 strength. Moving south and weakening to a tropical storm, it exited Florida in the southeastern Gulf of Mexico at around 3:00 a.m. EDT on August 26, leaving 14 dead in its wake. It quickly regained hurricane force as it moved across the Gulf. Within 24 hours, Hurricane Katrina was at Category 3 strength about 300 miles southeast of the Mississippi River.

At 10:11 a.m. CDT on Sunday, August 28, 2005, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued an urgent weather message. Hurricane Katrina, then at Category 4 strength, was churning through the Gulf of Mexico and gaining strength. By midnight, it would become a Category 5 storm with winds reaching 175 miles per hour (mph). The weather advisory warned of devastating damage, stating that:

Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks....At least one half of well constructed homes will have roof and wall failure....The majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional....All wood framed low rising apartment buildings will be destroyed....Power outages will last for weeks....Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by modern standards.

Katrina made its second landfall in southeastern Louisiana on August 29 at around 6:00 a.m. CDT and its third landfall at around 10:00 a.m. CDT near the Louisiana-Mississippi border. In the succeeding hours, days, and weeks, it became clear that the NWS warning was not overstated. Hurricane Katrina was the most catastrophic natural disaster in U.S. history. Even now, a year after the event, it is impossible to gauge with precision the duration and cost of full recovery, or even if such a recovery is possible.



Multi-State impact of Katrina's hurricane and tropical storm force winds.



Katrina weakened quickly after landfall and was downgraded to Category 2 by noon that same day. However, it drove a storm surge from 11 to 34 feet high that penetrated up to 6 miles inland and as far as 12 miles along bays and rivers. This powerful surge resulted from the expansive size of the storm, with hurricane strength winds stretching out 75 miles from the eye. The National Hurricane Center's *Tropical Cyclone Report* on Katrina attributes the height of the surge waters to Katrina's Category 3 winds, which drove waves formed while it was still at Category 5 strength just a few hours before landfall.



The estimated total land mass affected by the storm was 90,000 square miles. Coastal communities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were decimated. Roads and highways were buried under sand. Bridges collapsed. Communications facilities were demolished. Businesses, schools, churches, medical facilities, and historic buildings that had survived for centuries were gone, all washed away by Katrina. Entire neighborhoods vanished, leaving behind piles of rubble and debris as a reminder that life is

precious and uncertain. An estimated 600,000 households were displaced from the affected area. More than 1,500,000 people fled the region seeking safety at locations throughout the country, as citizens everywhere opened their homes to evacuees, transforming a regional catastrophic disaster into an event that was national in scope.

Environmental Impact

The environmental devastation caused by Katrina and exacerbated by Hurricane Rita is unsettling in scope and magnitude. Its full impact on life in the Gulf region may not be clear for decades. The sediment left behind by receding floodwaters coated the remains of homes, schools, and other public buildings. As it hardened, the dust from clean-up and repair work polluted the air. Thousands of abandoned vehicles, wrecked commercial facilities, downed power lines, damaged gasoline stations, residential appliances, electronic devices of all types, and other toxic-laden items presented serious health risks to unwary returning residents. By mid-December 2005, more than 225,000 household appliances and 40,000 electronic devices had been collected for disposal in Louisiana alone. The remaining polluted water was dangerously contaminated. The air smelled of petroleum, mold, and putrid organic matter. Soil and water samples tested after the storm showed dangerously high levels of arsenic, lead, pesticides, and petroleum components.





Katrina caused some 575 petroleum or hazardous chemical spills throughout the region. According to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), 10 of the largest spills in Louisiana released nearly 8 million gallons of oil. More than 1 million gallons of oil from a Murphy Oil Corporation refinery inundated nearly 2,000 homes in St. Bernard Parish, LA. The National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that if each of the 350,000 abandoned vehicles in the area had 8 gallons of gasoline in the tank, the effect, when combined with the oil spills, would be roughly equivalent to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.



Floodwaters submerged or otherwise damaged more than a dozen Gulf Coast toxic waste sites, including four Superfund sites in the New Orleans area. The "Superfund" label is reserved for the most contaminated areas.



Floodwaters submerged or otherwise damaged more than a dozen Gulf Coast toxic waste sites, including four Superfund sites in the New Orleans area. The "Superfund" label is reserved for the most contaminated areas.

It is estimated that Katrina produced more than 100 million cubic yards of debris. This is nearly three times the amount of debris left by the four hurricanes that struck Florida and the Gulf Coast in 2004 and almost 100 times more than was cleared from the World Trade Center site following the 2001 terrorist attack. In congressional testimony, a senior attorney from the NRDC described the volume of debris as being the equivalent of covering 1,000 football fields 50-feet deep in waste.

Impact on New Orleans

New Orleans is precariously situated between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain, approximately 100 miles north of the Gulf of Mexico. It is the third lowest point in the United States, with much of the city between 1 and 10 feet below sea level.

On August 27 at 10:00 a.m. CDT, Katrina continued on a track perilously aimed toward New Orleans with sustained winds of 115 mph and a forward speed of 7 mph. By 10:00 a.m. CDT on August 28, wind strength had grown to 175 mph and the hurricane's forward movement had increased to 12 mph.





It was, at this time, approximately 21 hours before landfall, that Mayor Ray Nagin ordered the first mandatory evacuation in the history of New Orleans. With a population of about 485,000 in the city proper and nearly 1,400,000 in the greater metropolitan area, the evacuation of all New Orleans residents would be a daunting task under the best of circumstances. One experienced emergency management specialist expressed the view that, if it is not enforced, a mandatory evacuation is, in effect, a voluntary evacuation.

At 6:00 a.m. CDT on August 29, Katrina's eye passed about 25 miles east of New Orleans with wind speeds still close to Category 4 strength and a forward motion of 16 mph. This created near-apocalyptic conditions. The rising waters of Lake Pontchartrain overflowed into adjacent neighborhoods adding to storm surge pressures already straining the city's intricate network of levees and canals. Some of the levees were overtopped by surging water on the morning of August 29. By late afternoon, the Industrial Canal, 17th Street Canal, and London Avenue Canal were all breached. By evening on August 29, 80 percent of New Orleans was under as much as 20 feet of water.





Evacuation

The primary means of transportation specified in the New Orleans evacuation plan is privately owned automobiles. Those residents with cars and gasoline jammed the major exit routes (Interstate 10 and Highway 90), creating bumper-to-bumper gridlock traffic. Many residents left voluntarily; others only when ordered from their homes. Some residents, however, could not, or would not, leave.



Residents jam Interstate 10 in an attempt to evacuate, creating bumper-to-bumper gridlock traffic.

Many tourists were stranded and some special needs populations were not evacuated because of the shortage of public transportation. Reportedly, only 21 of 60 area nursing homes were evacuated before landfall. Amtrak and Greyhound bus services were suspended well before landfall, and rental cars were in short supply as operators moved assets to safer locations in preparation for the advancing storm. Local school buses, which might have been used to evacuate residents, were stranded in flooded parking yards.



New Orleans school buses stranded by floodwaters following Hurricane Katrina.



Sheltering

More than 1,500,000 citizens were forced to flee their Gulf Coast homes as Hurricane Katrina roared ashore. About one-third of the evacuees sought refuge in 1,100 shelters operated by the American Red Cross in unaffected areas of Louisiana and Mississippi and in 25 other States and the District of Columbia. Others moved in with relatives or friends or, in many cases, accepted the generosity of strangers in locations throughout the country who opened their homes to those displaced by the storm. About 7,000 of the evacuees in Houston and San Antonio, TX, shelters were uprooted a second time when Hurricane Rita struck on September 24.

In coordination with the Southern Baptist Kitchen, the American Red Cross served more than 34 million hot meals and distributed another 30 million snacks at the shelters and in the ravaged communities. The Salvation Army served 4 million meals and assisted nearly 500,000 people across the affected area, and the Department of Defense (DoD) delivered an additional 21 million Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs). The Red Cross also operated a national survivor locator system, and the Salvation Army, using its emergency radio network, received more than 60,000 inquiries and was able to locate numerous missing survivors. More than 1,700,000 mental health contacts were made by American Red Cross counselors seeking to comfort those suffering the immense mental toll of this monumental catastrophe.



As many as 60,000 people gathered at the Louisiana Superdome seeking shelter from the approaching storm.

As many as 60,000 people eventually gathered at the Louisiana Superdome, a designated shelter of last resort stocked to supply up to 15,000 persons for no longer than 3 days. Another 20,000 made their way to the New Orleans Convention Center, which was neither planned nor prepared to serve as an emergency shelter.

In New Orleans' residential areas and in other communities throughout the Mississippi Delta, far too many people simply chose not to leave their homes.

The current death toll of those that could not, or would not, evacuate is 1,383 and continues to rise as additional bodies are discovered almost a year after the storm.

Debilitated Response Resources

The rapid chain of destructive events caused by the powerful winds and surging storm waters of Hurricane Katrina created circumstances far beyond the capacity of Gulf Coast response and recovery resources. In New Orleans, for example, the fire department wisely relocated fire and rescue apparatus to higher ground on the east bank of the Mississippi River, leaving the downtown area temporarily bereft of response equipment. The police department headquarters, like most public service facilities, was swamped with floodwater and most of the squad cars were under water or stranded on highway overpasses. With no other means of communication, attempts to contact police commanders by cell





phone from a makeshift headquarters in the valet parking lot of Harrah's Casino failed because Katrina wiped out the local exchange. Hurricane Katrina so severely disrupted the communications infrastructure that the emergency management and first responder community was without a viable command and control capability.

It was apparent that State and local emergency management and response organizations throughout the region were overwhelmed by the destructive force of Katrina and lost much of their capacity to respond. They would require massive assistance from other States and from the Nation as a whole. In addition to seeking resources from the Federal Government, the governors of the most severely affected States would turn to their counterparts, invoking the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which is designed to accelerate access to emergency response resources that compliment those available through the Federal Government.

Section 2

EMAC Background, Operational Systems, and Resources Deployed





SECTION 2

EMAC BACKGROUND, OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS, AND RESOURCES DEPLOYED

Background

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is not a Government agency. EMAC is a State-to-State mutual-aid agreement begun as a regional arrangement among southeastern States in 1993 following Hurricane Andrew. It gained national status with the passage of Public Law 104-321 in 1996. When Hurricane Katrina struck, 48 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands had ratified the Compact and were EMAC members.

National Emergency Management Association

The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) exercises administrative oversight of EMAC. NEMA is a non-profit, non-partisan association established in 1974 as a forum for the exchange of information among the State directors of emergency services. It has since expanded to include key members of State emergency management organizations, Federal Government agencies with related responsibilities, charitable organizations that participate in disaster recovery missions, private companies with related business interests, and individual emergency services practitioners.

During 2005, NEMA carried out its administrative oversight responsibilities through the EMAC Operations Subcommittee of the NEMA Response and Recovery Committee (see **Figure 1**). One NEMA staff person is assigned as the EMAC Coordinator and one as the EMAC Senior Advisor. The EMAC Senior Coordinator is the only paid employee dedicated full time to EMAC. The EMAC Senior Advisor is a NEMA part-time consultant.

EMAC Leadership

Responsibility for day-to-day business operations is assigned each year to an elected EMAC Member State, which serves as Chair of the EMAC Operations Subcommittee, the managing body of EMAC. The Chair of the EMAC Operations Subcommittee, with the assistance of a 19-member Executive Task Force (ETF), develops policies and issues guidance. The ETF includes the current and immediate past Chair, the succeeding Chair-elect, and the Legal Liaison. The Member States within each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regions choose a Lead State Representative (LSR) to serve on their behalf. The Chair also appoints up to three at-large ETF members. Additionally, the EMAC Coordinator and the EMAC Senior Advisor serve on the ETF in an ex-officio capacity.

In addition to the EMAC ETF, ad hoc task forces are regularly established to perform specific projects. These ad hoc task forces are staffed with personnel from the EMAC Member States.




Figure 1. EMAC 2005 Organizational Structure

National Coordination Group

Upon activating the Compact during an emergency, the Chair of the EMAC Operations Subcommittee becomes Chair of the National Coordination Group (NCG), which coordinates active EMAC emergency assistance operations. A Member State that accepts responsibility to Chair the EMAC Operations Subcommittee is also obligated to provide staff support to the NCG.



EMAC Administrative and Operational Resources

EMAC has a number of valuable aids to guide the Member States through all phases of EMAC operations.

- **EMAC Operations Manual.** The EMAC Operations Manual describes in clear and simple terms the EMAC organization, responsibilities, and standard operating procedures. It is a true workbook for individuals engaged in any aspect of EMAC activities. The Operations Manual contains appendices that include the legal operating protocols of the Compact and checklists for mobilizing and demobilizing resources, as well as other useful materials. A relatively concise document, it is continually updated and is available both in hard copy and online at the EMAC Web site for key personnel in Member States.
- **EMAC Broadcast.** The EMAC Broadcast system allows information to be sent via electronic mail (e-mail) to all key personnel of the Member States. Information pertaining to a resource request is categorized as an “Event Broadcast” and then labeled as a “Resource Request.” It replicates much of the material included on the REQ-A Form. Event request data remains in the Broadcast system as resources are identified and accepted, deployed, redeployed, and demobilized and reimbursement is paid to the Assisting State. All Broadcast event information is retained in the “resource tracking” section of the EMAC database. The Broadcast system is also used for other inter-State electronic communications, including distributing situation reports and similar event-related information.
- **Request for Assistance.** Officially labeled the EMAC Interstate Mutual-Aid Request, the Request for Assistance (REQ-A) Form is used to formalize the agreement between two Member States for resources to be deployed under the provisions of EMAC. An Authorized Representative of the Requesting State Emergency Management Agency signs Part I of the REQ-A Form, describing the type of resource needed and providing other basic information, including the name and contact information for the person initiating the request. The request is then broadcast to the Member States. When a Member State determines that it can respond with some or all of the required resources, the information is added to Part II of the REQ-A Form, which is then signed by an Authorized Representative of the offering State. Part II includes the estimated cost of deploying the resources based on the parameters described in Parts I and IV (Other Information). The REQ-A Form is then returned to the Requesting State. If the offer is accepted, an Authorized Representative of a Requesting State signs Part III. For purposes of authentication, the list of Member States’ Authorized Representatives is maintained on the EMAC Web site. See **Figure 2** for a sample of a completed REQ-A Form.
- **EMAC Web Site.** The EMAC Web site, which also functions as the front end interface to the EMAC database, is the principle repository for information related to EMAC operations. It includes all operational reference materials, such as the Operations Manual, the list of current Member State EMAC points of contact (POCs), and names of individuals authorized to commit on behalf of the governors to the contractual obligations implicit in the REQ-A process. Behind the Web site firewall, all missions are electronically tracked for Member States. This is further supported by a dynamic report generating capability. Administrative forms, such as those pertaining to reimbursement, are also found in the database, as are historical and contemporaneous records of EMAC resource deployments. With tens of thousands of records on file, the historical data provides a rich



Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

source for analyzing information regarding the type of resources most frequently needed, the average duration of deployments under different circumstances, and cost data of previous deployments that may be helpful in estimating future requirements.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT (EMAC) INTERSTATE MUTUAL AID REQUEST FORM REQ-A, 2002 Type or print all information except signatures			
PART I: TO BE COMPLETED BY THE REQUESTING STATE			
Date: 9 / 18 / 03	Time: 16 : 50 Hrs (local)	From the state of: NORTH CAROLINA	
Contact Person: Larry Dixon, EMAC Desk	Telephone (919) 733-9352	Fax (919) 733-7202	
To the State of: MISSISSIPPI	Authorized Rep: Doug Hoell		
Incident Requiring Assistance: Hurricane Isabel			
Situation is: <input type="checkbox"/> life threatening & requires immediate response. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> not life threatening, but resource shortages are critical.			
Type Assistance/Resources Needed (for more space, use PART IV & attach): Two (2) Experienced IA Specialists			
Date & Time Resources Needed: Saturday Sept. 20, 2003	Staging Area: NC EOC Raleigh, North Carolina		
Approximate Date/Time Resources Will Be Returned: Sunday October 5, 2003			
Authorized Official's Name: Doug Hoell /s/	Authorized Official's Signature: <i>Doug Hoell</i>		
Title: Operations Chief	Agency: North Carolina EM	Mission No.: 573	
PART II: TO BE COMPLETED BY ASSISTING STATE			
Contact Person: Tom McAllister, Operations Officer	Telephone (601) 352-9100	Fax (601) 352-8314	
Type of Assistance Available (for more space, use Part IV & attach): Two (2) Individual Assistance Specialists familiar with the federal IHP/ONA program. Estimated cost for these two personnel includes travel, meals, rental car, gasoline, laundry service, incidental travel expenses, and overtime pay for time worked over 40-hours per work week. Location of work is the NC EOC			
Date & Time Resources Available From: Saturday 20 September 2003	To: Sunday 5 October 2003		
Staging Area Location: State EOC, 116 West Jones Street, Raleigh, NC			
Approx. total costs of this deployment for which reimbursement will be requested: \$12,180.00			
Transportation Costs from Home Base: \$500	Return to Home Base: \$500		
Logistics Required from Requesting State (for more space, use Part IV & attach):			
Authorized Official's Name: Leon J. Shaifer	Title: Deputy Director		
Authorized Official's Signature: <i>Leon J. Shaifer</i>	Agency: Mississippi Emergency Mgmt. Agency		
Date: 09 / 18 / 03	Time: 18:00 Hrs (local)	Mission No: 573	
PART III: REQUESTING PARTY'S APPROVAL			
Authorized Official's Name: Doug Hoell	Title: Operations Chief		
Signature: <i>Doug Hoell</i>	Agency: North Carolina Emergency Mgt.		
Dated: 9/19/2003	Local Time: 09:14	Hrs (local)	

Figure 2. Sample Request for Assistance (REQ-A) Form

EMAC Assistance

Under the provisions of EMAC, the governor of a Member State that is confronted with a significant natural, technological, or catastrophic incident may seek assistance from other Member States. The governor of the affected State must first declare a state of emergency and request EMAC assistance. Upon request from the affected Member State, the NCG Chair recruits an



EMAC Advance Team or “A-Team” from other Member States. The A-Team deploys to the affected State, helps identify the types of assistance needed, and coordinates the preparation and submission of EMAC REQ-As. The resource request is shared with Member States by telephone, e-mail, facsimile, and the EMAC Broadcast system. Member States identify available resources to satisfy each request and determine the associated costs. As directed by the Requesting State, the A-Team negotiates the final terms with the member selected to be the Assisting State. After Authorized Representatives have signed off, the selected resources deploy to the operational area. Because all parties are simultaneously engaged in the EMAC resource request process, the sequential steps occur in rapid fashion. If the mission changes, or projected costs increase, the REQ-A must be amended. Upon completing the mission, the resources are demobilized and redeployed to the home State. Once the Assisting State is reimbursed by the Requesting State for the deployment costs, the mission is closed out (see **Figure 3**).




Figure 3. EMAC 7-Step Process



Levels of EMAC Operations

Depending on the magnitude of the event, the extent of damage sustained, and the amount of assistance required by a Member State, EMAC operates at one of three operational levels (see Figure 4).

- Level 3** is the least intense operational level and represents situations in which an affected State requests assistance directly from one or more Member States. The Requesting State Emergency Coordinator brokers the resources that are needed, but there is no requirement to deploy an EMAC A-Team.
- A **Level 2** situation exists when circumstances demand that one or more A-Teams deploy to assist an affected State implement the EMAC process.
- Level 1** is the highest EMAC operational level and occurs when a major disaster demands massive assistance. A-Teams, reinforced as appropriate to meet the anticipated operational demands, are deployed to one or more Requesting States. At the request of FEMA, the NCG deploys a National Coordinating Team (NCT) to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and possibly a Regional Coordinating Team (RCT) to the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC). It is the responsibility of the NCT and RCT to coordinate EMAC operations with the Federal agencies and other organizations represented at the NRCC and RRCCs.




Figure 4. EMAC Operational Components



Resources Deployed in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

The disastrous results of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita generated the largest and most costly response and relief effort ever marshaled in the United States. The 65,900 personnel deployed under EMAC possessed a broad spectrum of skills, many of which were represented at a facilitated debriefing held in March 2006 in support of this project. The following passages contain brief descriptions of some of the principal response categories and representative actions taken by personnel deployed under EMAC. This is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion. The magnitude of this event is simply too great for exhaustive detail. Following the description of response skill categories, **Table 4** on page 2-18 summarizes the number of responders by skill category from each Assisting State.

Urban Search and Rescue

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, more than 1,300 search and rescue personnel deployed under EMAC from 16 States were organized into 51 task forces.

Search and rescue is an operation mounted by trained emergency services personnel to find and return to safety individuals who have been reported missing and are presumed to be in danger. Search and rescue missions at sea are the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). In urban areas, search and rescue is most often the responsibility of the fire department. Search and rescue operations require specially trained and equipped personnel configured into mission-specific teams, such as urban search and rescue, wilderness search and rescue, and swift water search and rescue.



Search and rescue members prepare to pull a man out of the flood water in New Orleans.

Virtually every local jurisdiction has invested in some level of search and rescue capability. For example, Kentucky is a mountainous State with many sheer rock cliffs and an active mining industry. Among its 14 Regional Response Teams are large well-equipped organizations, with 40-foot trailers carrying 4x4 All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs), generators, life support medical equipment, and search and rescue supplies for various response requirements such as swift water rescue, mine and cave rescue, and high-angle/low-angle rescue. These teams are called Bluegrass Emergency Response Teams. Two of these highly capable teams deployed to the Gulf region—one from Lexington and one from Owensboro, KY.

Search and rescue personnel deployed under EMAC searched more than 22,300 structures and rescued 6,582 people. Additionally, 5,290 USCG search and rescue personnel rescued 12,533 persons by air and 11,584 by boat. The Department of Defense (DoD) reported that Active Duty and National Guard personnel rescued approximately 15,000 residents.



Search and rescue personnel deployed under EMAC searched more than 22,300 structures and rescued 6,582 people.



In addition to the search and rescue teams deployed under EMAC, FEMA is responsible for the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System, an integrated system of 28 task forces composed of 62 persons, each assigned to one of 31 positions. These FEMA task forces are sponsored by State and local emergency services organizations.

Public Health and Medical Services

More than 2,000 healthcare professionals from 28 States deployed under EMAC and treated more than 160,000 patients in the days and weeks after the storms, often under the most primitive conditions.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed most of the healthcare infrastructure along the Gulf Coast. Only three of New Orleans' 16 hospitals were open after the storm hit. The largest New Orleans medical center, Charity Hospital, is now closed, its 1939 structure beyond repair. Historically, Charity Hospital discharged 25,000 patients each year, while receiving nearly 144,000 emergency room and 407,000 outpatient visits annually. It was the only Level 1 Trauma Center in the Gulf region. Without "Big Charity," as it was called, the nearest Level 1 Trauma Center is more than 350 miles away. In Mississippi, 40 percent of the 775 medical clinics and individual medical practices were closed or offered limited services. An estimated 5,944 patient-care physicians in the 10 counties and parishes directly affected by the flooding were displaced.

Many healthcare personnel were deployed to evacuation destinations away from the stricken area, which had been quickly overwhelmed by the sudden influx of survivors. For example, officials estimate that in 1 week, East Baton Rouge Parish grew from a population of 425,000 to about 850,000, overwhelming the capacity of local health facilities.



More than 2,100 healthcare personnel from 27 States deployed under EMAC and treated more than 160,000 patients in the days and weeks after the storms, often under the most primitive conditions.

Human Services

Under the provisions of EMAC, 337 human services personnel from 20 States deployed to the Gulf Coast.

The violence of Hurricane Katrina ripped asunder the fabric that forms the safety net for our most needy citizens, young and old. Family and child services; unemployment benefits; food stamps; shelters for the homeless, battered, and abused; and other social services were interrupted or destroyed. In some cases, the loss of medical, financial, and administrative records produced a difficult challenge to public health and human services organizations at all levels.

As an example, in response to a request for assistance from Louisiana, one contingent of 10 public service professionals from eight different communities in Washington State departed for Louisiana on September 29, 2005. After flying to Houston, TX, the team endured a long road trip over the next 2 days, finally arriving in Alexandria, LA. For 12 days, they worked with the Louisiana Department of Social Services Office of Family Support in Alexandria and in more remote towns such as Ville Platte. Each day, the responders drove 2 hours to and from their assigned lodging, a Methodist church in Natchitoches, which served as a Red Cross shelter. All 10 slept in the same room. The remaining shelter space housed 80 evacuees.

The team spent the long working hours each day interviewing Louisiana citizens who had lost everything in the storm. Streamlined eligibility rules enabled them to disburse food benefits to people who had not previously participated in any public assistance program. During the deployment, they provided support to 21,478 families. The team members bonded with each other and with many of the storm victims they served.



The contribution of the 10-person Washington State team was replicated by 337 other public service personnel from 20 EMAC Member States that deployed to the Gulf region in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Fire and Hazardous Materials

Under EMAC, nearly 3,000 fire and hazardous material (HazMat) personnel from 28 Assisting States deployed to the Gulf region. In urban and suburban areas, the fire departments and emergency services organizations include specially equipped personnel trained in fire prevention, fire suppression, firefighting, and the handling of hazardous materials.



Under EMAC, nearly 3,000 fire and HazMat personnel from 28 Assisting States deployed to the Gulf region.

The circumstances in the area impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were especially challenging. The combination of electrical power outages, massive amounts of debris, and an almost infinite variety of hazardous materials, created an especially high probability of fire coupled with an equally high risk to responders. Flood waters and debris made response problematic as roadways were often blocked and signage was lost.

One example of EMAC assistance is the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) deployment in response to a Broadcast message seeking firefighters to reinforce and augment the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD). The initial contingent of 300 firefighters and an Incident Management Team (IMT) landed at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport aboard an aircraft donated by JetBlue Airways.

The NOFD and FDNY established a unified command that soon included task forces from Illinois, Maryland, and other States. Each day, the Operations section, composed of fire service officers from New Orleans, Maryland, Illinois, and New York, published an operations plan for the subsequent 24 hours. When NOFD dispatched an apparatus, the crew was filled out with FDNY members. Other firefighting contingents deployed under EMAC arrived with their own equipment and apparatus.



Following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the NOFD sent a brand new pumper to New York, which was christened the *Spirit of Louisiana* by the FDNY. The pumper returned to the NOFD as part of a FDNY relief convoy after Katrina. When the flooded historic Hotel St. Pierre in the French Quarter caught fire as a result of gas or electric failure, the first apparatus on the scene was the *Spirit of Louisiana*, manned by firefighters from both departments. As fate would have it, the hotel's address is 911 Burgundy Street. In matters of disaster response, circumstances often present opportunities for reciprocity.

Public Works and Engineering

Under EMAC, 61 public works personnel from 5 States and 200 engineers from 9 States deployed to the impacted area.

At the local level, public works applies to the most fundamental aspects of daily life, including water and environmental programs, transportation services, and building code compliance and structural safety. When a disaster strikes, the Public Works agency is charged with responsibilities such as debris removal, demolition of unsafe structures, temporary repair of essential facilities, building inspections to ascertain the status of structural safety, flood control, emergency sewage and solid waste disposal, and water and sewage facility restoration. It also helps provide traffic control by installing barricades and posting cautionary signs.

When this model is applied to the damage inflicted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the results are eminently overwhelming. Entire communities, including their supporting infrastructures, were washed away. A city of half million people was submerged under 20 feet of water. Road and railway bridges collapsed. Sewage and hazardous waste processing plants and treatment facilities were inundated and tainted the rising flood waters.



Entire communities, including their supporting infrastructures were washed away.



The American Water Works Association estimates that the cost to repair or replace the public drinking water infrastructure, including more than 925 separate water systems in the affected area, would exceed \$2 billion.

Public Works professionals and engineers deployed under EMAC joined in the effort to assess and restore basic services. Crews from supporting municipalities performed damage assessments and helped restore and repair utility systems in stricken communities throughout Louisiana and Mississippi.

For example, the citizens of Port Orange, FL, “adopted” Long Beach, MS, for purposes of assisting Long Beach in recovery efforts. Over the next several months, Port Orange, in conjunction with the Florida Local Government Coalition, dispatched 10 support teams under EMAC to augment the Long Beach Public Works staff. Each team was led by one or two city officials. Port Orange also delivered more than 500 Christmas gifts to Long Beach children who were particularly affected by the storm.

In the months since Katrina and Rita struck, the International County and City Managers Association (ICMA) began working on a plan to encourage member communities to organize Mobile Community Management Teams with expertise in all aspects of municipal management. Such teams could add a valuable dimension to EMAC response capabilities in future disasters.

Law Enforcement

Under the provisions of EMAC, more than 6,880 sheriff’s deputies and police officers from 35 States and countless local jurisdictions deployed across Louisiana and Mississippi; 35 percent of all civilian resources mobilized.

In response to disasters, law enforcement officers perform a broad range of public safety functions. These include responding to distress calls from local residents, safeguarding critical infrastructure, securing abandoned high-value properties, escorting other emergency responders, providing security at field work sites, guarding responder base camps, escorting high-level visiting dignitaries, preventing crime and apprehending criminals, patrolling streets and highways, and operating checkpoints to control access to and from restricted areas.

The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) lost its headquarters, most of its patrol cars, its communications capability, its command structure, and about 10 percent of its 1,500 officers, who were subsequently dismissed for deserting their posts. Looting in New Orleans began as desperate people took what they needed for their own survival and for family members (e.g., food, water, diapers, aspirin, soft drinks, and similar items). Soon, however, some individuals took advantage of the chaotic circumstances taking clothing, jewelry, microwave ovens, flat screen televisions, and similar items from stores. Sporting goods stores with guns and ammunition were targeted by those with more serious criminal intent, and lawlessness spread through some parts of the city (at one point evacuation operations were suspended after shots were fired at military helicopters transporting people from the Superdome to Houston’s Astrodome).



By Saturday, September 3, about 7,000 National Guard members were in New Orleans to support the NOPD, along with a growing number of police officers and sheriff's deputies from across the country and officers from Federal agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Biloxi and Gulfport, MS, experienced similar situations as looters ransacked stores, but authority was restored more quickly than in New Orleans.

Local law enforcement organizations throughout the region sought reinforcements under the provisions of EMAC primarily in the form of self-contained and self-sustaining task forces, with internal command and control, logistical, administrative, and support capabilities. Most were assigned discrete areas of operation to minimize ambiguity. When on patrol, many carried supplies of bottled water and food to disperse to local citizens. When not on duty, some contingents, such as the law enforcement component of the Indiana Task Force, helped their local counterparts clean up the debris in and around their own residences. They recognized that these local authorities could be more effective on the job if their personal circumstances were improved.



An armored vehicle rolls down Beale Street in downtown New Orleans days after Hurricane Katrina.

Animal Rescue

Under EMAC, 112 animal rescue personnel from 4 States deployed to the Gulf region.

The human trauma produced by Katrina rightfully commanded the world's attention and brought an unprecedented outpouring of help. One hundred (100) nations and 11 international organizations offered assistance in the first week after the storm struck. Less visible was the plight of animals left in the path of the storm. According to the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), 60 percent of U.S. households have pets, suggesting that as many as 250,000 pets were imperiled by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

At greatest risk were pets left at home by evacuees. In many cases, evacuees left pets with food and water in upper rooms of vacated residences, expecting to be gone only 2 or 3 days. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and HSUS received thousands of telephone calls from evacuees pleading for someone to rescue home-bound pets.



In many cases, evacuees left pets with food and water in vacated residences, expecting to be gone only 2 or 3 days.

Animal rescue workers from around the country streamed into the area of operations, bringing with them everything from pet food and medical supplies to fencing materials needed to temporarily expand shelter facilities. Initially prohibited from entering the flooded areas, animal rescue teams staged in the Florida Panhandle, in Texas on the west side of the impact area, and in safe areas in Louisiana and Mississippi. Eight shelters were set up in Louisiana, the three largest at the Parker Coliseum on the Louisiana State University Baton Rouge Campus, the Lamar Dixon Equine Center in Gonzales, and the Blackmon Coliseum in Lafayette.

As an example, North Carolina responded to an EMAC request for assistance from Mississippi, dispatching a State Animal Response Team (SART) to Hattiesburg, where it established an animal rescue command center. The North Carolina SART is a private not-for-profit organization that includes veterinarians and licensed veterinary technicians, public health veterinarians, an animal control officer, a sheltering officer, planning and logistics specialists, a fire captain, a cooperative extension agent, and a public information officer (PIO). The team was transported to Mississippi on a private jet donated by a North Carolina citizen. On site, it worked with other personnel from Florida, Georgia, New York, Pennsylvania, and California. The Hattiesburg facility ultimately sheltered some 1,500 animals. North Carolina is now working with Mississippi to establish a Mississippi Animal Response Team.





Emergency Management

More than 5,400 personnel from 38 States deployed to the Gulf Coast to help reestablish or reinforce local emergency operations. That is 27 percent of all civilian resources deployed under the provisions of EMAC.

Hurricane Katrina first caused the mandatory evacuation of low-lying Gulf Coast jurisdictions, then destroyed the infrastructure designed to manage such emergencies. Faced with serious emergency management resource deficiencies, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi looked to the only source of qualified support, their counterparts around the country. The Federal Government does not have access to resources trained and experienced in local jurisdiction emergency operations, therefore, the governors turned to EMAC.

As a result, virtually all of the affected State and local jurisdictions in Louisiana and Mississippi requested and received emergency management assistance under the provisions of EMAC. In each instance, local authorities retained both responsibility and control of response and recovery operations. EMAC augmentation provided badly needed manpower and functional expertise, replacing or relieving local staff members who were displaced by the storms or their consequences. In some cases, Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Support Teams deployed as a group to support a specific jurisdiction. In other instances, local authorities sought specific functional expertise, such as an operations chief, a logistician, a donation manager, or a public information specialist.



EOC Support Teams deployed as a group to support specific jurisdictions.

Because the National Incident Management System (NIMS) establishes a standard approach to emergency management at all levels of government, officials from the Requesting and Assisting States shared a common understanding of the fundamental emergency management structure. NIMS directs the formation of emergency management organizations around five basic functions—command, operations, plans, logistics, and finance/administration. The Federal Government requires that local public safety organizations implement NIMS as a prerequisite for receiving Federal grants. With NIMS in place, even jurisdictions that rely on part-time and volunteer emergency management staffing now share with every other local jurisdiction a common structural approach to emergency management.

The National Guard

On August 29–30, 2005, National Guard units from 10 States arrived in Louisiana and Mississippi, in what would become the largest major State-to-State National Guard deployment under EMAC. Thirty-seven (37) other States would follow suit in the succeeding days and weeks, bringing the total commitment of National Guard personnel deployed under EMAC to an unprecedented 46,503.



National Guard units brought more than manpower to the response effort. They brought badly needed communications, transportation, logistical support and supplies, and security to the impacted area. The National Guard also brought discipline, organizational integrity, and a practiced command and control structure that served well for both storm victims and other responders.

National Guard units engaged in virtually all aspects of response operations. They searched for, found, and rescued survivors. They delivered food, water, and other critical supplies to overcrowded emergency shelters. They established emergency communications links to isolated coastal areas decimated by the hurricane, patrolled vacated neighborhoods, and provided security for responders working at remote sites. In many cases, a camouflage-painted National Guard vehicle making its way along a flooded street was the first sign of institutional authority for stranded citizens.



In many cases, a camouflage-painted National Guard vehicle making its way along a flooded street was the first sign of institutional authority for stranded citizens.

By using EMAC to deploy the National Guard, States did not relinquish control of their National Guard units during the hurricane response mission. At the request of the National Guard Bureau Chief Lieutenant General Stephen Blum, DoD approved Federal funding on September 31 (retroactive to August 29) to use National Guard units to support relief efforts under Title 32. This extended military health benefits to Guard members and their families, even though the units had not been federalized. It also ensured Federal reimbursement to States for the cost of National Guard deployments.



The National Guard units were joined in the area of operations by additional active duty military personnel, bringing the total uniformed presence to more than 70,000, including units from the 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and the I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces. The USS *Bataan*, USS *Iwo Jima*, USS *Tortuga*, and USNS *Comfort* served as field hospitals afloat with nearly 1,300 beds.



The 1,000 bed hospital ship, USNS Comfort served as a field hospital afloat.

As mentioned previously, the following table (**Table 4**) summarizes the number of responders by skill category from each Assisting State.



Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

**Table 4. Summary of EMAC Responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
(Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, NCT, and RCT)**

STATE	Civilian Response by Discipline											TOTAL	National Guard Response	GRAND TOTAL	
	Not Categorized	Agriculture and Forestry	Emergency Management	Engineering	Fire/HazMat	Health/Medical/EMT/Ambulance	Human Services	Law Enforcement	Public Works	Search & Rescue	Transportation and Highways				Animal Resources
AK			1										1	7	8
AL			32		70	1		385		148			636	5,844	6,480
AR			9			224		213		7			453	1,070	1,523
AZ								215			30		245	403	648
CA			189	68	1	1	2	232			7		500	2,563	3,063
CO			61		25	22		70					178	400	578
CT													0	244	244
DC													0	496	496
DE			7		4		8						19	316	335
FL	5	6	3,420	46	208	144	38	1,301	10	640	48	72	5,938	530	6,468
GA	2		178		131	216		306		139	15		987	1,857	2,844
IA			9			30	10		14				63	202	265
ID			2				3	2					7	428	435
IL			26		917	77	75	416					1,511	1,390	2,901
IN	4			4		8		326					342	1,186	1,528
KS			176	10	78	8	37	279		4			592	639	1,231
KY	2		14		122	255	10	208		96			707	1,031	1,738
MA			2	11	10								23	596	619
MD			20		32		6	14	2				74	919	993
ME			22		10	27	7	29			1		96	65	161
MI			52		3	4	24	194					277	2,615	2,892
MN			8		64	103		236		20	2		433	129	562
MO			62		24	1	4	101		14		3	209	443	652
MS													0	4	4
MT			209										209	25	234
NC	20		54		9	177		61				12	333	982	1,315
ND			6			7		10					23	74	97
NE													0	289	289
NH													0	435	435
NJ		10	13		30	44		306		44			447	264	711
NM		6	10		11		5	112					144	464	608
NV			5		1	27		111					144	279	423
NY			27	22	701	340		357					1,447	207	1,654
OH			4	15	102	3	10	347					481	4,402	4,883
OK			7			1	41	16					65	233	298
OR			36		16						18		70	1,924	1,994
PA					31	192		67		8			298	2,571	2,869
PR													0	1,033	1,033
RI						16		5		40			61	193	254
SC			21			28		216		58			323	1,370	1,693
SD							5	5					10	269	279
TN	4		74		33	4		160	28	25			328	2,186	2,514
TX			42		45	100		160		88		25	460	2,533	2,993
UT			22				1	3					26	438	464
VA			271	10	123	15	5	396		10			830	1,316	2,146
VI													0	50	50
VT			2		2								4	105	109
WA	1		40	14			36		7				98	503	601
WI			14				10	10					34	428	462
WV			263		22			13		2			300	343	643
WY													0	210	210
		22	5,410	200	2,825	2,075	337	6,882	61	1,343	121	112	19,426	46,503	65,929

Section 3

EMAC Leadership, Coordination, and Advance Team Operations





SECTION 3

EMAC LEADERSHIP, COORDINATION, AND ADVANCE TEAM OPERATIONS



Introduction

Based on experience gained in developing the 2004 hurricane season response assessment, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Executive Task Force (ETF) Chair scheduled two facilitated breakout forums to engage the primary constituents who participated in the EMAC response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Sixty (60) participants were invited to attend the first session, which was conducted on January 24–25, 2006, in Lexington, KY. The participants represented four organizational entities, as follows:

- **National Coordination Group (NCG).** The NCG provides overall coordination and direction during EMAC operations and resolves any policy or procedural disputes that may arise. Among its responsibilities is the dissemination of critical information to Member States using the EMAC Broadcast system and recruiting qualified personnel to serve as EMAC Advance Team (A-Team) members in the Requesting States.
- **National Coordinating Team (NCT).** The NCT deploys to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) when requested by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It serves as the principle point of interface between EMAC and the community of Federal agencies represented in the NRCC. It also provides information on the status of EMAC operations for regular briefings to the President and other national leaders.



- **Regional Coordinating Team (RCT).** The RCT performs duties similar to the NCT when asked to deploy to a FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC).
- **Advance Team.** The A-Team deploys at the direction of the NCG in response to a Request for Assistance (REQ-A) from a Member State at risk. The A-Team works at the Requesting State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) reviewing and assisting in the preparation of REQ-A Forms. It then coordinates with Member States offering resources in response to a REQ-A and negotiates the final agreement, which is signed by the Requesting and Assisting States' Authorized Representatives.

The January forum included five breakout groups. One breakout group consisted of personnel who served at the NCG, the NCT, and the RCT. The other four breakout groups included personnel who served as A-Team members in Louisiana and Mississippi.

This section presents the results of the January session. It is organized under five categories of information—Operations, Command and Control, Logistics, Finance, and Resource Management. Each category includes areas that were especially successful and issues for improvement. Each area includes a list of positive accomplishments and issues for improvement along with associated recommendations.

- **Category 1 – Operations.** This category includes all issues related to the mechanics of identifying, requesting, mobilizing, deploying, redeploying, and demobilizing resources under the provisions of EMAC.
- **Category 2 – Command and Control.** Issues dealing with span of control, levels of activation, and coordination with external entities, including Government agencies and charitable or humanitarian organizations, are addressed under this category.
- **Category 3 – Logistics.** Issues related to accountability, resource tracking, reconciling EMAC transactions, and support for deployed resources are included under this category.
- **Category 4 – Finance.** This category addresses all matters dealing with financial aspects of resource deployment under EMAC, including cost estimating, reimbursement provisions, supplemental agreements, and costs allocated to other programs.
- **Category 5 – Resource Management.** All aspects of communicating information about and describing resources, including the subjects of resource typing, credentialing, and qualifications validation, are addressed under this category.

Lessons Learned

Category 1 – Operations

The contractual details and legal aspects of obtaining or providing EMAC assistance are explicitly incorporated in the terms of the Compact. The fact that the State legislatures ratify the Compact as a condition of membership ensures the requisite speed for completing an EMAC transaction. There is, however, a physical process that involves many steps from the identification of a requirement for resources until the mission is completed and the resources are demobilized. To the degree that this process can be improved or made more efficient, EMAC operations are enhanced.



Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- The REQ-A Form works well. It is simple and easy to use. When properly executed, it facilitated the process of delivering resources quickly.
- The timely declarations of a state of emergency by the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi enabled deployment of A-Team personnel and other resources before Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast.
- The availability of the EMAC leadership and support from the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) staff was outstanding. The NCG aggressively recruited personnel to serve on A-Teams and urged the Requesting States to use EMAC assistance. The EMAC Coordinator supported A-Team operations proactively, expediting the flow of communications among all parties.
- Personnel selected for A-Team duties were well qualified and possessed a broad base of useful operational skills.
- The transition between outgoing and incoming A-Team members went smoothly, ensuring continuity of operations.
- The EMAC Broadcast system worked well and became even better over time as the EMAC Coordinator implemented improvements recommended by A-Team members and officials from the Requesting States.

Issues for Improvement

3-1 – A-Team Composition. The two-person EMAC A-Team is not sufficiently robust for catastrophic disasters or large-scale Level 1 operations. The EMAC Operations Manual specifies the responsibilities of the A-Team, but does not prescribe its composition. Member States are required to maintain an A-Team familiar with State emergency operations and with EMAC procedures that can deploy within 24 hours for a minimum of 7 days. The Operations Manual further specifies that an A-Team normally consists of two persons. This provides for rapid expansion of the A-Team during operations by deploying successive two-person teams. During Katrina, the A-Teams grew to as many as 12 members. However, the current approach does not ensure that sufficient personnel with appropriate skills are available in the early critical hours. An A-Team should possess some degree of competence in operations, administration, logistics, and the financial implications of EMAC.

Recommendation

The EMAC Operations Subcommittee should consider defining the composition of an A-Team for large-scale Level 1 disasters consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) resource typing schemes.

3-2 – A-Team Training. Potential members are not trained in A-Team operations. There is no training course taught at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/FEMA's Emergency Management Institute (EMI) or elsewhere that is specifically designed for potential A-Team members. EMI, in cooperation with NEMA, has developed an A-Team Field Course, which it supports by offering two train-the-trainer courses each year. Member States are encouraged to



use experienced A-Team personnel to train others for future deployment and on-the-job training under an experienced supervisor during EMAC operations. With the growing recognition of and anticipated increased reliance on EMAC, personnel should be prequalified for A-Team duty.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should send qualified State and local instructors to the EMAC A-Team train-the-trainer courses at EMI in order to maintain an instructional cadre.
- b. Member States should regularly schedule and conduct the A-Team Field Course.

3-3 – A-Team Certification. There are no assurances that deploying A-Team members are qualified to perform the duties expected of them. The A-Team leader must assess the capabilities of each arriving A-Team member to determine how best to employ his or her skills. This is not a problem with individuals who have previous A-Team experience, but inexperienced personnel can present a management challenge that can be detrimental to efficient operations during the crucial early response period.

Recommendation

The EMAC Operations Subcommittee should explore the feasibility of testing and certification for A-Team members.

3-4 – A-Team Checklists and Job Aids. Each A-Team creates its own ad hoc checklists for important recurring activities, such as the transition between outgoing members and their replacements, and for specific functional responsibilities, such as logistics. All EMAC A-Teams should have access to standard checklists and job aids to ensure consistent operations from one deployment to the next. Such devices are helpful guides that can be adapted to the particular circumstances confronting an A-Team and provide a valuable and consistent starting point for EMAC operations.

Recommendation

Evaluate the family of checklists that have been developed in the field and create a standard set for A-Team operations.

3-5 – Electronic Request for Assistance. Because of the requirement for repeated facsimile (fax) transmissions, the current REQ-A Form becomes increasingly illegible over time. An electronic REQ-A Form with drop-down boxes would ensure that all required information is included, improve standardization, and make the REQ-A process more efficient. It would require the use of electronic signatures for Authorized Representatives of the Requesting and Assisting States or a change in the current policies regarding those signatures. For example, many of the faxes would be unnecessary if the signature of the person accepting contractual responsibility on the part of the Requesting State (Part III of the REQ-A Form) was the only one needed in its original form.

Recommendation

- a. Expedite development and testing of an electronic version of the REQ-A Form.
- b. Survey Member States to determine the feasibility of using electronic signatures.



3-6 – Integration of EMAC System Components. The EMAC database, Broadcast system, and REQ-A Form require excessive and duplicative data entry, presenting unnecessary opportunities for error. When fully integrated and with an electronic version of the REQ-A Form, information can be captured once and distributed automatically to all appropriate components. Drop-down boxes could guide completion of the REQ-A Form and standard information, such as the names and addresses of authorized Member State personnel, could populate the REQ-A Form automatically. Full integration will enable all authorized personnel to track, in real time, the status of every EMAC resource request from initiation through demobilization and reimbursement.

Recommendation

The EMAC Coordinator should proceed aggressively with the effort already under way to implement a fully integrated electronic EMAC support system.

3-7 – Resource Request Feedback. A Requesting State currently has no way of knowing the status of an open resource request. There is no provision for an interim response indicating which States are considering and might be able to fill all or part of the request. Additionally, Member States are not notified when a request is filled so that they can discontinue their own efforts related to that request. The EMAC Broadcast system does display requests in progress or indicate those that have been completed.

Recommendation

- a. Institute a feedback requirement whereby a Member State informs the Requesting State if it is considering an open resource request.
- b. Automatically inform all Member States when a resource request is filled and identify the designated Assisting State(s).

3-8 – Education and Training. Beyond the immediate EMAC community, there is little understanding of EMAC and how it works. Most of the people who deployed under EMAC in response to Hurricane Katrina had little or no knowledge of EMAC. This was particularly true among the various skill disciplines whose members were in great demand, such as health professionals, law enforcement officers, firefighters, search and rescue teams, building inspectors, and the like. A-Team members and personnel assigned to the NCTs and RCTs spent much of their time briefing others or answering questions about EMAC. While senior officials at the National Guard Bureau and Member State Adjutants General understood the advantages of deploying under EMAC, commanders in the field were unaware of its provisions.

Recommendation

Implement an aggressive and continuing EMAC education program at all levels of government and extend it to relevant professional associations and humanitarian organizations.

3-9 – Member State Contact Information. Identifying the proper official in a particular Member State or obtaining a timely response to inquiries after duty hours was sometimes difficult. The list of Authorized Representatives of the governors of Member States is no longer printed in the Operations Manual. It is now maintained online at the EMAC Web site and is much easier to keep current. Still, some of the information was not current when Katrina struck. Additionally, some States do not have a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (24/7) point of contact (POC) and, for those that do, many are unaware of EMAC. Some States use a contract answering service at



night and on weekends. Disasters don't have duty hours. The current system is not sufficiently responsive unless special arrangements are made in advance.

Recommendation

- a. Continue to remind Member States of their responsibility to regularly update contact information on the EMAC Web site.
- b. Add to the Operations Manual a requirement for Member States to ensure that after-duty hours POCs are familiar with EMAC and have explicit instructions to get messages to an appropriate official in a timely manner.

Category 2 – Command and Control

EMAC exists to expedite the movement of critical resources among Member States in response to a natural or technological disaster. It has no resources of its own. Without a traditional organizational structure, EMAC's success depends on the interaction and cooperation of the various participating entities.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- Daily EMAC conference calls were very helpful and kept the participants up-to-date on the operational circumstances and status of resource deployments. Calls should be recorded for subsequent dial-up access and transcripts should be distributed via the EMAC Broadcast system unless they contain sensitive information.
- A-Team participation in morning operational briefings helped ensure EMAC situational awareness among State authorities and agencies.
- Cross-training A-Team members to perform the functions of multiple A-Team positions proved very helpful.
- Early deployment allowed the A-Team to integrate into EOC operations and, in the case of Mississippi, to pre-position significant critical resources before landfall.
- Planning for adequate overlap between incoming and outgoing A-Team members ensured continuity of operations.
- The EMAC NCT was well received at the NRCC and interacted well with other agency representatives. FEMA routinely channeled State-level issues to the NCT for resolution.
- The National Guard Bureau provided excellent support to the EMAC NCT.

Issues for Improvement

3-10 – NCT and RCT Operations. The NCT and RCT had difficulty on occasion keeping other organizations apprised of the status of EMAC deployment. There are no established procedures for sharing deployment information with EMAC personnel assigned to the NCT and RCT. It is likely that an EMAC Level 1 operation will require activating the NCT. During Katrina, only one person was initially deployed to the NRCC. That proved inadequate.



Recommendation

- a. Ensure the NCT and RCT have access to the EMAC Broadcast system and, eventually, to a more robust complement of electronic management tools, including the REQ-A Form. They can then monitor operations and represent EMAC accurately to other organizations without increasing the A-Team's burden.
- b. Consider establishing minimal staffing requirements for the NCT to accommodate the demands of an intense daytime duty shift and a continued after-hours presence.

3-11 – NCT and RCT Roles and Responsibilities. There is insufficient clarity in the Operations Manual regarding the roles and responsibilities of NCT and RCT members. The NCT role at the NRCC evolved quickly into that of a substantial participant, regularly providing input into briefings for the President and other senior Government leaders. Additionally, the NCT served as a critical EMAC POC for Federal agencies and other external partners. FEMA did not request an RCT presence at the RRCC during Hurricane Katrina. When Rita struck, an RCT was requested and activated.

Recommendation

- a. Based on experience gained during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, clarify the roles and responsibilities of the NCT and incorporate this information into the Operations Manual and on the EMAC Web site.
- b. Prepare checklists and job aids for the NCT/RCT.
- c. Evaluate the continuing need for the RCT.

3-12 – Initial A-Team Operations. The intensity of initial operations placed an inordinate workload on the small A-Team staff that deployed before landfall. After four or five consecutive 20-hour days, A-Team leaders reported a significant increase in errors attributed to fatigue. Clearly, the requirements of standing up an EMAC operation in response to a catastrophic or large-scale Level 1 disaster places special burdens on the first deployed A-Team. It should have sufficient staff members with an appropriate array of skills to withstand the early intensity and to establish the basis for continuing operations. Backfill should be preplanned and dispatched as soon as the EMAC process is up and running.

Recommendation

- a. Develop a rapid response A-Team with sufficient members to withstand the intensity of functioning under the most demanding operating conditions. It should have strong, experienced leadership and include members well versed in administration, resource management, and logistics.
- b. Establish an initial backfill A-Team with instructions requiring deployment within the first week, upon direction of the first deployed A-Team.

3-13 – Field Communications. Virtually all ground-based communications systems were destroyed by the storm and directional satellite antennas were knocked out of alignment. Any remaining cellular capabilities were swamped with traffic, leaving it often impossible to communicate with deployed resources. The EMAC Operations Manual specifies only that a Requesting State provide two computers with Internet access for electronic mail (e-mail) and two telephone lines for the A-Team.



Recommendation

- a. Revise the Operations Manual specifying the requirement for “survivable” communications or recommending that A-Teams deploy with satellite telephones.
- b. Consider other alternative communications such as the Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP).
- c. Ensure that a deploying A-Team has access to a Government Emergency Telephone System (GETS) card for priority landline network access and to the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) for priority cellular network access.

3-14 – National Guard Deployments. There was substantial misunderstanding regarding National Guard units deploying under EMAC. Some Member States refused to sign the REQ-A Form if it specified a Title 32 deployment. It was also difficult for the A-Team to obtain detailed information regarding National Guard deployments. The deploying National Guard units sometimes considered EMAC a mere formality useful to initiate deployment, but otherwise inconsequential.

Recommendation

- a. Develop, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, an educational presentation that explains Title 32 within the context of an EMAC deployment and also explains the implications of EMAC for deployed National Guard units.
- b. Incorporate into the EMAC Operations Manual guidance regarding National Guard deployments.
- c. When significant National Guard involvement is anticipated, the Requesting State should provide a National Guard liaison to the EMAC A-Team.

3-15 – National Guard and NCT Interaction. Inconsistent availability of experienced National Guard staff impaired initial interaction between the EMAC NCT and the National Guard Bureau. The liaison personnel first assigned to the NCT by the National Guard Bureau were junior officers. They lacked the experience and seniority to act independently and were sometimes unavailable because of other duties.

Recommendation

Coordinate with DHS/FEMA and the National Guard Bureau to ensure that a sufficiently senior National Guard officer is assigned full time as liaison to the NCT at the NRCC.

3-16 – Federal Agencies and Other Partners. Problems frequently arose because EMAC’s Federal and private sector partners failed to understand the purpose and operational parameters of EMAC. Some Federal agencies continue to believe that EMAC is part of a hierarchical arrangement of relief support that must be exhausted before Federal assistance is available. Many simply have unrealistic expectations, believing that any resource can be obtained through EMAC without further restriction. Some private organizations with charitable or humanitarian missions assume that EMAC is accessible to any organization engaged in relief efforts.



Recommendation

- a. Prepare and implement a comprehensive education and public awareness campaign.
- b. Improve coordination between the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and EMAC.
- c. Recommend including a description of EMAC in the National Response Plan (NRP).
- d. Establish a cooperative relationship with law enforcement, firefighter, emergency healthcare, and other professional associations whose members traditionally engage in relief operations.
- e. Regularly present in public forums information regarding the nature of EMAC and the conduct of EMAC operations.
- f. Prepare a brief handout explaining EMAC in concise, simple terminology that can be distributed before and during an emergency.

3-17 – Self-Dispatched Resources. Individuals who deployed to the areas of operation without official status inadvertently caused confusion regarding EMAC. Volunteers who possessed badly needed skills provided helpful services to the Requesting States. However, in some cases, volunteers later sought EMAC reimbursement.

Recommendation

- a. Provide EMAC educational materials to professional associations whose members regularly engage in response and recovery missions and to local authorities who use their services.
- b. Emphasize the need for valid REQ-A documentation to qualify for EMAC reimbursement.

3-18 – EMAC Information Control. Unauthorized changes were made to deployment information in the EMAC database. On occasion, demobilized A-Team members who had returned to their home State accessed the EMAC database and made changes to data regarding operations during deployment. This lapse in information control jeopardizes the credibility of the database, which is crucial for current and future operations. The EMAC Coordinator should be the sole “gatekeeper” to the database and should control access through passwords and other appropriate security measures.

Recommendation

Prohibit database access without specific authority granted by the EMAC Coordinator.

3-19 – Deploying Teams Versus Individuals. Individual EMAC resources deployed to the areas of operation were more difficult to track than those deployed as teams. The A-Team can not reasonably keep track of hundreds of widely dispersed individuals. In contrast, when resources were organized and deployed as teams, tracking was easier.

Recommendation

EMAC resources should be requested and deployed in team configuration whenever possible.



3-20 – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). During operations, deployed personnel at all levels and locations are often confronted repeatedly with the same basic questions about EMAC. This was time consuming and burdensome.

Recommendation

Publish FAQs on the EMAC Web site.

Category 3 – Logistics

The operational effectiveness of deployed resources depends in large measure on the support available during relief efforts. They must have adequate work and living conditions appropriate for the severity of the circumstances in the area of operations. Administrative practices must be instituted to track and account for resources operating in the field. Activities must be sufficiently documented and reconciled for subsequent reimbursement.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- Support provided to the A-Team by Louisiana and Mississippi was outstanding.
- A color-coded portfolio style filing system used by the A-Team in Louisiana worked very well. All documents related to a specific mission were organized according to the Assisting State, requesting department, and Emergency Support Function (ESF). The information was summarized on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for quick reference.
- The EMAC database and Broadcast system proved to be valuable tools, especially as real-time improvements were implemented.
- Most arriving personnel were adequately prepared for the severe austerity in the areas of operation.
- In the absence of fixed structures and supporting infrastructure, the use of base camps to provide rudimentary living quarters for deployed personnel worked well.

Issues for Improvement

3-21 – Catastrophic Event Logistics. Logistical requirements associated with catastrophic events are not just larger than other situations, they are also different. The destruction of physical structures and infrastructure requires special expertise in setting up base camps with trailers or tents and providing administrative and logistical support for the base camps themselves. Supplies often must be shipped to staging areas for subsequent delivery to the areas of operation.

Recommendation

Member States should:

- a. Develop scenarios to analyze the special requirements of catastrophic events.
- b. Identify sources of expertise in base camp organizations and operations.
- c. Preplan staging areas for deploying resources in safe havens near high-risk locations.



3-22 – A-Team Work Space. With the intensity of EMAC operations during a catastrophic or large-scale Level 1 operation, the A-Team cannot function satisfactorily solely from an open work area in the Requesting State EOC. The EMAC Operations Manual asks that each Member State provide floor space for a two-person A-Team cell, along with two workstations and telephones, and access to a good quality fax machine that is adequate for high-intensity operations. Workspace in the primary operating area is important for coordination and communications purposes, but does not provide an adequate setting for the administration of EMAC operations. Louisiana was able to expand the EMAC EOC work area and also provide additional office space for “backroom” work. This proved very helpful.

Recommendation

Reconsider the Member State A-Team responsibilities as currently described in the Operations Manual and modify them to meet more realistically the demands of a large-scale Level 1 EMAC operation.

3-23 – A-Team Administration. Each deployed A-Team must create a system to manage its own operating practices. The process by which resources are requested and obtained is embedded with opportunities for delays and errors. It requires continuous tracking throughout the conduct of each mission. There are no standard procedures for filing resource requests and the various related documents so that every item related to a specific mission is readily available.

Recommendation

Evaluate the filing system implemented by the A-Team located in Louisiana and cited under *Positive Accomplishments* on the previous page. It may serve as a best practices model for an EMAC A-Team standard administrative procedure.

3-24 – Resource Requirement Tracking. It is difficult to track resource requests because of multiple tracking numbers used by different entities. For example, the tracking number used in the EMAC Broadcast system is different than the mission number designated on the REQ-A Form. Additionally, Member States often assign an internal tracking number to manage resource requests. If there were a standard EMAC tracking number, it could serve as a common reference throughout the EMAC community. Member States could also adopt it or continue using an internal numbering system should they choose.

Recommendation

In coordination with the Member States, establish a common alphanumeric tracking system for all EMAC inter-State mutual-aid requests.

3-25 – Synchronized Resource Tracking. Many Member States use spreadsheets to track resources internally that are not synchronized with those used by EMAC. This requires manually aligning resource information in order to complete a deployment record.

Recommendation

Coordinate with Member States to ensure that spreadsheets used internally to track deploying resources dovetail with EMAC tracking systems.



3-26 – Enforce EMAC Deployment Provisions. Deployed personnel and other officials within the areas of operation did not always follow EMAC procedures. In some instances, REQ-A assignments were changed without amending the REQ-A Form. In other cases, deployed personnel made their own arrangement for replacements from their home State. Such actions should only be taken with the knowledge and concurrence of the A-Team.

Recommendation

- a. Remind Member States of responsibilities pertaining to deployed resources and the potential risk of not qualifying for reimbursement if operating outside the provisions of a valid REQ-A.
- b. Revise or augment procedural guides and checklists for deployed resources in the field.

3-27 – Resource Accountability. It was impossible in an operation the size of the Katrina response for an A-Team to account for all of the deployed resources dispersed over 90,000 square miles. Even with the National Guard accounting for its own personnel, nearly 20,000 other resources deployed under EMAC. Accountability was also compromised because of the presence of persons who self-deployed to the affected areas without authorization or approval. These individual volunteers, while well meaning, would function more effectively within an established structure. EMAC accountability provisions did not envision an effort of this scope and magnitude. The A-Team was notified when resources left their home State and when they arrived at their destination. From that point, resources operated largely outside the A-Team's oversight capacity. In such circumstances, accountability must be a shared responsibility. The Assisting State is responsible for monitoring the situation and providing appropriate help to deployed personnel, if needed. The Requesting State is responsible for supporting the deployed resources as specified in the REQ-A. Ultimately, the official who asked for the resources and originated the REQ-A must accept responsibility for their welfare while engaged in the operating area.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC ETF should review the accountability requirements for deployed resources and consider a scalable approach that will accommodate major response efforts.
- b. Consider changing the designated POC on the REQ-A Form to specify "Responsible Official" so that the function of responsibility is explicit.
- c. Evaluate the prospect of implementing electronic check-in and check-out procedures on the EMAC Web site for deploying resources.

3-28 – Reliance on Facsimile Devices. Excessive reliance on fax transmissions proved to be a limiting factor. It was often difficult to connect because, in many locations, computers share the same transmission line as the fax machine. Additionally, the print quality of the document deteriorates with repeated transmissions.

Recommendation

Continue to enhance automated communications such as the EMAC Operations System and explore other avenues to reduce reliance on faxing, such as the use of electronic signatures.



Category 4 – Finance

EMAC is based on the fact that the State requesting help has agreed in advance to reimburse the State offering resources for the legitimate cost of the assistance. Agreement between the parties is negotiated as part of the REQ-A process. The basis for the agreement is a cost estimate calculated by the Assisting State using situational information provided by the Requesting State.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- Requesting States were flexible in amending the REQ-A Form based on operational changes, such as extending the duration of deployment and increasing the required work hours.
- The EMAC Broadcast system was very helpful in transmitting information required to obtain reimbursement.

Issues for Improvement

3-29 – Cost Estimating. Cost estimates contained on the REQ-A Form are inconsistent and often vary significantly from actual deployment costs. Estimating costs is not a precise science and there is no single methodology practiced by EMAC Member States. When operational circumstances increase the actual costs, the REQ-A Form is not always revised, nor is the Requesting State notified of the change.

Recommendation

- a. Identify best cost estimating practices among the Member States.
- b. Add more cost estimate detail to the REQ-A Form to ensure that all relevant costs are identified.
- c. Use the increasingly robust EMAC database with actual historic cost information to develop a cost estimating guide for frequently requested resources.
- d. Remind Member States that the REQ-A Form is a contractual arrangement requiring reimbursement for eligible mission costs. It must be amended when cost increases or other changes occur.

3-30 – National Guard Cost Estimates. REQ-A Forms associated with National Guard resources deploying under the provisions of Title 32 often did not contain cost estimates. Title 32 provides for Federal reimbursement for National Guard deployment and REQ-A originators presumed that such data was therefore unnecessary.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should determine if National Guard cost estimates are essential when reimbursement will not be sought from the Requesting State.



3-31 – Definition of Reimbursable Costs. Member States are not fully aware of which costs are reimbursable under EMAC and which are not. Some Member States mistakenly equate EMAC and FEMA allowable costs. The language in the Operations Manual is intentionally general and lends itself to misinterpretation.

Recommendation

- a. Consider adding more detailed instructions to the Operations Manual and to Reimbursement Form 1 (R-1) and Reimbursement Form 2 (R-2).
- b. Encourage Member States to inform State agencies, political subdivisions, other emergency response organizations, and private sector partners regarding allowable EMAC costs.
- c. Develop checklists specifying allowable costs and specifying the required reimbursement documentation.

3-32 – Unallowable Administrative Costs. The administrative costs associated with identifying and deploying resources are not reimbursable. For example, Washington State activated a small A-Team to administer EMAC requests for assistance. Those costs are not reimbursable.

Recommendation

- a. The NEMA EMAC Committee should consider whether certain costs currently born by the Assisting States might be reimbursable.
- b. The generosity of Member States that donate administrative and other services in support of EMAC operations should be publicly acknowledged.

3-33 – Reimbursement Process Compliance. Some Assisting States did not comply with reimbursement process guidance contained in the EMAC Operations Manual. The process recommends that the Assisting States first reimburse the providing agencies or local governments for eligible resource deployment costs. The providing entities obtain reimbursement by filing an EMAC R-2 Form with the Assisting State. After all providing entities are reimbursed, the Assisting State submits EMAC R-1 Form to the Requesting State. The R-2 Forms are attached to the R-1 Form as evidence that the providing entities have been reimbursed. Some Assisting States did not include all of the reimbursement documentation with the R-1 Form submission.

Recommendation

Reinforce the requirement to provide supporting documentation when seeking reimbursement from Requesting States for EMAC mission costs.

3-34 – “Single Check” Reimbursement Policy. The EMAC “single check” reimbursement policy presents a burden to some Assisting States. The EMAC Operations Manual specifies that the Requesting State will reimburse an Assisting State with a single lump sum payment within 30 days after receipt of the R-1 Form. In the case of a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina, this requirement could be impractical.



Recommendation

The EMAC Operations Subcommittee should consider alternative policies when extended missions produce inordinate reimbursement delays.

Category 5 – Resource Management

In brokering resource requirements between the Requesting and Assisting States, it is essential that all parties share a common understanding of the mission and of the nature and qualifications of the required resources. Otherwise, the deployed resources will not meet mission requirements.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- Because the offering State coordinated directly with the designated REQ-A POC, the Requesting States generally received the specific resources needed.
- Louisiana State University (LSU) Health Science Center verified the licenses and qualifications of deploying health professionals.
- Law enforcement officers, whose police powers remain in effect under EMAC, were also sworn as Louisiana officers, ensuring there would be no question regarding their legitimate authority.

Issues for Improvement

3-35 – Resource Typing. The absence of generally accepted typing terminology slowed the process of filling resource requests. Following the 2004 hurricane season, resource typing was a high-priority action item. The 2004 After-Action Report recommended that EMAC leadership examine and embrace one of the existing resource typing systems, including the continuing work of the NIMS Integration Center (NIC). That challenge still remains. The facilitator of one of the January 2006 work group sessions illustrated the problem by asking participants from four different States how many persons were assigned to that State's Type 1 Incident Management Team (IMT). He received four different answers, ranging from 36 to 82 persons.

Recommendation

- a. Develop or adopt a typing scheme for the resources most frequently requested under EMAC.
- b. Continue efforts to adopt an acceptable resource typing methodology.

3-36 – Defining the A-Team. The composition of the A-Team to operate in different circumstances or operating levels is not currently specified in the NIC resource typing directory or in the EMAC Operations Manual. The previous EMAC A-Team definition in the NIC directory was incorrect, and EMAC asked that it be deleted. It is clear that a large-scale disaster with widespread or catastrophic damage requires a more robust and substantially larger A-Team than a smaller event, which might still qualify as a Level 1 EMAC event (see **Issue 3-12**).



Recommendation

- a. The EMAC ETF should develop different A-Team structures to meet the requirements of operating at different levels of intensity.
- b. New A-Team definitions should be included in the NIC resource directory.

3-37 – Qualifications Verification. There is no national system to validate or verify professional credentials. Member States must devise methods to verify the licensing or certification qualifications of deploying resources.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF, along with relevant professional associations and licensing authorities, should explore the possibility of establishing a centralized verification process.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Section 4

EMAC Administration and Management





SECTION 4

EMAC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

Introduction

The second facilitated breakout session was conducted in Atlanta, GA, on March 28–29, 2006. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Operations Subcommittee Chair invited 150 persons to participate in this session. Among the participants were officials from the two Requesting States, Louisiana and Mississippi, and officials who helped administer the EMAC resource request process in many of the 48 Assisting States. This particular constituency is critical to timely, efficient, and well-managed EMAC operations. These individuals bring a unique perspective to the assessment process because they are engaged in every administrative aspect from mobilization through reimbursement.

Additionally, officials from Federal agencies that interacted with EMAC as well as representatives from relevant outside parties, such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the International County and City Managers Association, attended the proceedings as observers and were invited to share insights from their membership.

2005 Requesting States

Katrina

In response to Hurricane Katrina, five EMAC Member States—Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas—requested assistance under the Compact. The bulk of this assistance was requested by and deployed to Mississippi and Louisiana. A detailed account of this assistance is included in **Annex C** of this report. In response to Hurricane Rita, all but Alabama issued requests for assistance. Again, the majority of resources were deployed to Mississippi and Louisiana.

Katrina – Florida

Having suffered four back-to-back hurricanes in the previous year, Florida was prepared for, and the public was braced for, an active 2005 hurricane season. In June, Florida weathered the effects of Hurricane Dennis. This gave State and local officials the opportunity to energize and “shake down” their response systems. Thus, in late August, as Hurricane Katrina approached the United States, Florida was fully prepared for the second major hurricane of the 2005 season.

In advance of Katrina’s landfall, the State’s response system was put into high gear. Expecting that inter-State mutual aid would be necessary, on August 24, the State’s Mutual Aid Branch was activated and an EMAC event log was opened. Two mission requests were issued: one for a two-person Advance Team (A-Team) to supplement the State mutual-aid staff and one for a logistics planner, both to be staged at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tallahassee after landfall.

On August 25, 2005, at 6:30 p.m. EDT, Hurricane Katrina came ashore between North Miami Beach and Hallandale Beach. By this time, the storm was classified as a minimal Category 1



hurricane, making it unlikely that serious wind damage would occur. By Friday morning, a downgraded Katrina had passed over the southern tip of Florida as a tropical storm.

Although it left 14 dead and more than a million people without power, Katrina did not unduly strain Florida's response system.

Katrina – The Gulf Coast

By midday Friday, attention shifted to the Gulf Coast. Katrina was moving north and gaining strength. The National Hurricane Center revised the projected storm track identifying the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts as the most likely location for landfall. Given this forecast, and the growing intensity of the storm, the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas all declared emergencies under State law to set the stage for EMAC and other assistance.

Both Mississippi and Louisiana subsequently requested the EMAC National Coordination Group (NCG) arrange for EMAC A-Team personnel to be deployed to their State EOCs before landfall, knowing full well that inter-State assistance would become necessary. Alabama and Texas, on the other hand, were on the fringes of the predicted storm track and would rely on State personnel trained in A-Team operations to manage EMAC affairs in their respective States. In the end, Florida and Texas would not be recipients of assistance; instead, they would undertake one of the largest State-to-State mutual-aid efforts [to Mississippi and Louisiana] that the Nation has ever seen.

Rita – Florida and the Gulf Coast

Still reeling from the affects of Katrina less than a month earlier, Florida and the Gulf Coast had to prepare for a new storm, Rita, which became a tropical storm on September 18. Although slow to develop, the storm gradually gained strength as it skirted Florida and entered the Gulf. By September 21, it was a strong Category 5 hurricane.

In advance of landfall, evacuations were ordered for areas along the Texas coast and in coastal Louisiana parishes. In addition, Texas emergency management personnel deployed to assist with the Louisiana recovery from Katrina, were recalled to attend to anticipated needs back home. Both States had sufficient capability to manage EMAC operations—Texas with its own State officials trained in EMAC A-Team operations and Louisiana with what was, by then, an eight-person A-Team.

On September 24, 2005, Rita made landfall near the Texas/Louisiana border greatly increasing the need for assistance including inter-State mutual aid.

2005 Assisting States

The response to requests for assistance from Mississippi and Louisiana was immediate and unprecedented. Forty-eight (48) States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands deployed resources to the stricken area. The personnel deployed under EMAC came from cities, towns, and counties in every corner of the country. For example, one 213-person Indiana Task Force deployed to Mississippi with personnel from 9 sheriff's departments, 14 police departments, 5 fire departments, 10 county health departments, 8 hospitals, and 3 mental health centers. The total contingent represented 50 different local Indiana jurisdictions. This truly illustrates the neighbor-to-neighbor nature of EMAC mutual aid.



Findings

The March facilitated breakout forum included nine breakout groups. Four of them had participants who actually engaged in field operations delivering services to storm victims. The results from those sessions are included in **Section 5** of this report. This section presents the perspective of participants in the other five breakout sessions—one was composed of officials from the Requesting States, two included representatives from 31 of the Assisting States, one included members involved in incident management, and the last engaged representatives from Federal agencies that interacted with EMAC.

The perspective of these respondents is different than that reported in **Section 3**, which reflects the views of those who led the EMAC response and coordinated EMAC activities at the regional and national levels. Therefore, the categories under which information is organized in this section are somewhat different. The format, however, remains the same. Within each category, those areas that worked particularly well are listed, followed by a discussion of issues for improvement and related recommendations.

- **Category 1 – Executing Deployment** contains material dealing with all aspects of initiating EMAC support, including the process for requesting assistance and for receiving and fulfilling those requests, alert and notification actions, information exchange, preparing and delivering the requested resources, and similar topics.
- **Category 2 – Mobilization and Demobilization** addresses the process of activating resources in preparation for an EMAC mission and deactivation when the mission is completed, including cost tracking, financial management, and reimbursement.
- **Category 3 – Logistics** includes all aspects of ensuring adequate support to deployed personnel, including equipment, transportation, food, lodging, and providing for their safety throughout the deployment.
- **Category 4 – Field Operations** contains information about the actual conduct of response and recovery operations in the stricken area, including information management and personnel accountability.
- **Category 5 – Coordination and Control** considers such matters as span of control, operational control, and administrative management. It also includes the transition between incumbent and replacement personnel as well as coordination with assisting and cooperating partners, agencies, and jurisdictions.

Lessons Learned

Category 1 – Executing Deployment

It is one thing to plan on asking for or sending help when a disaster strikes. It is quite another thing to actually be able to implement such a plan under emergency conditions. This category considers all aspects of the deployment process, from identifying the requirement to finding, mobilizing, deploying, redeploying, and demobilizing the response resources.



Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- EMAC was able to deploy resources quickly with minimal administrative delay. The EMAC Broadcast system was used to effectively distribute resource request information.
- Some EMAC Member States automatically distribute resource Broadcast electronic mail (e-mail) to multiple recipients, ensuring uninterrupted timely action around the clock.
- States that had anticipated and pre-identified resources were able to fill requests very quickly.
- The EMAC National Coordinating Team (NCT) was well received and performed a valuable service at the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).
- The National Guard Bureau coordinated effectively the National Guard assets from 51 assisting entities.
- The National Guard Bureau recognized the value of EMAC and fully participated in the EMAC process.
- A-Teams in the impacted States worked diligently and effectively solving problems, resolving potential issues, and coordinating actions.
- Those States that tracked resources throughout the deployment process were able to better account for personnel when Hurricane Rita approached landfall.
- Most A-Team members were well versed in the Incident Command System (ICS) and able to integrate well into the Requesting State EOC.
- Those personnel who carried a copy of a fully executed Request for Assistance (REQ-A) were able to avoid some of the misunderstanding that others encountered regarding authorized presence in the impacted area.
- Some States dispatched advance parties prior to deploying large contingents of personnel. This helped them acquire accurate situational information and enabled deploying personnel to be properly equipped for the mission.
- The formation of large specialized teams and task forces tailored to mission requirements worked very well.

Issues for Improvement

4-1 – Intra-State Mutual-Aid Agreements. Member States that did not have well planned and practiced intra-State mutual-aid agreements had difficulty quickly identifying and obtaining access to local resources. Conversely, States that routinely plan on shifting emergency response resources among local jurisdictions when circumstances require were more familiar with local capabilities and resource inventories and also with the mechanics of mobilizing those resources. For example, local jurisdictions in Florida are part of an integrated Statewide response capability so that resources from unaffected jurisdictions comprise the initial response when another region of the State is threatened.



Recommendation

- a. EMAC Member States should review Statewide emergency response plans to ensure that a comprehensive and current inventory of local response resources is included.
- b. Member States should consider adopting a variation of the REQ-A model within the State. This would help familiarize local officials with the REQ-A process and better integrate intra-State and inter-State mutual-aid programs.

4-2 – EMAC Broadcast Requests. Many Member States responded to EMAC Broadcast messages calling for resource assistance to Louisiana or Mississippi. Often, the requests were quickly filled. Member States often continued to identify resources unaware that the requirement had been met. Others that wanted to help simply became frustrated with the process.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC Operations System should be revised so that it includes the current status of each unfilled request as well as notification when a requirement is met. A time stamp could signify that the requirement has been filled or a color code could indicate the working status.
- b. Provisions should be considered to allow different States to collaborate in filling a resource request. For example, one State might provide a specialized response team called for on a REQ-A and another might contribute a sustaining logistical package.
- c. As the automated EMAC tool set is improved and expanded, Member States should consider extending read-only access to local jurisdiction emergency management organizations so that they can better monitor the evolving situation.

4-3 – Requirement Definition. In many instances, misunderstandings occurred regarding the actual composition or configuration of resources described in the REQ-A. In some cases, resources were not defined in sufficient detail on the REQ-A. In other cases, practitioners on the ground in the Requesting and Assisting States understood the requirement; however, well intending, but less technically qualified, staff working in EOCs made changes to the REQ-A language.

Recommendation

- a. Direct dialogue between the requesting and offering entity should be encouraged whenever feasible to ensure that the specific requirement is clearly understood and the responding resources fully match the requirement.
- b. Staff personnel elsewhere in the EMAC process should be instructed not to change resource specifications without coordinating with the requesting entity.
- c. A standard resource typing protocol should be adopted to minimize such misunderstandings.

4-4 – Communications with Deployed Personnel. It was often difficult to communicate from the home State to personnel deployed in the impacted area. The communications infrastructure had been largely destroyed and, where cell phone capabilities existed, they were overwhelmed with call volume. Satellite telecommunications were more reliable, but not widely available. Deployed personnel need a communications channel to the Assisting State EOC so that



responsible home State officials can provide logistical and other support as circumstances demand. The North Carolina contingent addressed this requirement by establishing a Web site communications link.

Recommendation

- a. Deployed personnel should possess or have access to reliable and redundant communications capabilities, including satellite telephones with multi-directional antennas.
- b. Member States should consider the North Carolina model and develop a Web site communications link that can be activated upon deployment of State resources.

4-5 – EMAC A-Team Composition. There were insufficient A-Team members initially deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi to adequately execute the EMAC mission. Subsequent reinforcements quickly improved capabilities. The A-Team located at the Mississippi EOC grew to 12 members and, during one transition period, had a total of 16 personnel. The standard two-person A-Team specified in the EMAC Operations Manual is not adequate for the initial response to a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, A-Team personnel did not necessarily possess all of the skills that would have been most useful under the circumstances.

Recommendation

- a. Consider defining a scalable A-Team. The initial A-Team for a large Level 1 incident needs to be increased to a minimum of four to eight personnel.
- b. Consider classifying A-Team membership to conform to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) functional model (operations, planning, logistics, finance, and administration).

4-6 – National Guard Representation. There was not a National Guard representative assigned to the A-Teams. Given the significant involvement of National Guard units deployed under the provisions of EMAC, the A-Teams in Louisiana and Mississippi would have benefited from a National Guard liaison presence. Without it, the A-Teams had difficulty properly monitoring the complete status of EMAC deployment.

Recommendation

Whenever the National Guard participates within the guidelines of EMAC, a National Guard liaison person from the Requesting State should be assigned to the A-Team.

4-7 – EMAC A-Team Training. There is insufficient A-Team training. To compensate for the lack of training, personnel with previous A-Team experience deployed early, then supervised the on-the-job training of less experienced team members. This is not a satisfactory long-term solution.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC Executive Task Force (ETF) should encourage Member States to deploy the A-Team Field Course that has recently been developed and tested.
- b. EMAC leaders should continue to emphasize the value of supervised on-the-job training under qualified A-Team personnel.



4-8 – Requesting State Internal Protocols. A-Team members were unfamiliar with the internal operating protocols of the Requesting States. Such matters as delegation of authority are not standard from State-to-State or among all local jurisdictions. Clarification regarding legal and regulatory matters consumed an inordinate amount of time and sometimes interfered with normal EMAC operations.

Recommendation

The Requesting State EMAC Coordinator should brief arriving A-Team personnel on unique aspects of operational, legal, and regulatory protocols.

4-9 – Illegible EMAC REQ-A Forms. Repeated transmission by facsimile (fax) rendered the REQ-A Form illegible. This was exacerbated in many instances by poor handwriting or carelessness on the part of the requesting entity. It is understandable that speed is of the essence when a serious disaster looms, but care must be taken to ensure that response actions can be effectively managed. Illegible REQ-A Forms hampered the ability of personnel in both the Requesting and Assisting States to properly administer and manage the EMAC process.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC Coordinator should implement the automated version of the REQ-A Form as soon as possible.
- b. Member States should emphasize the need for clarity and accuracy when preparing the REQ-A Form, and it should be strictly enforced during the review process.

4-10 – EMAC REQ-A Content. The REQ-A Form does not contain sufficient detailed information. It does not provide for names, contact numbers and addresses, salaries, or other personnel data relating to deploying personnel or specify that it should be provided as an attachment. Additionally, it does not provide points of contact (POCs) for different disciplines that may be required for the same REQ-A mission.

Recommendation

As the EMAC ETF considers redesigning and automating the REQ-A Form, careful thought must be given to the volume of information it contains. Too much information will render it administratively burdensome. Too little information will result in operational gaps.

4-11 – EMAC Database. A-Team members were not sufficiently familiar with the EMAC operating systems to fully benefit from the database content and report capabilities. The EMAC automated system is a continuously evolving and dynamic capability. For example, it not only has a large assortment of standard reports, but a flexible ad hoc report generating capability as well. Most A-Team members do not routinely interact with the EMAC database and were therefore unfamiliar with all of its latest capabilities at the time of deployment. Additionally, many Member States use Microsoft Excel spreadsheets that are not compatible with or linked to the EMAC database to track resources internally. This leads to inconsistencies in resource information and EMAC database errors.



Recommendation

- a. The EMAC database tutorial should be included in the new A-Team training module.
- b. The EMAC Coordinator should maintain a summary briefing of updated database capabilities that is regularly distributed over the EMAC Broadcast system and provided to all A-Team members immediately prior to deployment.
- c. The EMAC Coordinator should work with the Member State EMAC Coordinators to ensure internal tracking tools are compatible with the EMAC database.

4-12 – Self-Sustainment. There continues to be considerable misunderstanding about the definition of self-sustainability, both with regard to the applicable duration and the conditions it implies. Many plans specify that deploying entities will be self-sustaining for a period of 72 hours, presuming that they will carry the necessary administrative, operational, and logistical support for that period of time. Such a policy does not account for the special conditions of the intended work and living area and does not necessarily ensure automatic and timely replacement of perishable items, thus placing an unplanned burden on the requesting entity.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should consider establishing a task force to analyze requirements for self-sustainability and recommend a standard approach to Member States.

4-13 – External Encroachment. Organizations not officially part of the EMAC community improperly interceded in the resource mobilization process. Some professional associations monitored the EMAC Broadcast system and initiated actions through their membership while the resource requests were being transmitted to Member States. Generally speaking, parallel communications helped reinforce the request process and ensured a better understanding of the requirement by the requesting and offering entities. However, on occasion the State-to-State nature of EMAC mutual aid was overlooked, causing confusion among the various parties.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC should implement a thorough education and awareness program that extends to all relevant professional associations and other appropriate organizations.
- b. The EMAC ETF Chair should reinforce the need for all parties to strictly adhere to policies set forth in the EMAC Operations Manual.

4-14 – Cost Estimating. It often took too long to compile cost information in response to a REQ-A resource request. Some Member States pre-identified resources likely to be needed in a disaster and were able to estimate deployment costs quickly. For others, it was a tedious and time-consuming requirement.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should consider pre-identifying deployable resources and computing in advance approximate deployment and daily operating costs.
- b. The EMAC Coordinator should develop a cost estimating guide using actual cost data from past EMAC deployments.



4-15 – Incomplete Cost Data. The REQ-A Form often had incomplete or incorrect cost data. Cost estimates were not presented in sufficient detail to ensure all operating expenses were included. Staffing changes and deployment extensions were not always accompanied by updated cost estimates.

Recommendation

Ensure the REQ-A Form is filled out completely with the most accurate financial data available. When deployment requirements change, initiate a new or amended REQ-A with amended cost information.

4-16 – Self-Deployed Resources. Well-meaning personnel who deployed to the area of operations on their own initiative caused problems and contributed to the administrative burden. Often, they learned of EMAC while working in the field and determined that it might offer a path to obtain reimbursement for volunteer services. This required explaining the proper channels for EMAC assistance and directing them to their home State emergency management agency, which was fully engaged in administering an ongoing deployment.

Recommendation

Member States need to communicate the purpose of EMAC and how it works through all available channels, including professional associations. Self-deployment should be discouraged. Such service is strictly voluntary and must comply with the laws and regulations of the impacted State.

4-17 – Reconciling Estimated and Actual Costs. Actual costs of deploying resources under EMAC are often different than estimated costs. This is normal and should be expected. As actual costs accrue, the REQ-A Form must be amended to reflect expenses more accurately. If actual costs dramatically exceed those estimated on the REQ-A Form without some reasonable explanation, the Requesting State may refuse to reimburse the Assisting State.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC ETF Chair should reinforce the need for accurate cost estimating as well as the importance of amending the REQ-A Form as estimates change.
- b. Consideration should be given to treating the estimated costs as a not-to-exceed limit.
- c. Develop status reports that improve visibility of ongoing operational costs for all parties.

4-18 – Timely Emergency Declarations. If the governor of a threatened Member State delays issuing an emergency declaration or fails to ask for EMAC support early, it is difficult to position critical resources for timely response. Immediately after Governor Barbour declared a state of emergency, Mississippi asked the EMAC NCG to deploy an A-Team to help process REQ-As. This enabled Florida to pre-position key resources for rapid response.

Recommendation

Governors of Member States should be advised to issue declarations as soon as the danger is considered imminent (if permitted by State law) and should also ask for EMAC A-Team support.



4-19 – Civil/Military Coordination. Coordination between the EOCs of the impacted States and the Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters established to coordinate the Department of Defense (DoD) response and relief efforts was inadequate. Inaccurate and incomplete information was exchanged regarding deployment status of military units and EMAC resources.

Recommendation

Increase communications and understanding at all levels of government through better coordinated plans, training, and exercises involving all parties.

4-20 – Staging Area Coordination. Staging areas were often inadequate to accommodate the large number of deploying personnel and logistical support required for extended operations. Some deploying task forces arrived at predesignated staging areas only to discover that they were already occupied or, in some cases, had not yet been prepared for occupancy.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should preplan and survey potential staging areas so that the capacity and operational conditions are clearly understood.
- b. The Requesting States should thoroughly reconnoiter designated staging areas and coordinate with Assisting States in advance of deployment to ensure they are adequate for the intended mission.

4-21 – National Guard Law Enforcement Support. There are restrictions on the use of National Guard personnel from one State to perform a law enforcement role in another State. This is exacerbated by the expanded commitment of National Guard forces to warfighting missions abroad. A Member State faced with a significant disaster might have limited organic National Guard resources available to ensure public safety and may have to rely on help from other States.

Recommendation

Member States should prepare draft Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) to be executed between governors should additional law enforcement support be required.

Category 2 – Mobilization and Demobilization

Some of the most critical activities occur at the beginning and end of an EMAC mission. If pre-deployment activities are flawed, operational success is jeopardized. Deploying personnel must be physically, mentally, and psychologically prepared for the circumstances in the impacted area and they must be properly equipped for the mission ahead. Once the mission is completed and responders are redeployed to their home State for demobilization, they should be properly debriefed to capture important information early, offered clinical counseling if appropriate, and provided administrative assistance to obtain prompt reimbursement for time and services.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- The process of activating and assigning personnel to the NCT and Regional Coordinating Team (RCT) worked very well. EMAC representatives were able to provide



valuable information to Federal agency personnel and representatives of other participating organizations.

- Member States with intra-State mutual-aid agreements or other cooperative arrangements with local jurisdictions were able to quickly commit resources to EMAC missions.
- The REQ-A Form proved to be flexible and easily amended to extend or change personnel assignments or meet revised mission requirements.
- The use of checkpoints and staging areas in the Requesting States helped account for deploying personnel and provided an opportunity for situation briefings and orientations on current operations.
- The ability to seek reimbursement based on completion of an authorized REQ-A mission was an improvement over the end-of-deployment lump sum payment policy.
- Direct coordination between the POC in the Requesting State and leaders of deploying personnel ensured much better communications and clarity of mission-related information prior to deployment.
- The EMAC database was very useful to personnel engaged in administration and management, who used it to verify information on the REQ-A Form and, with the help of the EMAC Coordinator, generated ad hoc reports to meet special information requirements. It is much more user-friendly than earlier versions.
- Many Member States use internally developed spreadsheets to help track EMAC missions. This works particularly well when the spreadsheets are compatible with the EMAC database.

Issues for Improvement

4-22 – National Response Resource Inventory. EMAC planners do not have access to information about the potentially deployable assets of Member States. If such information were available, REQ-As could be directed to States possessing resources specifically sought by a Requesting State, rather than issuing a blanket bulletin to all members.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should be encouraged to develop and maintain an inventory of deployable resources.
- b. EMAC should seek read-only access to automated resource inventories maintained by Member States.

4-23 – Credential Verification. The absence of a commonly accepted nationwide credentialing system made it difficult to fill requests for personnel with specialized skills. It also delayed check-in and check-out procedures and, in some cases, the operational assignment of deployed personnel. It is important to quickly verify specialty training, education, and experience to avoid mismatches in key response positions. This applies to many key sectors, such as health professionals, law enforcement and public safety officials, logisticians, engineers, and others.



Recommendation

- a. The EMAC ETF should identify key emergency response skills that require verification as well as credentialing systems that now serve specific professions.
- b. An EMAC task force should be formed to develop a prototype credentialing system for key emergency response skills.
- c. Assisting States should post to the EMAC database information about deploying personnel, including lead POC, arrival date, contact information, and projected date of demobilization.

4-24 – Mobilization Briefing. There is not a standard EMAC mobilization briefing presented to all responders before deployment. For firefighters, police officers, search and rescue personnel, emergency medical staff, and other traditional response professionals, mobilization is second nature; however, many of the personnel who deployed under EMAC following Hurricane Katrina had not previously participated in an emergency response. Large numbers of responders represented professions not normally associated with emergency response, such as family and children services, legal aid counselors, and many other human services skills. Such personnel need detailed guidance.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should prepare a special briefing and checklist for distribution to all deploying personnel, including POCs in both the Requesting and home States.

4-25 – Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD). Most responders did not participate in a CISD upon completion of an EMAC mission. The affects of working in an environment of total loss and destruction are not limited to the physical fatigue of long hours and hard work, there is an unavoidable psychological and emotional toll as well. The mental health profession includes specialists in Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) who are trained to help victims and responders deal with the serious long-term implications of catastrophic events. Some deploying task forces included CISM clinicians who debriefed task force members before they returned to their home State. Some Assisting States offered counseling during the demobilization process, although for many responders it was voluntary.

Recommendation

- a. Large task forces should include CISM trained personnel to serve both task force members and victims in the impacted area.
- b. Staging areas in the areas of operation should offer end-of-mission CISD programs for redeploying personnel.
- c. Assisting States should provide CISM support to responders who have not previously participated in a debriefing.

4-26 – Expense Documentation. Records were not always maintained documenting purchases made to meet unanticipated operational requirements or describing the condition of items damaged or lost during operations. Detailed acquisition records and receipts of purchase are important if reimbursement is sought.



Recommendation

- a. Receipts should be obtained for all items purchased to meet operational requirements.
- b. Inventories of equipment should be maintained and the status of non-perishable items reported through team leaders to the Requesting State EMAC Coordinator.

4-27 – Duration of Deployment. Some personnel found that a 14-day deployment under the severe conditions in the impacted area was too long and stressful. In many cases, there were insufficient personnel available early in the deployment to develop reasonable work shift policies. As a result, physical exhaustion and emotional stress contributed to reduced work quality as time progressed.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC leaders should continuously evaluate deployment policies balancing the need for team integrity and stability with the well-being of individual team members.
- b. Assisting States should propose sufficient numbers of deploying personnel to support reasonable shift assignments commensurate with the mission and circumstances in the area of operations.

4-28 – Predesignated Deployable Resources. The process of identifying resources available for mobilization under EMAC is difficult and time consuming. In some cases, the EMAC Coordinator in an offering State must survey Statewide professional associations and solicit volunteers from their membership. This is particularly challenging at night and on weekends. There is now a sufficient body of knowledge from past EMAC deployments to determine what resources are most likely to be needed during the severe weather season.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC should analyze past deployment data, especially from the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, to ascertain the types and quantities of resources requested and the deployment priorities for resource types.
- b. Member States should be encouraged to pre-identify prior to the beginning of each severe weather season deployable resources that are most likely to be needed early in a response.

4-29 – Reimbursement for Local Purchases. EMAC policy regarding reimbursement for local purchases was not always clear to deployed personnel. Some Assisting States did not provide advance funding, and deployed personnel spent out-of-pocket money to purchase items needed to meet operational requirements. When a single REQ-A covered several teams or groups of resources, reimbursement did not occur until the entire REQ-A mission was completed, causing possible financial hardship. Additionally, guidance in the EMAC Operations Manual regarding reimbursement is inadequate and does not follow Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP).

Recommendation

- a. Greater explanation should be provided to personnel deploying under EMAC regarding reimbursement policies for local purchases.



- b. EMAC should consider seeking incremental reimbursement payments when a REQ-A covers a large number of deployed personnel and is repeatedly extended.

4-30 – Operating Cost Documentation. In many cases, requests for reimbursement did not include sufficient documentation, such as approved purchase orders or receipts. This creates delays in the reimbursement process as the Requesting State seeks additional information and documentation.

Recommendation

- a. Include a note in the EMAC Operations Manual reinforcing the need for cost documentation.
- b. Reimbursement Forms R-1 and R-2 should include a brief checklist that lists necessary documentation.
- c. Member States should be reminded of their responsibility to account for all expenditures in accordance with GAAP and to provide backup documentation to support reimbursement claims.

Category 3 – Logistics

Logistics incorporates all aspects of support required by deployed resources to successfully complete assigned missions. It includes all of the necessary work-related materials and equipment as well as appropriate shelter, food, transportation, and other personal amenities.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- All of the National Guard units and many of the large task forces deployed with a full compliment of logistics support and supplies sufficient for the planned duration of operations.
- This was a valuable learning experience for all participants as the catastrophic circumstances redefined the understanding of austere living and working conditions.
- The Assisting States actively supported deployed personnel, helping arrange for billeting and maintaining communications with State team leaders and with A-Team members in Louisiana and Mississippi.
- Florida and Mississippi established an area command that included the six southern counties in Mississippi. This unified command structure helped coordinate logistical support activities.
- Assisting States were able to support the operations of large teams and task forces committed for extended periods of time.
- The EMAC Broadcast system was useful in finding unique or difficult to locate items, such as stop signs and traffic signals, as well as humanitarian supplies for hurricane victims. Florida ordered bulk quantities of diapers, formula, and other essential items through EMAC.



Issues for Improvement

4-31 – Operational Environment. Despite the fact that living and working conditions were described by the Requesting States as substandard, some responders were unprepared for the catastrophic nature of the circumstances and ill prepared to function effectively for the duration of the deployment. Even when widespread news coverage portrays the utter devastation wrought by a catastrophic disaster, there is a natural tendency for non-traditional responders to presume that just beyond camera range, life is normal. It is difficult to live and work in an environment without water, electricity, plumbing, transportation, telephone service, fresh foods, and all of the accouterments of life to which we have become accustomed.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC Broadcast system should be used to regularly convey information describing the living and working conditions in the impacted area.
- b. EMAC should consider defining more explicit keywords depicting the circumstances in the area of operations.

4-32 – Situational Awareness. Assisting States were not able to keep abreast of changing circumstances in the impacted area. This limited the ability to properly equip deploying personnel and also to provide appropriate levels and types of support during deployment. For example, if radio frequencies allocated to deployed organizations by officials in the Requesting States are not shared with the Assisting State, they cannot monitor communications traffic and anticipate support requirements.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should be reminded that direct and continuous communications between the requesting entity and the Assisting State is the most assured way of having timely and accurate situational information.
- b. EMAC should consider adding a situational “chat board” to the Broadcast system or maintaining online situation reports in coordination with Requesting States.

4-33 – Safety and Accountability. Given the large number of deployed personnel and the expansive size of the operating area, it was impossible to keep track of everyone all the time. Accountability and safety responsibilities must be delegated to, and shared by, personnel at all levels of operations. On the ground, it begins with the buddy system where no one is left alone and teammates look out for one another. The buddy system was frequently violated during the Katrina response when individuals from small delegations were sent to separate work sites.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC Operations Manual should explicitly direct Member States to honor organizational integrity of deploying resources and not to violate the fundamental buddy system.
- b. Assisting States should be directed to always deploy teams of personnel or to add individuals with special skills to teams already working in the area of operations.
- c. Task forces and large teams of deployed resources should designate a safety officer responsible for looking out for the well-being of team members.



4-34 – Life Support Items. Immediately following landfall and for the next several days, items such as ice, water, and food were in critically short supply. The Federal Government had difficulty establishing adequate supply channels for these items to support the victims who could not evacuate or remained in area shelters. Additionally, emergency procurement of critical items by Federal agencies reduced supplies that might otherwise have been available to responders.

Recommendation

Member States should ensure that all deploying personnel have access to sufficient essential supplies to operate effectively until emergency supply mechanisms are in place.

4-35 – Immunizations. Information about required immunizations for deploying personnel sometimes was not provided in a timely fashion. Some immunizations required multiple course treatments. This either delayed deployment or required that deployed resources remain in a staging area until treatments were completed.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC should obtain from Member States and post to the EMAC Web site any health-related prequalifications required for visitors or temporary workers responding to an EMAC event.
- b. Emergency responders in Member States should ensure that inoculations are up-to-date at all times.

4-36 – Large Team Deployments. Some task forces and other large deploying organizations did not deploy with a full complement of logistical supplies and had to forage for fuel or other requirements. Others were fully organized and equipped with an operational command structure compliant with the ICS, which includes a logistics section, and an accompanying logistical component.

Recommendation

Large team deployments should be encouraged during response operations of catastrophic magnitude, but they should be fully self-sustaining for the duration of deployment or have plans to replenish all classes of supply.

4-37 – Base Camp Logistics. Some base camps received late, insufficient, or inaccurate notification of arriving organizations and were not adequately prepared to provide long-term support. Base camps are an excellent solution to supporting deployed personnel working in extremely austere conditions; however, operating the base camp requires good planning and logistics support.

Recommendation

When Requesting State emergency management officials assign a deploying organization to a base camp, the base camp operator should be notified. All available information about the arriving organization should be provided to the base camp operator, including the number of personnel, vehicles, unit leader, contact information, estimated time of arrival, and duration of deployment.



Category 4 – Field Operations

When all is said and done, success or failure is defined by operations in the field. There may be complications during deployment, lack of adequate logistics support on site, and failure to receive timely reimbursement, but the ability to deliver essential services to disaster victims defines a successful EMAC mission.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- From the perspective of those responsible for administering and managing the EMAC deployment, this was a successful response of historic proportions. It demonstrates that EMAC itself is scalable and able to adapt as circumstances demand. Virtually all deployed personnel found it to be a positive experience.
- National Guard forces deployed under EMAC integrated smoothly into the Requesting State's command and control structure.
- Assisting States that designated a single POC or State team leader were able to track and account for personnel around the clock. All Member States should emulate this practice.
- Granting deployed law enforcement officers powers of arrest in Louisiana eliminated any potential doubt regarding the legitimacy of their authority.
- Florida and Mississippi applied the principles of unified command in the form of an area command that incorporated the six southern Mississippi counties. This worked very well and helped ensure accountability of deployed personnel. It should serve as a model for subsequent events of similar magnitude.
- Experienced emergency response personnel were familiar with and embraced the principles of the NIMS and ICS. This proved to be a valuable unifying factor and helped non-traditional responders adapt to the NIMS/ICS structure.
- The NIMS joint Incident Action Plans (IAPs) ensured proper integration of response resources provided by disparate sources when it was employed.

Issues for Improvement

4-38 – Joint Field Office Liaison. Because it was located some distance from the Louisiana EOC, information about EMAC operations was difficult to share with the Federal agency representatives at the Louisiana Joint Field Office (JFO). Some States have plans to co-locate staff agencies with Federal counterparts at the JFO. This is not always the case and is sometimes impractical.

Recommendation

Requesting States should consider asking the NCG to assign an EMAC liaison team to the JFO if it is not in the same location as the Requesting State EOC. Alternatively, the EMAC RCT mission could be extended to include the JFO.



4-39 – NIMS Incident Action Plans. EMAC status reports describing resource requests and mission assignments were often not included in daily government IAPs. This suggests that EMAC operations are not part of a unified effort to accomplish IAP objectives.

Recommendation

- a. Government agencies at all levels must implement, train, exercise, and regularly use the provisions of NIMS, including the IAP.
- b. EMAC should encourage Member States to follow NIMS operating principles and procedures wherever applicable.

4-40 – Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). ATMs in most locations were destroyed by the hurricane. Many early responders had anticipated using ATMs to obtain cash for out-of-pocket expenses and to purchase incidental supplies for field work. This placed a burden on supervisors to find alternative funding sources. North Carolina anticipated this situation and provided all deploying personnel with a cash advance.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC Member States should consider establishing policies to provide a cash advance to deploying personnel.
- b. The status of ATMs and similar point of sale devices should be determined early in the emergency and made part of situational Broadcasts on the EMAC system.

4-41 – Managing Expectations. Some responders had difficulty adapting to dramatic changes in the operational environment. On some occasions, missions or work locations were changed while responders were en route or after partially completing the initial mission. In other situations, responders expected to be working in a specific field commensurate with their education, training, and experience, but subsequently learned that the requirement was for more routine and less glamorous work. Short assignments morphed into longer periods and mission definitions changed overnight. This reflects the nature of disaster response. Requirements are difficult to accurately project and instability characterizes the situation.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should caution all potential responders regarding the fluid status of conditions in an area impacted by a catastrophic storm of a magnitude similar to Hurricane Katrina.
- b. Responsible officials in all capacities—the Requesting State, Assisting State, A-Team members, deploying unit team leaders, and requesting entities—need to convey mission-related information clearly and honestly so that responders understand evolving circumstances.

4-42 – Continuity of Operations. When replacement personnel arrive in the operations area after the incumbent responders have already departed, continuity of operations suffers. Advance communications between incoming and departing personnel is not an adequate substitute for physical overlap. Incumbents should share a work shift with replacements and introduce them to both the work routine and to the people with whom they will interact.



Recommendation

EMAC administrators must ensure that a minimum 24-hour overlap occurs between replacement and incumbent resources.

4-43 – Local Acceptance. In many instances, local officials were unfamiliar with EMAC and unsure of the legal status and operational responsibility of deployed personnel, even when the original requesting entity was from the same jurisdiction. While EMAC resources were warmly welcomed, there was sometimes an initial sense of wariness regarding the sudden appearance of outsiders in the neighborhood. This was particularly true in cases where personnel deployed under EMAC replaced local authorities who had evacuated or were otherwise indisposed.

Recommendation

- a. Member States need to ensure the widest possible education regarding EMAC, its purpose, provisions, and limitations.
- b. Local jurisdictions should participate in State-organized training and exercises to gain familiarity with EMAC provisions. The potential use of EMAC-provided resources should be included in local jurisdiction comprehensive emergency plans.

Category 5 – Coordination and Control

The engagement of more than 65,000 personnel, including almost 20,000 civilians, in the largest EMAC response operation ever mounted, clearly presented management challenges to responsible officials at all levels.

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- Louisiana implemented a very effective system for filing hard copies of REQ-A Forms. Forms were filed based on the Assisting State and color coded to indicate status.
- Most Member States used some form of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to manage and track resources. EMAC should attempt to standardize these forms so that they are compatible with the EMAC database.
- EMAC procedures worked well in terms of integrating Assisting State resources into the local jurisdiction response structure. Familiarity by most parties with the NIMS helped the integration process.
- Some Assisting States instituted centralized mobilization procedures during which deploying personnel received immunizations and were briefed on rules of engagement, the chain of command, and operational information in the impacted area.
- States with intra-State mutual-aid agreements for resource sharing among local jurisdictions in an emergency were able to respond to EMAC resource requests quickly.



Issues for Improvement

4-44 – Mission Numbers. There was some confusion over the use of the mission number for deploying resources. Many Member States have their own system for assigning mission numbers. As a result, in some cases, multiple mission numbers applied to the same resources. In a few instances, the REQ-A Form mission number was missing.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC should explore with Member States the possibility of creating a common mission number format that can be used by all parties.
- b. If creating a common mission number format that can be used by all parties is not possible, consider recording both the Requesting State mission number and the EMAC mission number on the REQ-A Form.
- c. The EMAC Coordinator should consider implementing a mission number generator as part of the new automated REQ-A Form.

4-45 – Disjointed Coordination. There were too many gaps to be bridged between the various discipline areas, response mechanisms, and coordinating agencies. With Federal, State, and local EOCs coordinating the efforts of more than 100,000 personnel representing disciplines that span all 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and interacting with a multitude of professional, volunteer, and faith-based organizations, opportunities for confusion were ample. Resources requested by one entity were mistakenly delivered to another or, in some cases, were “hijacked” en route to meet an urgent need. Some personnel sought for an EMAC deployment had already been mobilized for a Federal mission without coordinating with the State emergency management agency. Federal agencies in the area of operations aggressively implemented procurement activities that denied local resources to other bonafide responders.

Recommendation

- a. The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) should work in conjunction with the Federal Government to clarify the roles and responsibilities of all parties in a massive response effort such as occurred following Hurricane Katrina.
- b. A nationwide exercise program for local jurisdictions in high-risk geographic areas should be designed to engage all potential responsible parties, including EMAC.

4-46 – Resource Tracking. The A-Teams at the Requesting State EOC were not able to track the status of EMAC mission requests. The A-Teams were not initially given login access to the EMAC automated Broadcast system and database. Instead, A-Teams created their own database spreadsheets in an attempt to monitor the EMAC deployment process.

Recommendation

- a. Upon activation, A-Teams should receive password access to all EMAC automated systems.
- b. With the implementation of the automated REQ-A Form, EMAC should strive for total visibility over the response process from mobilization to demobilization.



4-47 – EMAC Coordination Teams. There appears to be overlap among the duties of the NCG, NCT, and RCT. This stems in part because officials with whom the team members interact at the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) tend to view the EMAC presence as representing all of the participating States. As a result, they are often asked questions or given information beyond the strict domain of EMAC. Additionally, until EMAC automated support systems provide everyone the same bird's eye view of the deployment status, NCT and RCT members rely on telephone and e-mail inquiries to A-Team personnel and the EMAC Coordinator to update status information.

Recommendation

- a. Continue expeditiously with improvements to the EMAC database and Broadcast system.
- b. Revise descriptions of roles and responsibilities of NCG, NCT, and RCT in the EMAC Operations Manual as appropriate.

4-48 – National Guard Coordination. In some cases, National Guard units were deployed under direction of the National Guard Bureau or by mutual agreement among the Adjutants General. Without a formal EMAC REQ-A, it was presumed that the National Guard units would be converted to EMAC status after deployment. In other instances, the REQ-A Form was used, but without specific information about mission assignments or cost data. If National Guard resources deploy under EMAC without the provisions of Title 32 in place, the Requesting State would be expected to reimburse the costs of deployment and operations.

Recommendation

- a. Based on the experience gained during the response to Hurricane Katrina, Member States should provide EMAC familiarization training to State National Guard units and encourage the National Guard to include scenarios involving EMAC in emergency response training and exercises.
- b. EMAC leaders should engage the National Guard Bureau in a continuing dialogue to increase understanding of EMAC provisions.

4-49 – Personnel Rotations. Sometimes the number of personnel deployed to fill an extended mission was significantly greater than the number of specified man-days described in the requirement. Thus, if a requirement specified 30 man-days of support for 90 days, the Assisting State, on its own initiative, might replace deployed personnel every 14 days, in which case a total of 180 individuals could have participated in the mission. It is important to capture all of this information so that subsequent analysis does not understate or overstate the magnitude of the event.

Recommendation

- a. Replacement plans and rotation schemes should be thoroughly coordinated with the EMAC A-Team.
- b. When large rotations occur, the REQ-A Form should be appropriately amended or a new one initiated to account for all participating personnel.



4-50 – Conference Calls. The timing of daily EMAC conference calls was not always convenient for some key participants and often included unnecessary details or subjects of peripheral interest. Conference calls are important mechanisms for sharing situational information and adjusting the flow of EMAC resources as circumstances dictate. However, participants may be in locations that span several time zones and many of them have busy agendas of their own.

Recommendation

- a. Conference calls should occur according to a predesignated schedule and follow a set agenda, with high-priority operational issues addressed first.
- b. Some parties should be requested to monitor, but not engage in, the conversations unless they have something critical to contribute on a particular item.
- c. Conference calls should strictly adhere to a standard agenda, just like any well-organized business meeting.

4-51 – Technology Failures. In a catastrophic emergency, technology failures are familiar experiences. Electrical outages, damaged satellite antennas, destroyed communication towers, and similar events are commonplace. EMAC is increasingly reliant on technology. With the implementation of the automated REQ-A Form, this reliance will be even greater.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC should ensure that hard copy backup systems replicate electronic formats so that data collected during a technological failure can be easily uploaded when systems are restored.
- b. A-Team personnel should be trained in both automated and manual capabilities.

4-52 – Response Versus Recovery. Prior to the 2004 hurricane season, EMAC was used mostly as a conduit to obtain resources in the immediate aftermath of a natural or technological event. EMAC support continued for several months following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, far beyond initial response and well into the recovery phase. For example, the outsourcing of services under EMAC due to the destruction of laboratory or clinical facilities has long-term implications. This represents a new dimension for consideration by Member States.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should evaluate long-term support requirements to determine if EMAC changes are necessary if, for example, support continues after a state of emergency ends.

4-53 – Delegation of Authority. Uncertainty prevailed regarding the delegation of authority and the definition of powers such delegation conveys. Potential liability to which those exercising the delegation of authority might be exposed was unclear. It was uncertain if personnel from an Assisting State could actually negotiate contracts on behalf of a local jurisdiction in the Requesting State.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC legal advisor should assess and report to the ETF the implications of delegated authority within the context of EMAC operations.



- b. Delegation of authority should be addressed in the EMAC Operations Manual.

4-54 – Multiple Command Structures. The proliferation of command and control organizations sometimes led to confusion regarding who was in charge. With EOCs functioning at all jurisdictional levels, along with area commanders, Incident Commanders, and task force and multi-discipline team leaders, it was not always clear which resources were ordered by what organizational entity.

Recommendation

Member States should work to establish a clear and commonly understood hierarchical command and control model to prevent conflicting or confusing resource requests.

4-55 – Public Information Officer (PIO). Many of the PIOs deployed under EMAC had no training or experience in emergency management. As a result, they were not able to answer simple questions from media representatives regarding the status of response activities. This placed an inordinate burden on other officials who had to fill the knowledge gap of the unqualified PIO.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC should stress the need to explicitly state on the REQ-A Form the required qualifications of all requested personnel.
- b. Member States should require that State and local government PIOs receive training in emergency management, including familiarization with the National Response Plan, NIMS, ICS, and EMAC.

4-56 – Lead State Representatives (LSRs). EMAC LSRs were underutilized during the Katrina response. An LSR is appointed to the EMAC ETF representing Member States in each of the 10 FEMA Regions. These are valuable resources who could work within their Regions to coordinate logistical support and other common requirements of regional Assisting States.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should consider the possibility of assigning an operational mission to LSRs during a large Level 1 operation.

4-57 – EMAC Leadership Transition. Changing EMAC leadership during the heart of hurricane season adds additional burden when there are ongoing response operations. The transition from the current EMAC Committee Chair to the Chair-elect coincides with the annual NEMA conference, which occurs in late summer or early fall. In each of the past 2 years, major EMAC response operations were taking place when this transition took place. Thanks to excellent planning and execution, the transitions occurred without incident. However, it would be simpler if the incoming Chair assumed responsibility in a historically more tranquil time of year.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should reconsider the timing of leadership transition.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Section 5

Resources Deployed Under EMAC





SECTION 5 RESOURCES DEPLOYED UNDER EMAC

During the preparedness for and response to Hurricane Katrina, one of the biggest success stories has been the active utilization of EMAC. This Compact allowed our State to activate, mobilize, and receive assets and resources from all across this country...EMAC continues to not only be a valuable resource in times of disaster, but necessary for States when local and State resources fall short of requirements for both short-term response and long-term recovery.

*Robert R. Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
testifying before the House Select Bipartisan Committee*



Introduction

Among the participants in the March facilitated breakout session were 129 individuals who deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi in response to Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Requests for Assistance (REQ-As). They represented 31 Assisting States and each of the following eight skill categories (see **Section 2** to this report for a full description of each category):

- Urban Search and Rescue
- Public Health and Medical Services



- Human Services
- Fire and Hazardous Materials (HazMat)
- Public Works and Engineering
- Law Enforcement
- Animal Rescue
- Emergency Management

Few of these responders had ever heard of EMAC before Hurricane Katrina. They simply answered the call for help and followed a path presented by local authorities throughout the community of EMAC Member States.

Findings

This section presents the results of discussions among these EMAC responders, as well as information extracted from relevant documents and follow-up telephone interviews with individual participants. The findings are organized under the same five categories as in the previous section. Within each category, activities that were particularly successful are identified followed by issues needing improvement and associated recommendations.

Lessons Learned

Category 1 – Executing Deployment

Positive Accomplishment

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- EMAC worked, deploying 65,000 responders in a timely fashion.
- Prescribed liability protection, license recognition, and reimbursement procedures embedded in EMAC eliminate many barriers to speedy response.
- Florida was able to pre-position personnel and equipment in staging areas reasonably close to Mississippi from which to launch task forces directly into assigned areas of operation.
- The proliferation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) ensured the seamless integration of deploying Incident Management Teams (IMTs).
- The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conducted weekly conference calls and then coordinated Assisting State animal rescue response through EMAC.
- Implementing the disaster food stamp program was aided by the fact that Louisiana and some of the Assisting States use the same automated eligibility system, simplifying the training of deploying personnel.
- Personnel deployed under EMAC were experienced and highly capable professionals within their skill disciplines.



- Cooperation among different response teams and local officials was exceptional. Everyone shared the same goal of helping the devastated hurricane victims.
- Coordination and transition between successive IMTs was seamless. Base camp arrangements established for one team remained in place for replacements.
- Pre-established mutual-aid relations between neighboring Member States further enhanced the EMAC process. The Florida Division of Emergency Management helped Mississippi define resource requirements for Part I of the REQ-A Form while simultaneously preparing the resources for deployment.
- Deploying large self-sustained teams of personnel under a single command structure proved most effective.
- Maintaining contact with both the Assisting State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Advance Team (A-Team) or point of contact (POC) in the Requesting State while traveling minimized operational surprises upon arrival.
- In cases where Assisting States activated and staffed the EOC, the process of responding to REQ-As was particularly fast and efficient.
- The EMAC process proved very flexible and adaptable to changing requirements.
- The REQ-A process is simple and direct. It should be used as a model for other programs, such as the process of obtaining a Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT).

Issues for Improvement

5-1 – Familiarity with EMAC. For many participants, this was their first EMAC experience. This was particularly true of staff members of Assisting State supporting agencies, functional specialists deployed to the area of operations, and local government officials in the Requesting States. While the REQ-A Form is relatively simple, its provisions must be strictly adhered to by all parties. Reasonable recordkeeping is important in order to obtain reimbursement following demobilization. EMAC can best be implemented with a minimum amount of advanced knowledge.

Recommendation

- a. EMAC should be included in State and local government personnel training and should be included in all disaster training exercises.
- b. The EMAC Web site should be used as an information resource for deployed personnel and as a predeployment learning aid.
- c. When a REQ-A is initiated, a link should be attached to the EMAC Web site with a one-page EMAC summary along with general guidelines for reimbursement.

5-2 – Alert and Notification (#1). When a REQ-A Form was circulated and Member States responded, resources were placed on alert. Sometimes, there was no follow-up on the request at all. In other cases, personnel were instructed to stand-down because another State with lower costs was chosen for the response. This created a “hurry up and wait” environment and left the impression with some that EMAC participation was similar to bidding for resources on a contract where lowest price rather than best value wins. Many described the predeployment



status as a “roller coaster ride,” with units alerted to deploy, then told to stand-down, only to be alerted once again. The Lexington, KY, Bluegrass Emergency Response Team (BERT) was on the verge of deploying when the mission was cancelled. The mission was reinstated 36 hours later. A Georgia search and rescue canine team was alerted to deploy to New Orleans, then the mission was changed to Mississippi. Twelve (12) hours later it was changed back to New Orleans. Many organizations related similar stories. Repeatedly ramping resources up for deployment costs money, wastes time, and affects morale.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC leadership should monitor ongoing operations to ensure there is timely closure on every REQ-A.
- b. The EMAC Executive Task Force (ETF) should consider initially distributing REQ-As in concentric circles, first seeking resources from States in relatively close proximity to the Requesting State, and then broadening the search as needed.
- c. The EMAC ETF should educate Member States on the various criteria by which Requesting States choose among resources offered by other Member States. Cost may sometimes be a factor, but, more often, it is timeliness of arrival or other qualifications that differentiate offers of assistance.

5-3 – Alert and Notification (#2). While parallel communications through professional associations or from counterpart-to-counterpart were, for the most part, helpful, they sometimes caused confusion and premature deployment activities that are not reimbursable.

Recommendation

- a. Advise Member States of the requirement to follow established EMAC policies and not act prematurely based on unofficial information.
- b. Urge partner professional associations to inform membership about EMAC and the proper procedures for its implementation.

5-4 – REQ-A Analysis and Preparation. Some REQ-As contained minimal information early during the hurricane response, with little detailed description of the required resources. For example, a request for a fire apparatus classified as a tanker may not have specified that it be equipped with a pump unless it was only intended to transport water. This can be critical information. Later in the deployment, the requests seemed to be more thoroughly analyzed and guidance was more specific.

Recommendation

- a. A-Team members must review each REQ-A to ensure all necessary detail is included.
- b. EMAC leaders should aggressively pursue some form of resource typing to enable shorthand descriptions of commonly used resources.

5-5 – Weekend REQ-A Response. Beginning at the close of business on Friday afternoon, the response from Member States to REQ-As often slowed down, with momentum regained beginning Monday morning. Disasters don't watch the clock, and response actions must be similarly uninterrupted. Some Member States regularly take extraordinary measures to ensure timely



response to urgent requirements. For example, Washington State activates at its own expense a small internal A-Team simply to deal with EMAC requests.

Recommendation

- a. Remind Member States of the need to maintain a continuous response capability.
- b. Instruct A-Team and deploying Assisting State team leaders to begin planning for follow-on requirements as soon as a particular need is met. This will allow sufficient lead time for Assisting States to minimize weekend requirements.

5-6 – EMAC Support from Local Jurisdictions. Despite the fact that several thousand local jurisdictions from across the United States sent personnel to the Gulf Coast under EMAC, some were initially unclear of the costs and benefits of doing so. Undoubtedly, there are many local authorities who do not understand EMAC. As articulated by the assistant city manager of Port Orange, FL, in addition to it being “the right thing to do,” it may someday be a matter of reciprocity. No jurisdiction has a free pass in this risky world.

Recommendation

- a. Provide educational materials about EMAC to mutual-aid stakeholder organizations representing local government for distribution to their membership.
- b. Consider distributing a one-page summary describing EMAC suitable for insertion into local government Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans.

5-7 – Mission Definition. In many cases, the REQ-A did not adequately describe the mission that would be performed. Several REQ-As requested law enforcement assets, but did not specify whether they would be assigned general police work or special duties. Similarly, some requests for firefighters to deploy to New Orleans did not specify a requirement for high-rise building certification. The New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) also requested that only paid firefighters be deployed. As a result, some deployed personnel were underemployed. At one point, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) was asked to find work for several volunteer firefighters from other jurisdictions. The volunteer firefighters were assigned to the “Operation Chainsaw” team, a debris removal detail.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should remind Member States that it is incumbent on the Requesting State to ensure that every REQ-A accurately reflects the mission detail and that resource specifications are sufficient to accomplish the mission.

5-8 – EMAC Mission Authorization. It sometimes took too long to obtain final approval for EMAC missions. In one case, after Florida assembled five urban search and rescue teams at staging areas with nearby access to Mississippi, a 2-hour delay in obtaining the final go ahead wasted precious daylight hours and precluded full deployment until the next morning. Often, such delays resulted from difficulties finding an Authorized Representative to execute the completed REQ-A.



Recommendation

- a. As the REQ-A is finalized, all parties should be communicating to ensure that a last minute administrative oversight does not create operational delays.
- b. Member States should consider increasing the number of personnel authorized to execute the completed REQ-A.

5-9 – REQ-A Form. While the current form works well when properly executed, there are still improvements that should be made to the REQ-A Form. Some users feel that it is not sufficiently user-friendly. Others would like it to include more detailed information. Clearly, it is a challenge to incorporate as much useful information as possible while retaining the essential simplicity. Virtually everyone who relies on the REQ-A Form for its many purposes, including use as a valid identification (ID) for legitimate EMAC responders in the area of operations, observed that repeated facsimile (fax) transmission between the Requesting and Assisting States and among different entities within those States causes the REQ-A Form to become illegible.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC Coordinator should expedite the implementation of an electronic version of the REQ-A Form.
- b. The EMAC ETF should consider assigning a special assignment task force to review and recommend changes to the REQ-A Form.

5-10 – Resource Typing. There continues to be too many instances where the requesting and offering entities do not share the same understanding of the required resources. In some cases, commonly accepted terminology is used inappropriately. For example, some local authorities requested an IMT when they actually needed an EOC Support Team. In other instances, a general type resource was requested without specifying required capabilities, such as the request for a fire apparatus tanker without noting the need for an onboard pump. When the FDNY task force requested a Type 2 IMT to replace the FDNY Type 2 IMT, great confusion ensued because the EMAC process does not embrace “type and kind” classifications. There is almost universal agreement that a standard resource typing protocol would clarify understanding and speed the REQ-A process.

Recommendation

Member States should consider formally adopting one of the existing resource typing systems, such as the one developed under NIMS.

5-11 – Self-Deployed Resources. Well-meaning individuals and groups who travel to the impacted area to offer help on their own initiative complicate circumstances on the ground. They do not enjoy the protection of EMAC status. The affected State may not recognize licenses or other professional certification, and freelancing individuals may suffer undesirable insurance and legal exposure. Sometimes, self-deployed resources learn of EMAC after the fact and attempt to obtain affiliation retroactively. Individuals or groups with useful skills should contact their home State emergency management organization and investigate the possibility of EMAC deployment.



Recommendation

- a. EMAC should continue awareness activities through all available channels, including Member States, professional associations, conferences, and partner groups.
- b. Requesting States should establish checkpoints to ensure that only individuals responding under proper authority are permitted into the areas of operation.

Category 2 – Mobilization and Demobilization

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- The initial A-Teams deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi provided valuable and timely predeployment information to the Assisting States.
- The EMAC processes described in the Operations Manual worked very well, even though they had not previously been tested in an event of this magnitude.
- Communications between counterparts and through professional associations ensured the continuous flow of information from the impacted area.
- Deploying advance elements ahead of large response organizations was very important. In some cases, planned en route base camps were determined unsuitable, and substitute locations were identified before arrival of the main body.
- Communications through professional associations and between counterparts among Member States was very beneficial. It enabled Assisting States to identify and organize resources for potential deployment while Requesting States were able to pre-define and assign geographic areas of operation.
- In some cases, functions that could no longer be performed in the Requesting State were outsourced. For example, clinical specimens were shipped by Louisiana via REQ-A to an Iowa medical facility for analysis. This “reverse deployment” proved very successful.
- When they occurred, predeployment briefings on cultural, socio-economic, demographic, and political aspects of the assigned areas of operations proved very beneficial. Such information should be provided to Assisting States by Requesting States and reinforced upon arrival.
- Identifying and organizing resources in anticipation of a REQ-A allowed greater time for preparation and orientation.
- If inoculations were not provided before departure, the American Red Cross offered them in staging areas throughout the impacted area.
- Many Assisting States conducted formal debriefings after redeployment. Some encouraged participation in debriefings by scheduling them to coincide with reimbursement processing. Many organizations published very useful After-Action Reports (AARs).



Issues for Improvement

5-12 – Predeployment Information. In many instances, information about the work and living conditions in the area of operations was not accurately conveyed to responders in sufficient detail before departing an Assisting State. This was particularly true during the first weeks after the hurricane struck. When conditions are unstable, information is particularly perishable and must be frequently refreshed. This was compounded in that many of the people deployed under EMAC were unfamiliar with field operations. They normally work in a standard office environment where activities are organized, predictable, and performed routinely for 8 hours each day. At the end of the day, they go home to a comfortable residence, enjoy a nice meal, spend time with family and friends, and get a good night's sleep. Some were simply not prepared for the utter devastation of the impacted area.

Recommendation

- a. Based on the experiences of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season, the EMAC ETF should prepare a template or checklist for the A-Team to follow when reviewing the REQ-A Form to ensure it conveys adequate details.
- b. Requesting States should provide instructions to every individual designated as a POC for deploying resources conveying the importance of thoroughly communicating the “ground truth.”
- c. Requesting States should thoroughly brief arriving personnel and ensure they are properly equipped for the challenges ahead.

5-13 – EMAC Knowledge and Understanding. The response to Hurricane Katrina touched more than 2,500 different local jurisdictions across the country. Most of the responders and local and State officials were unaware of EMAC before Katrina. This necessitated countless ad hoc briefings, browser searches, and telephone calls as individuals sought information about EMAC. There was also confusion in the areas of operation among resources deployed under EMAC and those associated with other private or government programs. The need to proliferate EMAC information at every level to private citizens and government officials will help expedite support in future emergencies.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF and Member States should consider EMAC education, training, and public awareness a matter of the highest priority.

5-14 – Arrival Information (#1). In many instances, problems occurred upon initial arrival in the impacted area. Arriving responders were sometimes given incorrect reporting locations. On other occasions, the designated POC was not available, could not be located, or did not work at that site. Instructions related to work areas often did not include specific information about getting there, such as information about bridges that had washed away or impassable roads.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should require a POC identified on the REQ-A for each deployment and also identify one or two alternates with all necessary contact information.



- b. If possible, when conditions are uncertain, the Requesting State officials should guide arriving resources to the designated work destination.

5-15 – Arrival Information (#2). Often, officials in the impacted area were unaware of exactly what resources were en route and when they would arrive. Thus, when the first contingent of 300 New York City firefighters arrived at the New Orleans airport, there were no buses available to transport them to the assigned base camp.

Recommendation

- a. Whenever possible, a small advance party should precede larger groups to help coordinate arrival.
- b. Ensure continuous coordination between the A-Team and local jurisdictions during deployment.
- c. Leaders should maintain contact en route with both the Assisting State EOC and with the A-Team in the Requesting State EOC.

5-16 – Deployment Scheduling and Team Transitions. Replacement schedules were random and inconsistent. Some responders remained in the impacted area for 1 week, others for 2 weeks or longer. In some cases, individuals or groups departed before replacements arrived. In other instances, Assisting States replaced deployed personnel on a regular cycle without coordinating details with the Requesting State or with the A-Team.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should standardize the replacement process.
- b. Member States should be reminded that the A-Team should be informed in advance of resource replacements and REQ-A Forms must be appropriately amended.
- c. A minimum 24-hour overlap between incumbent and replacement personnel should be mandatory.

5-17 – Cost Tracking. Reimbursement was sometimes delayed because responders did not retain sufficient documentation regarding operating costs. Excessive delays in the reimbursement process may discourage assisting entities from participating in future deployments.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should review and modify current guidance for tracking costs and submitting claims to ensure that reimbursement occurs in a timely manner.

5-18 – Personnel Debriefings. Many deployed personnel returned home and were deactivated without participating in a mission debriefing. Such debriefings present an important opportunity to collect first-hand insights that can quickly be translated into operational improvements. Additionally, they offer responsible leaders an opportunity to help returning responders deal with other aspects of the deployment, such as recognizing symptoms of residual psychological stress that may benefit from counseling.



Recommendation

- a. Debriefings by Member States should be a mandatory part of the demobilization process.
- b. Member States should be asked to produce and share with the EMAC ETF a brief AAR following each EMAC operation.

5-19 – Personal Safety and Decontamination. Deploying personnel were sometimes unaware of the potential health risks in the area of operations. Additionally, redeployed equipment was often returned immediately to service in the home State without undergoing decontamination. When an incident first occurs, the full range of potentially dangerous conditions are not fully apparent. It is imperative that information about possible personal risks and potential exposure to hazardous environmental conditions be continuously monitored and widely disseminated.

Recommendation

- a. The A-Team should routinely disseminate information concerning safety and health conditions in operating areas using the EMAC Broadcast system.
- b. Requesting State officials should brief EMAC responders upon arrival in the impacted area and provide required safety materials, inoculations, or other items not obtained prior to deployment.
- c. Regular safety inspections should be conducted during prolonged deployments.
- d. All equipment returning from an area with known hazardous conditions should undergo a thorough decontamination process.

5-20 – Law Enforcement Response Planning. Mobilization and field deployment of law enforcement resources is seldom addressed in detail in State and local jurisdiction emergency management plans. The Federal Government cannot provide a great deal of appropriate law enforcement support, short of declaring martial law and engaging military forces in police duties. State and local governments need to consider the employment of police and sheriff department resources from other jurisdictions in emergency plans.

Recommendation

- a. State emergency management agencies should review, revise, and update plans to ensure adequate attention to deployment of reinforcing law enforcement resources.
- b. State exercises with local jurisdictions should include situations that require reinforcing law enforcement organizations.

5-21 – Mission Completion. Some personnel remained in the area of operations after their deployment ended. This created complications for replacement personnel and also presented potential risk to those individuals. With the expiration of the mission as stipulated on the original REQ-A Form, such individuals are not protected under the EMAC covenant.



Recommendation

- a. Unless the requesting entity asks deployed personnel to extend deployment and amends the REQ-A Form appropriately, personnel should return to their home State upon completion of the mission.
- b. Assisting States should closely monitor the status of each REQ-A mission to ensure redeployment is timely and complete.

5-22 – Command Structure. While most emergency management and first response organizations have fully embraced NIMS and ICS, many other responders were not familiar with ICS or with any other structured command organization. Many individuals not previously exposed to ICS found it overly restrictive and personally invasive.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC leadership, along with the Members States, should encourage professional organizations to provide NIMS information to members.
- b. Member States should provide NIMS training to State and local emergency responders and should invite relevant professional groups to participate in State and local jurisdiction emergency management exercises.
- c. A predeployment ICS briefing or a brochure with summary information should be provided to all responders.

Category 3 – Logistics

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- En route support provided to the Indiana Task Force at Southaven, MS, was outstanding. Responders did not need to unpack personal items. Everyone was issued toiletries, towels, washcloths, and bedding. Thirty (30) portable showers were installed at the direction of the mayor of Southaven and the board of the Southaven Expo Center.
- Establishing base camps for large groups of responders worked very well.
- The base camp infrastructure remained in place for replacements as teams redeployed to their home State.
- The American Red Cross provided inoculations prior to deployment or upon arrival in the area of operations.
- As victims waited in line for public assistance support at field sites, National Guard, State police, county sheriff, and city police provided security and the Red Cross distributed water.
- There was generally good health and safety information available to deploying personnel.



- Outsourcing requirements to unaffected States reduced the logistics burden in the impacted area.
- When proper channels were used, originators received the requested support.
- Many of the large contingents, including fire/HazMat task forces, law enforcement, and IMTs brought with them everything needed for extensive self-supported operations.
- Some responders described food and shelter in the area of operations as better than they had expected.
- The use of advance parties preceding large groups into the operating sites allowed for adjustments to logistics plans before departure.

Issues for Improvement

5-23 – Definition of Self-Sufficient. Some deployed resources described as self-sufficient quickly expended their own supplies and spare parts and required additional logistical support. This placed an unexpected burden on requesting entities. Many organizations define self-sufficient as inclusive of a 72-hour operating period. Others plan on carrying supplies for the duration of the deployment.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC ETF should coordinate with Member States to achieve a standard definition of self-sufficiency.
- b. EMAC should consider adopting the FDNY support package consisting of:
 - Communications and computer equipment
 - Mechanics for equipment failures
 - Emergency medical providers
 - Medical supplies
 - Fuel
 - Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs)
 - Water
 - Tents
 - Sleeping bags
 - Cots

5-24 – Replenishing Supplies. The process of ordering supplies under EMAC is not clearly defined. Some deployed organizations were resupplied directly from their home State. Others acquired supplies from the requesting entity. Some simply foraged from local sources. Incoming supplies were sometimes commandeered by someone other than the ordering organization.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should consider, in coordination with Member States, a standard resupply process that is accounted for on the REQ-A.



5-25 – Item Ownership. In some cases, non-perishable items purchased in the areas of operation for which the Assisting State was subsequently reimbursed by the Requesting State were retained by deployed personnel. Equipment such as computers, cell phones, and similar items should be left with replacement personnel and delivered to the requesting entity upon mission completion.

Recommendation

- a. The EMAC Operations Manual should include a policy addressing the disposition of non-perishable items for which reimbursement will be sought.
- b. During the demobilization process, Assisting States should ascertain the status of non-perishable items acquired during deployment and ensure appropriate disposition.

5-26 – Base Camp Support. While the base camp concept worked very well, in some cases, there was insufficient infrastructure support. The NOFD did the best it could to arrange for food and other supplies for the deploying FDNY task force. Unfortunately, without electricity and sufficient ice, perishable food stocks spoiled quickly and FDNY had to forage locally until they hired a caterer. Members of the FDNY task force also performed support duties at Camp Algiers when not working on shift. This added stress to already long work days.

Recommendation

When setting up base camps, Member States should consider all aspects of camp operations to ensure the support infrastructure is adequate.

5-27 – Base Camp Security. In some cases, base camp security was lax, with only sporadic check-in and check-out procedures. At one point, National Guard personnel who had been performing security missions at some base camps were redeployed in anticipation of Hurricane Rita because replacements were not available.

Recommendation

Member States should include security provisions in all plans calling for base camp operations. Deployed personnel should be provided a safe area to recuperate from long and strenuous work shifts.

5-28 – Base Camp Preparations. Some designated base camps were not ready for occupancy when response units were directed to occupy them. The Indiana Task Force was assigned to a base camp at a Navy construction battalion facility near Gulfport, MS. Fortunately, they dispatched an advance party before breaking camp. This reconnaissance revealed that only about 10 percent of the area had been cleared, certainly insufficient for an organization with 110 vehicles and 213 personnel. Some of the advance party vehicles received flat tires while surveying the site.

Recommendation

All proposed lodging areas and base camp sites should be reconnoitered to ensure adequate conditions prevail before ordering responders to occupy them.



5-29 – Lodging Locations. Many deployed personnel had very long daily commutes from assigned lodging to work sites. The public assistance support team from Washington State traveled 2 hours each way to deliver service to hurricane victims.

Recommendation

Whenever possible, Requesting States should assign responders to lodging as convenient as possible to the place of work.

5-30 – Communications with Base Camps. A-Teams working at State EOCs did not have regular communications with base camps or other lodging sites so that they could maintain contact with deployed resources housed in those facilities.

Recommendation

When operations of extended duration are anticipated, communications should be established between the A-Team and billeting sites used to house large numbers of responders.

5-31 – Cost of Donated Supplies. Donated supplies are not free. They must be transported, stored, and maintained in the impact area. For example, medical supplies need to be protected from climate extremes and must be carefully accounted for. These expenses are not always considered during cost estimating or in reimbursement calculations.

Recommendation

EMAC should ask Member States to analyze all costs associated with the Katrina/Rita deployment to help improve future cost estimating.

5-32 – Operating Authority. In many cases, IMTs were not given delegation of authority by the requesting entity, and some did not have independent purchasing authority. This was sometimes problematic because requesting entity decision-makers were not always collocated with deployed organizations. For example, Camp Algiers was home to the NOFD, the FDNY Task Force, the Illinois Task Force, and the Maryland Task Force. NOFD and FDNY shared unified command responsibility; however, NOFD decision-makers were located at City Hall. This complicated otherwise simple requirements that needed some exercise of fiduciary authority.

Recommendation

- a. In cases where deployed personnel are operating in areas not readily accessible to requesting entity officials, the Requesting State should be delegate authority to responsible officials.
- b. Member States should designate a State team leader with reasonable discretionary purchasing authority.

5-33 – Personnel Accountability. If a team leader was not specified on the REQ-A, it was difficult and sometimes impossible to notify deployed personnel regarding the imminent danger posed by the approach of Hurricane Rita. In some cases, individuals learned of the threat because of precautionary actions taken by local citizens rather than from advisories emanating from a hierarchical authority within the EMAC framework. In massive deployments such as occurred in response to Hurricane Katrina, personnel accountability is a shared responsibility.



However, at the location where EMAC support is delivered, the requesting entity is responsible for the safety and well being of resources deployed under EMAC.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should reinforce the roles of all parties in accounting for deployed personnel during all phases of operations.

5-34 – Area Maps. There was a severe shortage of street maps covering the cities and towns in the impacted area. With most of the signage destroyed, navigation was already very difficult. The absence of maps only worsened the situation.

Recommendation

- a. Member States should encourage every jurisdiction to stockpile street maps for distribution in case of emergency.
- b. Portable Global Positioning System (GPS) devices should be considered as standard equipment for deploying organizations.

Category 4 – Field Operations

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- Local officials invited EMAC representatives to participate in situation briefings and public meetings.
- Requesting entities were flexible in adapting REQ-As to adjust numbers of personnel.
- Ensuring a 1-day overlap between arriving and departing personnel provided adequate time for orientation.
- Photographs taken during deployment provided excellent documentation and provided evidence of the usefulness of donated materials.
- Some responders produced and distributed handouts within affected communities with contact information for government and volunteer relief organizations.
- State Animal Response Teams (SARTs) proved to be very helpful to the animal rescue effort.
- Communications and rumor control efforts were very important. North Carolina created a Web site for responders to communicate with families back home.
- Dispatching advance detachments before deploying larger organizations helped responders arrive better prepared for existing circumstances.
- Organizations that had embedded logistics capabilities were better able to manage logistics activities in the field.



- Having standard nationwide law enforcement services aided in the integration of personnel from many different jurisdictions.

Issues for Improvement

5-35 – Community Interaction. In some instances, relations with local residents was contentious due to the fact that EMAC responders were perceived as “outsiders.” Some local emergency services organizations had to be reassured that deployed responders were not taking over operations; rather, they were in a support role. For example, leaders of the deployed FDNY Task Force asked the union leadership in New York to convey that message to their New Orleans’ counterparts.

Recommendation

- a. All personnel deploying under EMAC should be reminded that local authority prevails and that responders are there to help them carry out their responsibilities.
- b. Prior to departing their home State or immediately upon arrival in the Requesting State, personnel should be thoroughly briefed on local conditions, government organization, culture, demographics, and other important items to help them fit in rather than stand out.

5-36 – Delegation of Authority. Some local authorities were unwilling to delegate authority to response personnel even though they were distracted by personal loss and often unavailable to make important decisions on the scene.

Recommendation

In cases where the devastation is such that local responders are unable to devote sufficient attention to community needs because of personal circumstances, delegation of authority to supporting outside resources should be encouraged.

5-37 – Mission Adjustments. Frequent mission changes were sometimes disruptive. The local Incident Commander must have the flexibility to reassign resources to meet changing requirements in turbulent circumstances.

Recommendation

- a. Responders must be flexible and ready to adapt quickly to changing requirements.
- b. Changes in mission or location should be coordinated with the A-Team and, when appropriate, documented with a REQ-A Form amendment.

5-38 – Identification and Access Control. The absence of a common EMAC identification credential made it difficult to consistently control access to base camps and other lodging areas and to verify authorized entrance to work sites. In some cases, personnel deployed under EMAC were turned back by law enforcement or National Guard personnel at control points on the perimeter of the impacted area.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should explore with Member States the possibility of issuing a standard EMAC photo ID to personnel deploying under EMAC.



5-39 – Total Resource Integration. Activities of Federal, State, and local government organizations and resources from private and charitable sources were not always coordinated and synchronized. The Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) task forces deployed into Mississippi by Florida encountered Federal US&R teams working in the same area of operations. Neither knew of the others' presence. Similar incidents occurred among law enforcement agencies from different jurisdictions.

Recommendation

Member States should fully implement the ICS so that a single Incident Commander is responsible for coordinating and directing all response activities in a specific geographic area regardless of the source of response resources.

5-40 – Organizational Integrity. Sometimes deploying organizations were split and individuals were sent to different operating locations. This effectively disrupts organizational unity and reduces accountability. This frequently happened to law enforcement organizations, but also to others. For example, the members of a four-person team deployed as part of the North Carolina contingent were assigned to work at four disparate locations. This has serious implications for morale and emotional well being.

Recommendation

- a. Whenever possible, unit integrity should be kept intact during field operations.
- b. A minimum two-person buddy system should be mandatory to ensure that no one is left without some resource to share the burden of response operations. Such a requirement should be incorporated into the EMAC Operations Manual.

5-41 – Staging Areas. Initial staging areas for arriving resources were not always identified in advance, and staging area activities were inconsistent. In some cases, arrival and check-in procedures were well organized and thorough. In other cases, they appeared ad hoc. Some staging areas were inadequately staffed and lacked appropriate operating procedures. All newly arriving personnel should be thoroughly briefed with current operational information. Inoculations and other preventive medical procedures should be provided if they had not been accomplished prior to deployment. Personnel should be inspected to ensure they are properly dressed and equipped for operations.

Recommendation

- a. Based on experience gained during the response to Hurricane Katrina, EMAC should coordinate with Member States to develop standard staging area procedures for major Level 1 response operations.
- b. Staging areas should be sufficiently staffed to perform all of the required activities for the anticipated number of deploying responders.

5-42 – Situational Awareness. Often, the circumstances on the ground differed significantly from those described on the REQ-A Form. In a fast moving situation where conditions can deteriorate rapidly, information must be frequently updated. This is especially difficult to accomplish if a hard copy REQ-A Form is the primary means of conveying such information.



Recommendation

- a. Multiple sources should regularly disseminate situational information from the impacted area. The requesting entity should relay updates through the A-Team and from the designated POC directly to the providing entity. Advance parties deployed to reconnoiter the operating area should send information back to the main body.
- b. An electronic REQ-A Form should be implemented as soon as practical. It can be amended more easily than hard copy and information can be more quickly disseminated.

5-43 – Cost Tracking and Accountability. Standard procedures were not used to keep track of operational expenditures, hourly personnel costs, acquisition of supplies and equipment, and cost of living expenses.

Recommendation

EMAC should establish a mechanism within the EMAC Operations System for tracking personnel and operating expenditures for which reimbursement will be sought.

5-44 – Information Flow. Often, the information about the mission and local conditions available to replacement personnel was the same as that provided on the original REQ-A Form. It is unlikely that such information reflected current circumstances in the areas of operation. Some situational changes require amending the REQ-A Form or issuing a new one.

Recommendation

The incumbent team leader is obligated to provide current situational information to replacements prior to departure and should also keep Assisting State officials familiar with evolving circumstances in the area of operations. This information should be shared with A-Team members as well.

5-45 – Building Inspection Documentation. Entering data while simultaneously performing inspections hampers the performance of certified building inspectors and slows the overall process. Digital photography provides an acceptable way to supplement inspections consistent with Applied Technology Council Standard 20 for storm damage. There is limited knowledge about properly documenting building inspections.

Recommendation

Data entry personnel provided by the Requesting State should accompany building inspectors to capture results in real time during inspections.

Category 5 – Coordination and Control

Positive Accomplishments

The positive accomplishments in this category were noted as follows:

- Deployed personnel from Florida established an area command embracing Mississippi's six southern counties. This unified command approach clarified reporting and coordination channels.



- The Virginia EMAC contingent began transition planning 1 week before replacements were scheduled to deploy and included the A-Team in the planning process. This ensured smooth and seamless transitions between incumbent and replacement resources.
- Two-week deployment periods with additional travel and transition time worked well.
- The NIMS/ICS structure provided a common foundation for coordination among organizations from different jurisdictions.
- Deployed mobile command posts proved to be very useful for purposes of coordination and control.
- Law enforcement, fire, and multi-disciplinary emergency responder task forces with embedded command and control, logistics, administrative, and other support resources worked very well.
- The Louisiana State Police established a very effective network of staging areas in the Baton Rouge area, which helped as the region swelled with evacuees to nearly double its normal population.
- The Florida EOC predesignated en route refueling locations for resources deploying into Mississippi.
- Health and safety information, including guidance regarding decontamination and inoculations, was available to most deploying personnel.
- The practice of having the Requesting State issue ID cards to personnel from Assisting States reduced confusion regarding authorization to be in the area of operations.
- Interagency participation in Requesting and Assisting States planning activities helped expand knowledge about EMAC and produced better coordinated plans.
- In some cases, representatives from the Requesting State accompanied deployed personnel to the area of operations. This practice aided coordination with local authorities.
- Deploying an advance party ahead of a larger body of responders ensured better coordination upon arrival in the impacted area.
- Many Assisting States have already collected information from the Katrina deployment and implemented improvements in their internal policies and programs.

Issues for Improvement

5-46 – Federal Agency Coordination. Coordination with Federal agencies in the field was problematic. Some Federal agency contingents arrived self-contained and operated in a vacuum with minimal communications with local authorities and other responder groups. In many instances, deployed Federal responders were uninformed about EMAC. Often, Federal personnel presumed that EMAC personnel were subordinate to, and could be directed by, Federal representatives. Some Federal officials asked to use EMAC to obtain additional resources, unaware that it is a State-to-State mutual-aid compact.



Recommendation

- a. Increase EMAC awareness and understanding throughout the Federal Government community.
- b. Engage in training exercises that involve all government jurisdictions.

5-47 – Operational Coordination. IMTs and unified area commands were often unaware of the location and activities of Federal entities working in the same area. This lack of coordination prevented intelligence sharing and confused local authorities attempting to fulfill public safety responsibilities.

Recommendation

EMAC leaders should initiate, through the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), a dialogue with Federal officials aimed at improving coordination before and during response activities.

5-48 – Information Sharing. In some cases, leaders of deployed Federal responders were not empowered to share situational intelligence with other parties, including local authorities. Clearance had to be obtained from higher authority, which delayed the exchange of perishable operational information.

Recommendation

Leaders of deployed Federal organizations engaged in field operations should be authorized and required to share situational information with other response entities and with local authorities.

5-49 – Local Area Knowledge. Many deployed responders were unfamiliar with local area governmental structure, policies, procedures, and operating parameters.

Recommendation

Upon arrival in the area of operations, deploying resource team leaders should request a briefing by local officials to familiarize responders with operational conditions.

5-50 – National Guard Deployment. National Guard units from Assisting States did not follow a standard deployment protocol. Some deployed in response to a REQ-A using standard EMAC procedures. Others deployed as a result of direct coordination between the Requesting and Assisting State Adjutants General and later applied for EMAC status. Some States coordinated deployment through the National Guard Bureau, while others appeared not to.

Recommendation

EMAC leaders should coordinate with the National Guard Bureau and Member States to arrive at a standard policy for deploying National Guard resources under the authority of EMAC.

5-51 – Incident Management Team Typing. There was occasional misunderstanding about the composition and nature of IMTs. Some requesting entities specified the need for an IMT when the actual mission was inappropriate based on generally accepted resource typing



definitions. In some cases, the need for an EOC support team was instead expressed as a requirement for an IMT.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should persist in pursuing adaptation of the NIMS resource typing protocol or one of the other systems used by specific disciplines.

5-52 – EMAC Training for Non-A-Team Members. There is currently no EMAC training available except for the recently deployed A-Team Field Course. Non-A-Team members deploying under EMAC have no opportunity to learn about EMAC and its operating parameters.

Recommendation

- a. NEMA and the EMAC ETF should prepare a short tutorial on EMAC that can be presented by Member States to all deploying resources as well as to various professional associations and other appropriate groups.
- b. Encourage widespread access to EMAC information publicly available on the EMAC Web site.

5-53 – Resource Demobilization. In some cases, EMAC demobilization occurred without a plan. Some responders returned to their home State without external coordination when replacements arrived. The demobilization checklist included in the EMAC Operations Manual was apparently not always utilized by Assisting States.

Recommendation

- a. Review and revise as appropriate the EMAC demobilization checklist to serve as a more useful guide assisting States.
- b. Consider encouraging the use of the ICS Incident Action Plan (IAP) for mobilization and demobilization planning.
- c. All replacement and demobilization activities should be coordinated with the A-Team at the Requesting State EOC.

5-54 – NIMS Adherence. Some individuals chose to operate outside the NIMS/ICS structure. For example, physicians sometimes chose to work through professional medical channels to obtain supplies rather than through the ICS logistics section. Many deployed professional staff members were unfamiliar with both EMAC and NIMS and did not understand or appreciate the value of structure and discipline in field operations.

Recommendation

- a. Implement an aggressive public awareness and education program with emphasis on reaching critical professional organizations.
- b. Encourage Member States to include broad public participation in local training and exercises to increase familiarity with both EMAC and NIMS.
- c. Standardize the orientation of all deploying personnel stressing the need for compliance with command and control provisions.



5-55 – Double Counting Resources. When Assisting States attempted to activate resources to meet an EMAC REQ-A, they occasionally discovered that those personnel had already been committed under a Federal agency program.

Recommendation

The deployment of State assets by any organization should always be coordinated through the State emergency management entity.

5-56 – Freelance Volunteers. Individuals who deployed to the impacted area unaffiliated with any response organization sometimes approached personnel deployed under EMAC and asked to join their effort. Often, these individuals have valuable skills that are highly useful in response operations.

Recommendation

Such individuals should be instructed to contact their home State emergency management entity to determine if there is an unmet requirement for his or her skills reflected on an active or pending REQ-A.

5-57 – Overqualified Responders. Some responders were clearly overqualified for the requirement specified on the REQ-A. Upon arrival in the area of operations, they quickly discovered that there wasn't a need for highly specialized skills and they were not able to perform well the less demanding work that was needed. This produced an unhappy responder and an unfilled real requirement.

Recommendation

- a. The A-Team should ensure that every REQ-A clearly defines the requirement.
- b. Assisting States should ensure that offering entities adhere to the skill specifications described in the REQ-A.
- c. Peer-to-peer communications will help ensure that requesting and offering entities are synchronized.
- d. Imposing a resource typing protocol will prevent such errors.

5-58 – Post-Deployment Costs. Some post-deployment costs are not now considered reimbursable under EMAC, such as physical and mental medical screening.

Recommendation

The EMAC ETF should review current reimbursement provisions and restrictions to ensure appropriate coverage.

5-59 – Problem Resolution. When problems arose in the field, there was not always an obvious path for resolution. Sometimes, there appeared to be parallel chains of command involving the National Guard, local government leaders, Federal agencies, area commands, IMTs, task force leaders, and others. Almost every potential dispute involves multiple jurisdictions. Everyone, regardless of parent organization or point of origin, is in the area of operations to support the Requesting State through its local officials. Unless there is a declaration of martial law, the senior official in the appropriate local government jurisdiction is in charge.



Recommendation

Continued education by Member States at all levels and among all relevant parties should reduce ambiguity.

5-60 – REQ-A Consolidation. Sometimes, several REQ-As were processed for similar and simultaneous requirements. This led to some confusion regarding what resources were working under the terms of which REQ-A.

Recommendation

The A-Team should recommend consolidating REQ-As whenever appropriate in order to eliminate unnecessary paperwork and simplify resource management.

5-61 – Fax Transmissions. Repeated fax transmissions reduced the legibility of REQ-A Forms to the point that they served little practical value.

Recommendation

Implement an electronic REQ-A Form as soon as practical.

5-62 – REQ-A Changes. Requesting entities were often unaware of how to amend an existing REQ-A. Often, a new REQ-A Form was submitted to extend resources already on site because the process of initiating support was more familiar than amending an existing contract.

Recommendation

Member State EMAC Coordinators should ensure that information on revising or extending missions and amending the REQ-A is available to officials in every local jurisdiction that might require mutual aid through EMAC.

5-63 – Deployment Status. Because of the sheer volume and speed of deployment, A-Teams had a difficult time keeping track of the ongoing status of deploying resources. The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency assigned a staff member the primary responsibility of tracking the whereabouts of EMAC resources.

Recommendation

In large-scale Level 1 EMAC deployments, consider augmenting the A-Team with an additional person dedicated to tracking current operations while the remaining members facilitate and process requests for additional resources.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Annex A

Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale





ANNEX A

Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale

The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1 to 5 rating based on the hurricane's present intensity. This is used to give an estimate of the potential property damage and flooding expected along the coast from a hurricane landfall. Wind speed is the determining factor in the scale, as storm surge values are highly dependent on the slope of the continental shelf and the shape of the coastline, in the landfall region. Note that all winds are using the U.S. 1-minute average.

Tropical Depression

Not named

Winds: Less than 38 mph (33 kt or 62 kph).


Tropical Storm

Not named

Winds: 39 to 73 mph (34 to 63 kt or 63 to 118 kph).

Category 1 Hurricane

Minimal



Winds: 74 to 95 mph (64 to 82 kt or 119 to 153 km/hr).

Storm Surge: Generally 4 to 5 feet above normal.


Damage: No real damage to building structures. Damage primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery, and trees. Some damage to poorly constructed signs.

Flooding: Some coastal road flooding and minor pier damage.

Examples: [Hurricane Lili](#) of 2002 made landfall on the Louisiana coast as a Category 1 hurricane. [Hurricane Gaston](#) of 2004 was a Category 1 hurricane that made landfall along the central South Carolina coast.

Category 2 Hurricane

Moderate



Winds: 96 to 110 mph (83 to 95 kt or 154 to 177 km/hr).

Storm Surge: Generally 6 to 8 feet above normal.

Damage: Some roofing material, door, and window damage of buildings. Considerable damage to shrubbery and trees with some trees blown down. Considerable damage to mobile homes, poorly constructed signs, and piers.


Flooding: Coastal and low-lying escape routes flood 2 to 4 hours before arrival of the hurricane center. Small craft in unprotected anchorages break moorings.

Examples: [Hurricane Frances](#) of 2004 made landfall over the southern end of Hutchinson Island, FL, as a Category 2 hurricane. [Hurricane Isabel](#) of 2003 made landfall near Drum Inlet on the Outer Banks of North Carolina as a Category 2 hurricane.



Category 3 Hurricane

Extensive



Winds: 111 to 130 mph (96 to 113 kt or 178 to 209 km/hr).

Storm Surge: Generally 9 to 12 feet above normal.

Damage: Some structural damage to small residences and utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall failures. Damage to shrubbery and trees with foliage blown off trees and large trees blown down. Mobile homes and poorly constructed signs are destroyed.

Flooding: Low-lying escape routes are cut by rising water 3 to 5 hours before arrival of the center of the hurricane. Flooding near the coast destroys smaller structures with larger structures damaged by battering from floating debris. Terrain continuously lower than 5 feet above mean sea level may be flooded inland 8 miles (13 km) or more.

Evacuation: Evacuation of low-lying residences with several blocks of the shoreline may be required.

Examples: [Hurricanes Jeanne](#) and [Ivan](#) of 2004 were Category 3 hurricanes when they made landfall in Florida and in Alabama, respectively.

Category 4 Hurricane

Extreme



Winds: 131 to 155 mph (114 to 135 kt or 210 to 249 km/hr).

Storm Surge: Generally 13 to 18 feet above normal.

Damage: More extensive curtainwall failures with some complete roof structure failures on small residences. Shrubs, trees, and all signs are blown down. Complete destruction of mobile homes. Extensive damage to doors and windows.

Flooding: Low-lying escape routes may be cut by rising water 3 to 5 hours before arrival of the center of the hurricane. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the shore.

Evacuation: Terrain lower than 10 feet above sea level may be flooded requiring massive evacuation of residential areas as far inland as 6 miles (10 km).

Examples: [Hurricane Charley](#) of 2004 was a Category 4 hurricane made landfall in Charlotte County, FL, with winds of 150 mph. [Hurricane Dennis](#) of 2005 struck the island of Cuba as a Category 4 hurricane.

Category 5 Hurricane

Catastrophic



Winds: Greater than 155 mph (135 kt or 249 km/hr).

Storm Surge: Generally greater than 18 feet above normal.

Damage: Complete roof failure on many residences and industrial buildings. Some complete building failures with small utility buildings blown over or away. All shrubs, trees, and signs blown down. Complete destruction of mobile homes. Severe and extensive window and door damage.

Flooding: Low-lying escape routes are cut by rising water 3 to 5 hours before arrival of the center of the hurricane. Major damage to lower floors of all structures located less than 15 feet above sea level and within 500 yards of the shoreline.

Evacuation: Massive evacuation of residential areas on low ground within 5 to 10 miles (8 to 16 km) of the shoreline may be required.



Examples: Only 3 Category 5 hurricanes have made landfall in the United States since records began: The Labor Day Hurricane of 1935, Hurricane Camille (1969), and [Hurricane Andrew](#) in August 1992. The 1935 Labor Day Hurricane struck the Florida Keys with a minimum pressure of 892 mb—the lowest pressure ever observed in the United States. Hurricane Camille struck the Mississippi Gulf Coast causing a 25-foot storm surge, which inundated Pass Christian. [Hurricane Andrew](#) of 1992 made landfall over southern Miami-Dade County, FL, causing 26.5 billion dollars in losses. In addition, [Hurricane Wilma](#) of 2005 was a Category 5 hurricane at peak intensity and is the strongest Atlantic tropical cyclone on record with a minimum pressure of 882 mb.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Annex B

2005 EMAC Post- Deployment Survey Results





ANNEX B

2005 EMAC Post-Deployment Survey Results

742 Total Number of Survey Responses

1. Have you taken an EMAC training class in the last 24 months?

13%	92	Yes
87%	642	No
734		Total Responses to Question

2. Were you deployed more than one time?

9%	64	Yes
91%	668	No
732		Total Responses to Question

3. Please indicate the event(s) you were deployed for and the timeframe of your dates of service.

Deployment Locations and Length of Service

10	Hurricane Katrina – Florida
316	Hurricane Katrina – Louisiana
389	Hurricane Katrina – Mississippi
4	Hurricane Katrina – Alabama
6	Hurricane Rita – Texas
43	Hurricane Rita – Louisiana
20.05	Average Length of 1st Deployment
16.16	Average Length of 2nd Deployment
17.50	Average Length of 3rd Deployment
37.50	Average Length of 4th Deployment
22.80	Average Number of Days Deployed



4. Please indicate what discipline your deployment is considered.

0%	3	Agriculture & Forestry
22%	159	Emergency Management
10%	74	Fire-HazMat
9%	68	Health-Medical-EMT-Ambulance
3%	23	Human Services
13%	93	Law Enforcement
0%	2	Law Enforcement – Corrections
5%	35	Law Enforcement – Sheriff
6%	45	Law Enforcement – State Police
1%	9	Public Works
4%	29	Search and Rescue
1%	8	Transportation & Highway
14%	104	National Guard
10%	76	Other

728 Total Responses to Question

5. Were you familiar with EMAC processes and procedures prior to your deployment for Hurricane Katrina (or Hurricane Rita if that was your first response event)?

32%	232	Yes
68%	496	No

728 Total Responses to Question

6. Please specify your work location(s).

For Internal EMAC Purposes Only

7. Identify your specific assignment(s).

For Internal EMAC Purposes Only

8. Was your assignment made clear before you were deployed?

70%	504	Yes
30%	215	No

719 Total Responses to Question

9. Were deployment conditions (living conditions and work environment) adequately described to you?

74%	534	Yes
26%	183	No

717 Total Responses to Question



10. Were mobilization instructions clear?

77%	556	Yes
23%	164	No
720		Total Responses to Question

11. Were you briefed and given instructions upon arrival?

84%	604	Yes
16%	112	No
716		Total Responses to Question

12. Did you report regularly to a supervisor during deployment?

91%	653	Yes
9%	63	No
716		Total Responses to Question

13. Were your mission assignment and tasks made clear?

81%	584	Yes
19%	135	No
719		Total Responses to Question

14. Do you feel that there was sufficient continuity of operations?

65%	467	Yes
35%	251	No
718		Total Responses to Question

15. Was the chain of command clear?

76%	545	Yes
24%	171	No
716		Total Responses to Question



16. Did you encounter any barriers or obstacles while deployed? You can tell us about an issue that made your job difficult or something that you had to work to get resolved. Please keep your comments focused and brief.

a. Is this an EMAC issue or a State issue?

44%	169	EMAC
56%	214	State

383 Total Responses to Question

b. Was there resolution?

48%	187	Yes
52%	206	No

393 Total Responses to Question

c. The 10 most frequently commented "EMAC" issues. (Same issue in EMAC and State)**

1.	**	Poor communication, miscommunications, and lack of coordination between Federal/State/local/agencies/EMAC and deployed personnel.
2.	**	Lack of adequate maps of the area.
3.	**	Inadequate lines of communications.
4.	**	Lack of information on deployment procedures.
5.	**	Inadequate living conditions (e.g., no place to sleep, no food, cold showers, etc.).
6.	**	Reimbursement issues (e.g., asked to work 12-hour shifts, but worked 24-hour shifts; out-of-pocket expenses; expectations did not parallel with reality).
7.		Understaffing—could not get missions signed in a timely manner and had no 24-hour coverage at EMAC desk.
8.		Personnel not qualified for mission assignment.
9.	**	Took too long to deploy resources, equipment, and personnel.
10.		Politics and personal agendas including discourse within teams making mission difficult.

d. If this was an EMAC issue, was it resolved?

49%	83	Yes
49%	83	No
2%	3	No response

169 Total Responses to Question



e. The 10 most frequently commented "State" issues. (Same issue in EMAC and State)**

1.	**	Poor equipment (e.g., copiers, computers, fax machines).
2.	**	State agencies were unprepared for emergency and incoming help – need more Statewide training and better organization.
3.	**	No clear or direct chain of command or control of mission.
4.	**	Lack of adequate maps and priority areas were not mapped/assigned.
5.	**	Lack of adequate communications.
6.		Unclear mission assignments.
7.	**	Poor coordination between agencies/State/Federal/counties.
8.		Deployed personnel were under utilized – could have done more, but mission was restricted to niche so sat and wasted time – politics limited assignments.
9.		Many State agencies did not know how to use EMAC and bypassed the process.
10.	**	Inadequate living conditions (men and women billeted together) and price gouging for resources (e.g., rental cars, lodging, etc.). Were sent into field with no food, money, or lodging.

f. If this was a State issue, was it resolved?

43%	93	Yes
53%	113	No
4%	8	No response

214 Total Responses to Question

17. Did you have communications while in the field?

87%	606	Yes
13%	94	No

700 Total Responses to Question

18. Were you adequately debriefed after completion of your assignment?

60%	420	Yes
40%	283	No

703 Total Responses to Question

19. Since your return home, have you identified or experienced any symptoms you feel might require "Critical Incident Stress Management" (i.e., debriefing)?

7%	47	Yes
93%	657	No

704 Total Responses to Question



20. Would you want to be deployed via EMAC in the future?

92%	645	Yes
8%	56	No

701 Total Responses to Question

21. Identify the areas where EMAC needs improvement? (check all that apply)

23%	88	Executing Deployment
19%	72	Command and Control
23%	89	Logistics
16%	62	Field Operations
20%	77	Mobilization and Demobilization

388 Total Responses to Question

22. Identify the areas of EMAC that worked well.

1. EMAC A-Teams knew the EMAC process well and were helpful – different disciplines on A-Team helped to facilitate requests.
2. The home State EMAC reps were very helpful in solving problems with the host State – as missions changed they kept field personnel informed.
3. Minimal paperwork or EMAC is a plus.
4. EMAC did a good job, but problems within the States themselves made EMAC look bad.
5. Many A-Team personnel came with “Go Kits” and satellite telephones – were ready to go when they hit the ground.
6. People on the ground did a great job despite lack of direction.
7. EMAC personnel easily fit into existing structures.
8. National-level EMAC structure was fast and effective in identifying critical needs and matching individuals to immediate areas needing attention.
9. Knowing license and credentials were protected – allowed to focus on work.
10. It seems that EMAC has a lack of the normal “governmental red tape.”

23. Identify what EMAC resource needs improvement? (check all that apply)

27%	118	EMAC Education
26%	117	EMAC Training
10%	46	Electronic REQ-A Forms
10%	44	Resource Typing
12%	53	Resource Descriptions
9%	41	Broadcast Notifications
6%	26	Web Site

445 Total Responses to Question



Explanation
1. Need more education on what EMAC is and how it works across all disciplines including State personnel and agencies within the States and at the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. Didn't know what EMAC even was before being deployed and barely knew then. State EMAs must do more EMAC training to locals and agencies within State.
2. Must have standardized resource typing even to the point of having EMAC resources typed and job descriptions for EMAC A-Teams in the manual/Web site.
3. Need advanced EMAC training for A-Team members and field EMAC training for deployed personnel.
4. Online REQ-A is needed.
5. Need more assistance when filling out requests—how to do it, how to know what to ask for.
6. All deployed personnel need a condensed brief course on emergency operation procedures.
7. Need job descriptions for EMAC A-Teams and should be included in the manual and Web site.
8. Need more training on the EMAC Web site.
9. States need to keep Web site updated—was still filling requests to find they were already filled or withdrawn.
10. Need more information on reimbursement—what will be paid for, how to get paid, etc.

24. Provide any additional comments you want us to consider in the After-Action Review.

1. Need 24/7 coverage at NRCC and State EOCs.
2. Need more training/education on EMAC for all disciplines.
3. Need to be told to bring own supplies, materials, staff, and transportation.
4. Interoperability is a concern. Reduce National Guard lingo (abbreviations), and the National Guard definition of a mission is different than how EMAC defines a mission.
5. National Guard needs to work through EMAC in requesting/assigning resources not around EMAC. I received several complaints from Assisting States on this when trying to purge all the pending National Guard REQ-As in Louisiana.
6. I wish that the media would have more fully covered EMAC's exceptional performance. EMAC is a demonstration of Government cooperation at its best.
7. The EMAC system was fine, it was the locals that had difficulty identifying their needs.
8. Forms sent out on how to send in reimbursements. Better clarification for exempt employees—are they paid hour for hour worked or just normal salary?
9. States need to do more education, not just on EMAC but also on just emergency response in general (e.g., chain of command, not letting politics get in the way, joint command structure, etc.).
10. Need more efficient deployment efforts, briefings upon arrival, leadership and accountability from officials, and standard method for identifying work assignments and accomplishing missions. Within States, there needs to be more education of resource types and their roles so they can be used efficiently and effectively.

Annex C

EMAC Deployments to Louisiana and Mississippi





ANNEX C

EMAC Deployments to Louisiana and Mississippi

The following pages provide the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) deployments of personnel, equipment, and supplies made to the States of Louisiana and Mississippi in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Louisiana





Louisiana-Katrina

Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel	
8/28/2005	2	IA	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team	7	2	
8/29/2005	37	CO	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team	9	2	
8/29/2005		TX	State	Search and Rescue	Strike Team - Swiftwater Rescue	10	35	
8/30/2005	900	TX	State	Search and Rescue	Water Rescue - Search and Rescue	6	53	
8/30/2005		KY	State	Search and Rescue	Water Rescue	4	46	
8/30/2005		FL	National Guard		Helicopter - Air support	10	24	
8/30/2005		TX	National Guard		Tankers to Provide Re-Fueling of Incident Aviation		8	
8/30/2005		TX	National Guard		Helicopter - Search and Rescue and Disaster Relief Operations	31	6	
8/30/2005		TX	National Guard		Helicopter - Aerial Resupply	31	16	
8/30/2005		OK	National Guard		2 UH-60s with Hoist Capabilities	31	16	
8/30/2005		TX	National Guard		Aircraft w/FLIR and Camera	31	10	
8/30/2005		TX	National Guard		ISISCS - Commo Set	31	47	
8/30/2005		TX	National Guard		Aircraft for Cargo - Resupply and Evacuation		4	
8/30/2005		AL	National Guard		Unit Ministry Teams	31	350	
8/30/2005		AL	National Guard		315 PAX to Include Transport and Logistical Support in New Orleans	31	315	
8/30/2005		WV	National Guard		C26 Program Aircraft and Crew to Provide Aerial Surveillance, Photography, and Other Mission	17	4	
8/30/2005		KY	National Guard		NG One (1) O12 Aircraft & Crew	19	1	
8/30/2005		AR	National Guard		Back Dated--Personnel and Vehicles for Evacuation--Back Dated	3	0	
8/31/2005		1,892	NV	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Medical Personnel	13	27
8/31/2005			TX	State	Emergency Management	Support Incident Management in LA	16	40
8/31/2005	IL		State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Medical Personnel: 3 EMTs, 5 RNs, 2 Doctors	15	10	
8/31/2005	TX		State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	50 Ambulances	32	100	
8/31/2005	TX		National Guard		Medical Co., 300 MPs, 100 engineers, 1 FSB, 1 ANG Spears Package	30	900	
8/31/2005	CO		State	Emergency Management	Base Camp Management	15	4	
8/31/2005	TX		National Guard		Aviation Support	30	25	
8/31/2005	GA		National Guard		National Guard Air Support	30	20	
8/31/2005	KY		National Guard		National Guard C-130 - Crew of 20	30	20	
8/31/2005	KY		National Guard		190,000 Sandbags		0	
8/31/2005	TX		National Guard		Security Forces 4-Hemmits	30	300	
8/31/2005	TX		National Guard		4 UH-60s / 3 C-130s / 8 CH-47s	4	30	
8/31/2005	KY		National Guard		Special Tactical Squadron - 24 Personnel. C-130 Air Support in Transport and Resupply.		24	
8/31/2005	OH		National Guard		National Guard Support	30	314	
8/31/2005	VA		State	Search and Rescue	Helicopter with 2 Pilots	9	2	
8/31/2005	AR		National Guard		62nd Civil Support Team	30	4	
8/31/2005	AR		National Guard		C2 Cell/AOD and Air Traffic Control Cell, SRT 37 PAX	30	60	
8/31/2005	MO	National Guard		12 Army Aviation Maintenance Support Team	30	12		
9/1/2005		NC	State	Emergency Management	Public Assistance	13	5	
9/1/2005		WA	State	Emergency Management	IA Resource Staff	16	1	
9/1/2005		FL	State	Transportation & Highways	Bridge Recovery Team	0	6	
9/1/2005		AR	National Guard		National Guard Ground Support	14	500	
9/1/2005		AR	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Medical Personnel, Ambulances, Boats, and Medivac Helicopters	14	100	
9/1/2005		GA	National Guard		National Guard Support	59	41	



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/1/2005	1,783	KS	National Guard		UH-60 Helicopters w/Sling Hoist Capability	29	16
9/1/2005		NV	National Guard		MP Company Guard	29	120
9/1/2005		TX	State	Fire - HazMat	HazMat Responders	20	19
9/1/2005		IA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Complete Laboratory Testing and Reporting via the Iowa Newborn Screening Information System		0
9/1/2005		KS	National Guard		2 UH-60s + Support Personnel		0
9/1/2005		MI	National Guard		Base Camp Management Team		0
9/1/2005		FL	State	Transportation & Highways	FODT Bridge Recovery Team		6
9/1/2005		TX	National Guard		221st Comm Unit	59	85
9/1/2005		AL	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Support for LA State Police	30	38
9/1/2005		AR	State	Law Enforcement	Support of LA Law Enforcement During Response and Recovery	18	41
9/1/2005		CO	National Guard		MP Company w/Firearms and Ammo 2. CH-47 Helicopters Cargo Transport 3. ISISCS - 140th Comm	29	63
9/1/2005		KY	National Guard		Personnel, Aircraft, and G tport	29	152
9/1/2005		KS	National Guard		35th Division HQ and 2 UH-60 Helos	29	13
9/1/2005		IL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	IMERT Team: 30 RNs, 15 Command	15	45
9/1/2005		ME	National Guard		101st FRW; 20 Slings	29	0
9/1/2005		KY	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Support	45	6
9/1/2005		DE	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team	14	2
9/1/2005		FL	National Guard		NG Guard Personnel Support	7	7
9/1/2005		FL	National Guard		1,000 Cots for NG Personnel		0
9/1/2005		AL	National Guard		75 Special Forces	29	75
9/1/2005		CA	National Guard		68 PAX from JTF-CA	29	68
9/1/2005		RI	National Guard		144 PAX from the 119th MP Co.	22	144
9/1/2005		TN	National Guard		11 PAX from the DET 1 146 MED AV Company	29	11
9/1/2005		TX	National Guard		One (1) C300 (1,200) Gallon Fuel Truck with Two (2) Drivers	19	0
9/1/2005		AR	National Guard		National Guard Troops	29	100
9/1/2005		WA	National Guard		66th AV-125 PAX	20	90
9/1/2005		VA	National Guard		JVB - 2 PAX	29	2
9/1/2005		VA	National Guard		3647th MAIN - 12 PAX	28	12
9/1/2005		VA	National Guard		1710th TRANS - 15 PAX	29	15
9/2/2005		OK	State	Emergency Management	Donations Management Officer	14	1
9/2/2005		IA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Medical Personnel	16	30
9/2/2005		NV	State	Emergency Management	PDA Team	16	5
9/2/2005		NM	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team	17	2
9/2/2005	NE	National Guard		UH-60s - Medivac	28	64	
9/2/2005	MD	National Guard		66 MPs Transported on Two C130s	28	65	
9/2/2005	TN	National Guard		2x MP Companies	15	0	
9/2/2005	TN	National Guard		UH-60s + Support Personnel	28	16	
9/2/2005	TN	State	Fire - HazMat	Water Rescue Team	11	32	
9/2/2005	ME	State	Law Enforcement	Request for 25 Officers and 10 Boats - Water Rescue		25	
9/2/2005	VA	National Guard		MP Security Forces--125--Red Horse Reverse Osmosis Purifying Unit 22d Qm DET for Water Distribution	27	169	
9/2/2005	AZ	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Tactical, Patrol, and Command Staff	5	13	
9/2/2005	GA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	DMORT - Body Removal and Retrieval	14	38	
9/2/2005	KY	National Guard		TALCE Cadre	43	8	
9/2/2005	KY	State	Law Enforcement	State Police Officers	14	45	



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel	
9/2/2005	3,868	MS	National Guard		CH47 Recovery Aircraft	1	0	
9/2/2005		MO	State	Search and Rescue	4 Water Rescue. Flatboats	30	8	
9/2/2005		NV	National Guard		25 PAX: Security Force Detachment: 25 Personnel Medical Detachment	28	50	
9/2/2005		NC	National Guard		QRF Strike Team	21	253	
9/2/2005		NM	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff		2 Emergency Response Teams from Bernalillo Co Sheriff's Office	14	36
9/2/2005		SD	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff		Tactical/HazMat Team	14	5
9/2/2005		TN	National Guard			2 Co. of Military Security Troops	15	350
9/2/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police		Tactical Team for 14 Days	44	10
9/2/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police		Law Enforcement Support	44	20
9/2/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - State Police		Law Enforcement Support	44	4
9/2/2005		WY	National Guard			C-130 Medevac Units for Drop of UH-60 Med Support Equipment	28	36
9/2/2005		FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance		Laboratory Testing	89	0
9/2/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police		7 Law Enforcement - Tactical, Patrol, and Command Staff	14	7
9/2/2005		TN	National Guard			National Guard Troops	15	200
9/2/2005		WV	State	Emergency Management		320 Personnel; Security Forces, Engineering Support Teams, Staff	28	262
9/2/2005		AZ	State	Law Enforcement - State Police		Law Enforcement Support	44	100
9/2/2005		VT	National Guard			150 NG Security Guard Task Force (Army and Air) w/Equipment, Logistical, and Transportation Support	28	101
9/2/2005		PR	National Guard			Puerto Rico Guard to Work MP Duties in New Orleans	28	1016
9/2/2005		GA	National Guard			MP Company to Provide Assistance (Security); 229 Troops; 62 Vehicles	14	229
9/2/2005		AL	National Guard			OH-58 Helicopters	28	16
9/2/2005		KY	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections		Department of Corrections Personnel and Resources	16	58
9/2/2005		FL	State	Transportation & Highways		Electricians and General Ops.	7	5
9/2/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff		LA Task Force - Sheriff	44	19
9/2/2005		CA	National Guard			67 PAX from the 163rd ARW	28	67
9/2/2005		CA	National Guard			119 PAX from the 870th MP Co.	28	119
9/2/2005		CT	National Guard			2 PAX from the 14th CST	13	2
9/2/2005		DC	National Guard			267 PAX from the 104th MAINT Co.	20	267
9/2/2005		NJ	National Guard			35 PAX from the 108th SEC FOR Co.	28	35
9/2/2005		UT	National Guard			13 PAX from the 151st SEC Co.	26	13
9/2/2005		CO	National Guard			One (1) CH-47 Helicopter and Crew		4
9/2/2005		GA	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff		Law Enforcement Tactical and Patrol Personnel and Equipment	9	20
9/2/2005		TX	National Guard			TF Lone Star	18	22
9/2/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff		Madison County SO	7	21
9/3/2005		IL	National Guard			DS-Maintenance Company	27	310
9/3/2005		CT	National Guard			MP Unit for Military Support for LO National Guard/15 Humvees	27	100
9/3/2005		CO	State	Emergency Management		EMAC A-Team	11	2
9/3/2005	ND	State	Emergency Management		EMAC A-Team (1 person)	15	1	
9/3/2005	AR	State	Law Enforcement		Counter Drug Aviation Assets (RAID) 2 OH 58A Helicopters; 4 Pilots	27	32	
9/3/2005	GA	State	Law Enforcement		Law Enforcement support for LA Law Enforcement	14	102	
9/3/2005	IL	State	Law Enforcement		State Police Officers w/Tactical Equipment to Provide LE Support with LA State Police	14	120	
9/3/2005	IA	State	Emergency Management		200 KW Generator and Support Personnel for Emergency Power	15	0	
9/3/2005	IL	State	Law Enforcement		Law Enforcement for Pete Maravich Medical Center		148	
9/3/2005	IL	National Guard			High Water Vehicles for On-Going Support and Coordination in LA	27	0	
9/3/2005	IL	National Guard			Security Team		124	



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/3/2005	5,462	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	25 Ambulance + Personnel	7	105
9/3/2005		KY	State	Search and Rescue	Officers/Boats for Rescue	7	25
9/3/2005		MI	National Guard		250 PAX	27	250
9/3/2005		MN	State	Law Enforcement	Mobile Command Unit	30	6
9/3/2005		GA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	40 Ambulances w/100 Medical Personnel (EMT)	14	100
9/3/2005		MI	National Guard		One E Meds Package / Pnl	27	7
9/3/2005		NY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	MTA Buses	5	340
9/3/2005		NM	State	Agriculture & Forestry	Livestock Inspectors	10	6
9/3/2005		NM	National Guard		NG Troops	10	400
9/3/2005		OK	State	Law Enforcement	RAID Assets	12	6
9/3/2005		PA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Ambulance/EMTs	8	73
9/3/2005		SC	State	Law Enforcement	Water Rescue w/20 Boats w/Trailers	14	40
9/3/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Deputies/Units	43	2
9/3/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Officers, Com, Water Equip.	43	0
9/3/2005		TX	National Guard		250 Soldiers for 10 Days. Air Traffic Control Facility w/Tech Support and Controllers.	27	250
9/3/2005		VA	National Guard		Laundry Bath Unit, ROPU Unit	27	0
9/3/2005		IL	National Guard		634th Forward Support Battalion, 33rd Area Support Group, State WMD	27	499
9/3/2005		TX	National Guard		10 Tx ANG HEMMT Tankers w/Diesel	27	20
9/3/2005		IL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	4 Environmental Health Strike Teams	14	12
9/3/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement	43	3
9/3/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Patrol & Command Staff	43	50
9/3/2005		TN	National Guard		Light Armored Vehicle to NAS New Orleans w/3 Men Crew	58	3
9/3/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement	Counter Drug Aviation Assets (RAID) 2 OH 58A Helicopters 4 Pilots	27	6
9/3/2005		KY	State	Search and Rescue	Water Rescue and Law Enforcement Support	7	25
9/3/2005		WV	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Patrol and Command Staff	22	13
9/3/2005		FL	State	Transportation & Highways	(3) Airfield Operators, (4) Airport Technicians for Louis Armstrong Airport	38	7
9/3/2005		MA	National Guard		535 Security Forces from the 35th ID	27	535
9/3/2005		NE	National Guard		(2) Light Armored Vehicles LAV, 7 PAX and (1) Command Officer	27	8
9/3/2005		MD	National Guard		12 PAX from 175th SEC Force	27	12
9/3/2005		CA	National Guard		7 PAX from the CA LNO CO	27	7
9/3/2005		CA	National Guard		595 PAX from the TF 169 Co.	17	595
9/3/2005		NV	National Guard		84 PAX from the 72nd MP Co.		84
9/3/2005		NH	National Guard		13 PAX from the 157th ARW		13
9/3/2005		NY	National Guard		12 PAX from the NEADS SEC FOR Co.	27	13
9/3/2005		CA	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	100 CHP Officers and Vehicles	27	232
9/3/2005		AR	National Guard		39th MED Team	19	20
9/3/2005		AR	National Guard		188 MGD Team	19	5
9/3/2005		CT	National Guard		103 MED - 2 PAX	26	2
9/3/2005		CO	National Guard		193 SPACE BN	17	6
9/3/2005		CO	National Guard		140th MED Group	41	8
9/3/2005		CO	National Guard		128 MPAD	18	4
9/3/2005		IL	National Guard		RAID Unit	27	3
9/3/2005	MO	National Guard		35th STB	29	167	
9/3/2005	CA	National Guard		146 AW	17	1	



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/3/2005		CA	National Guard		126th MEDIVAC	11	19
9/3/2005		CA	National Guard		163rd MGD	10	18
9/3/2005		CA	National Guard		185th AR	27	361
9/3/2005		CA	National Guard		JBB - 2 PAX	21	2
9/3/2005		CA	National Guard		JTF-143 PAX	15	143
9/3/2005		MA	National Guard		126th MED	27	6
9/3/2005		WY	National Guard		1022nd MED AVN - 11 PAX	19	11
9/4/2005	2,370	AR	State	Search and Rescue	Tactical, Patrol, and Command Staff. Comm Equipment, High Water Clearance Vehicles, Search and Rescue	14	7
9/4/2005		DE	National Guard		(2) C-130 Airlift Request to Transport 2 Command and Control Vehicles w/Trailers and One Support Van	0	5
9/4/2005		MD	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Officers, Com, Water Equipment	14	4
9/4/2005		MI	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Officers	14	111
9/4/2005		NJ	State	Search and Rescue	Water Rescue Team	10	6
9/4/2005		MI	State	Law Enforcement	Boats/Officers	14	50
9/4/2005		NM	National Guard		SNS OP Ctr + 3 People	16	3
9/4/2005		NJ	State	Search and Rescue	Water Rescue Team	14	24
9/4/2005		NM	State	Law Enforcement	21 Law Enforcement and Patrol units	16	21
9/4/2005		OH	State	Law Enforcement	Boats with Qualified Officers	16	20
9/4/2005		TX	National Guard		JTF-FWD Control and FWD Support Battalion	26	800
9/4/2005		MD	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement - Tactical Staff	14	10
9/4/2005		DC	State	Fire - HazMat	Firefighters and Apparatus to Respond to New Orleans		0
9/4/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	2 Command and 6 Patrol	48	8
9/4/2005		OH	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement Tactical Patrol and Command Staff	16	73
9/4/2005		NC	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	6 Person EOC IMT for New Orleans PD	14	6
9/4/2005		CO	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	11 Person Team w/Vehicles and Provisions	25	11
9/4/2005		MO	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Support for LA State Police	7	16
9/4/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement	Lower Colorado River Authority, Mobile Comm Trailer & Command Post Manned with 8 Personnel	14	8
9/4/2005		CA	National Guard		Medical Team	26	7
9/4/2005		NY	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Incident Management Team for New Orleans for Law Enforcement	13	4
9/4/2005		OR	National Guard		Two (2) LAV Vehicles & Four (4) PAX	26	4
9/4/2005		MI	National Guard		NG 485 PAX from 129th FA BN	17	485
9/4/2005		MI	National Guard		NG 580 PAX from 175th MP BN		580
9/4/2005		CA	National Guard		7 PAX from 118th Maint Company	26	7
9/4/2005		CA	National Guard		38 PAX from the 240th SIG BN	16	38
9/4/2005		CA	National Guard		13 PAX from the CA 261st CBCS CO	11	13
9/4/2005		UT	National Guard		15 PAX from the 1/19th SF Co.	58	15
9/4/2005		OK	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Support	28	10
9/4/2005		MA	National Guard		104 MGD	23	16
9/4/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Tactical Unit	42	8
9/5/2005			SC	National Guard		Medium Truck Company	25
9/5/2005	SC		National Guard		National Guard MP Company	25	120
9/5/2005	NC		State	Emergency Management	EMAC Support	13	1
9/5/2005	ID		State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Officers with Water Rescue Supplies	41	2
9/5/2005	TX		State	Law Enforcement - State Police	K-9 Cadaver Teams	41	12
9/5/2005	NY		State	Fire - HazMat	Type II Mgt. Team	16	33



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/5/2005	5,555	IL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Decon Showers	21	0
9/5/2005		GA	National Guard		National Guard Support	25	4
9/5/2005		SC	State	Search and Rescue	Urban Search and Rescue Task Force	14	58
9/5/2005		NM	State	Fire - HazMat	FD Task Force	15	11
9/5/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	LE Strike Team	41	30
9/5/2005		KY	National Guard		3 OH-58 Helicopters Flying in Support of Col. Dimisky	55	24
9/5/2005		KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Mission Medical Personnel	25	9
9/5/2005		KY	National Guard		Support Personnel to Handle Security and Displaced Resident at the KY ANG 123rd Wing		11
9/5/2005		NY	State	Fire - HazMat	FD Assets Including Apparatus	37	314
9/5/2005		NM	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Decontamination Showers		0
9/5/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement	41	2
9/5/2005		VA	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Support in Water Inundation Areas	13	70
9/5/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement Support	41	11
9/5/2005		MD	National Guard		2 Urban Search and Rescue Teams, 100 Medical Personnel, NG MPs to Support	15	161
9/5/2005		TX	State	Transportation & Highways	Portable, Variable Message Signs		0
9/5/2005		KY	State	Fire - HazMat	Decon Trailers w/Prime Movers, 4 Personnel	15	4
9/5/2005		MI	National Guard		2 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) with Personnel	25	6
9/5/2005		VA	State	Search and Rescue	2 Boats, 6 Vehicles, 8 Personnel	14	8
9/5/2005		IN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement Support	41	12
9/5/2005		AR	State	Transportation & Highways	Portable Message Boards		0
9/5/2005		IL	State	Fire - HazMat	Fire Support	14	548
9/5/2005		GA	State	Search and Rescue	Search and Rescue Team	9	77
9/5/2005		MN	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Support	41	84
9/5/2005		PA	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	12 Man SWAT, 3 SUVs, Trailer, Motor Home, 2 Week Deployment	11	12
9/5/2005		TX	State	Emergency Management	Task Force	5	2
9/5/2005		DE	National Guard		3 5-Ton tractor-Trailers - M1083-High Water Capable, w/Drivers - Flatbeds for Delivery of Supplies	25	3
9/5/2005		IN	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	2 Man ALS Team with Ambulance	30	8
9/5/2005		NY	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	State Troopers	14	150
9/5/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement Support	41	0
9/5/2005		SC	National Guard		ROPWU (Water Purification) w/Personnel, Transportation, Fuel, and Self Support, 10 PAX, 2 HMMWVs, 4 Trailers	26	10
9/5/2005		TX	State	Fire - HazMat	Dallas Ft. Worth AFRR Crew	13	5
9/5/2005		MD	National Guard		61 PAX from the 29th MP company	25	61
9/5/2005		MI	National Guard		NG 30 PAX from 131st Air Wing	25	30
9/5/2005		AZ	National Guard		31 PAX from the 855th MP company	25	31
9/5/2005		CA	National Guard		361 PAX from the CA 2/185 AR	25	361
9/5/2005		CA	National Guard		7 PAX from CA Counterdrug CO	25	7
9/5/2005		CA	National Guard		11 PAX from the CA 149th CBCS CO	10	11
9/5/2005		DC	National Guard		20 PAX from the DET 3 MEDCOM Co.	25	20
9/5/2005		DC	National Guard		34 PAX from JTF Co.	25	34
9/5/2005		DC	National Guard		34 PAX from the CBCS Co.	25	34
9/5/2005		DC	National Guard		101 PAX from the 273rd MP Co.	25	101
9/5/2005		MI	National Guard		NG 32 PAX from 131st FW	14	32
9/5/2005		NH	National Guard		312 PAX from the 2nd BN SEC Co.	25	312
9/5/2005		NY	National Guard		6 PAX from the 109th AN Co.	15	6



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/5/2005		NY	National Guard		4 PAX from the 174th SFS Co.	15	4
9/5/2005		OR	National Guard		1913 PAX from the TF	42	1913
9/5/2005		WI	National Guard		4 PAX from the TF HQ	25	4
9/5/2005		WI	National Guard		14 PAX from the 115th FW Co.	17	14
9/5/2005		WI	National Guard		43 PAX from the 32nd MP Co.	17	43
9/5/2005		WI	National Guard		107 PAX from the 1157th TRANS Co.	17	107
9/5/2005		WI	National Guard		22 PAX from the 147th AV Co.	17	22
9/5/2005		WI	National Guard		187 PAX from the 132nd SPT BN	17	187
9/5/2005		MA	State	Fire - HazMat	Four (4) Engine Companies, Two (2) 80ft Ladder trucks, & One (1) Type I Incident Command Section.	13	0
9/5/2005		AL	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Personnel		0
9/5/2005		NY	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	100 NYPD Officers w/Basic Equipment and 50 Vehicles for Law Enforcement Mission	14	111
9/5/2005		MN	National Guard		87 PAXs	16	87
9/6/2005		962	MN	State	Search and Rescue	10 Boats w/20 Qualified Officers	8
9/6/2005	NC		State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement - Tactical Patrol and Command Staff	40	17
9/6/2005	CO		State	Emergency Management	Base Camp Management	15	6
9/6/2005	NJ		State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement - Tactical Patrol and Command Staff	40	153
9/6/2005	NC		State	Emergency Management	Dispatchers for St. Tammany Parish EOC at Covinton	8	10
9/6/2005	MO		State	Emergency Management	1 Comm Van, Fully Equipped with Phones and Radios	14	0
9/6/2005	OH		State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement	14	42
9/6/2005	NC		State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Officers w/Vehicles	29	17
9/6/2005	CO		State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement	14	7
9/6/2005	VA		State	Law Enforcement	6 Person EOC IMT for New Orleans PD	15	6
9/6/2005	AL		State	Fire - HazMat	Fire Department Support	14	28
9/6/2005	TN		National Guard		National Guard Support	45	104
9/6/2005	CA		National Guard		(2) Light Armored Vehicles LAV, 7 PAX from CA Counterdrug Unit, (1) Suburban	24	7
9/6/2005	CA		National Guard		8 PAX from 128th ARW		8
9/6/2005	CA		National Guard		9 PAX from the 147th CBCS	24	9
9/6/2005	CA		National Guard		19 PAX from the CA 222nd CBCS CO	9	19
9/6/2005	DC		National Guard		39 PAX from the 547th TRANS Co.	24	39
9/6/2005	NE		National Guard		48 PAX from the 192nd MP Co.	24	48
9/6/2005	RI		National Guard		23 PAX from the 1207 MTC Co.	24	23
9/6/2005	SC		National Guard		329 PAX from the 163rd SUP BN	24	329
9/6/2005	TN		National Guard		NG 13 PAX from MEDCOM Company	24	13
9/6/2005	VI		National Guard		45 PAX from the 6612T Co.	16	45
9/6/2005	UT		National Guard		10 PAX from the JTF-HQ	24	10
9/6/2005	PA		National Guard		HQ PAOANG	12	2
9/7/2005	RI		State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Police Officers	7	5
9/7/2005	ND		State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement - Tactical, Patrol, and Command Staff	14	10
9/7/2005	CO		State	Law Enforcement - State Police	20 Flat Bottom Boats, 48 Game Wardens and Park Wardens	15	48
9/7/2005	KS		State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Law Enforcement	39	5
9/7/2005	CT	National Guard		100 Person QRF, 40 PAX for New Orleans	23	140	
9/7/2005	TX	State	Fire - HazMat	Airport Fire rescue - ARR	12	18	
9/7/2005	NY	State	Emergency Management	2,000 Gallon Pumper, 350 Waders	61	0	
9/7/2005	MD	State	Law Enforcement	Supplies		0	



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/7/2005	3,287	MI	National Guard		3 LAV, High Water Vehicles, 4 Flatbed Tractors		18
9/7/2005		PA	National Guard		56th SB 28th Infantry	23	2426
9/7/2005		PA	National Guard		ANG Fire Bucket for C-130 Transport	23	0
9/7/2005		NY	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Department of Corrections: Personnel and Resources	14	72
9/7/2005		MI	National Guard		NG 66 PAX from 1221TC Company	53	66
9/7/2005		KS	National Guard		200 PAX from the 35th ID UEX Co.	23	200
9/7/2005		NJ	National Guard		22 PAX from the 3/112th Co.	2	22
9/7/2005		WA	National Guard		125 PAX from HHC 55th AV Company	23	125
9/7/2005		OK	National Guard		HHC 45th BDE	30	132
9/8/2005	123	NM	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Department of Corrections: 34 Officers; 1 Admin Officer	16	35
9/8/2005		AL	State	Emergency Management	Transfer New Orleans EMT	14	2
9/8/2005		KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Public Health - Coroners		12
9/8/2005		TX	State	Fire - HazMat	Planning Assistant - Fire Chief Mark Czerwiec	7	1
9/8/2005		NY	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Maintain Current Incident Management Team from NY State Police	120	2
9/8/2005		MI	National Guard		NG 67 PAX from 206th MED CO	22	67
9/8/2005		MA	National Guard		104 W-4 PAX	21	4
9/9/2005	583	RI	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Decon Teams w>Showers and Personnel	19	16
9/9/2005		AR	National Guard		National Guard - Generators	21	10
9/9/2005		TX	State	Veterinary - Animal Control	25 Animal Control Officers with Vehicles		25
9/9/2005		PA	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Department of Corrections: Emergency Supplies	18	27
9/9/2005		CA	State	Emergency Management	ICS Advisors, IMT Support, Donations Manager	17	14
9/9/2005		NC	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Consultation Services for Substance Abuse in Impacted Area	13	1
9/9/2005		TX	State	Fire - HazMat	Communications Assistant	7	1
9/9/2005		CA	State	Fire - HazMat	Logistics Assistant-Fire Chief Kevin Crawford	8	1
9/9/2005		TX	State	Fire - HazMat	Logistics Asst. Chief Sean Gearinger, Port Naches FD	7	1
9/9/2005		NV	State	Fire - HazMat	One (1) Ops Chief	7	1
9/9/2005		KS	State	Fire - HazMat	State Fire Marshall: Special Ops Asst.	9	1
9/9/2005		KY	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Support	21	2
9/9/2005		UT	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Emergency Supplies and DOC Workers	4	3
9/9/2005		MI	National Guard		478 PAX from 1140th ENBN	21	478
9/9/2005		AZ	National Guard		Provide Aerial Surveillance, Photography	6	0
9/9/2005		MO	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	2 LE Officers	6	2
9/10/2005	106	IL	State	Human Services	Mobile Command Unit	14	75
9/10/2005		NC	National Guard		OH-58A for Reconnaissance and FLIR Capabilities with Crew	20	7
9/10/2005		CO	State	Emergency Management	3rd Base Camp Management Team	14	6
9/10/2005		WA	State	Emergency Management	Administrative Assistant: Shelley Bossum	30	1
9/10/2005		GA	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Department of Corrections: Supplies and Truck	1	2
9/10/2005		DE	National Guard		261st Signal Brigade	20	15
9/11/2005	189	NY	State	Emergency Management	EMAC Program Matter Expert	16	1
9/11/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Support	7	7
9/11/2005		CA	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member: Sam Musgrave	15	1
9/11/2005		AR	National Guard		Unified Command Suite	10	0
9/11/2005		NJ	State	Fire - HazMat	HazMat Team	10	12
9/11/2005		NJ	State	Search and Rescue	2 Water Rescue Teams, Fully Equipped, Self Sufficient, Vehicles (14 personnel)	10	14



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel	
9/11/2005		UT	National Guard		Assist the CST Team of the LA NG	49	32	
9/11/2005		AZ	National Guard		Assist the CST Team of the LA NG	19	20	
9/11/2005		MD	National Guard		102 Physicians & Nurses & NG LOG	19	102	
9/12/2005	229	MI	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	2 ALS EMT-Ps per Ambulance w/Basic Supplies	7	4	
9/12/2005		GA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Support	15	1	
9/12/2005		FL	State	Transportation & Highways	400 Traffic Signal Heads		0	
9/12/2005		WA	National Guard		40 Personnel to Work UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters: Operations and Maintenance (5 crews)	30	40	
9/12/2005		MO	National Guard		Missouri NG CST	18	20	
9/12/2005		AL	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Support	34	22	
9/12/2005		MN	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Medical Team to Work with Acute Care Patients for Shelters in Lafayette	54	103	
9/12/2005		NH	National Guard		33 PAX from the JTF HQ Co.	18	33	
9/12/2005		TX	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Support, Refer to REQ-A 0805-311	7	6	
9/13/2005		69	CO	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Support	8	4
9/13/2005			ME	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Certified Nurses Assistants to Thibodeaux Special Needs Shelter at Nichols University	8	10
9/13/2005	OK		State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Consultation Services for Substance Abuse Issues in Impacted Area	5	1	
9/13/2005	PA		State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	2 Certified Nursing Aids to the Thibodeaux Special Needs Shelter at Nichols University	9	2	
9/13/2005	NM		State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team	15	2	
9/13/2005	GA		State	Search and Rescue	USAR Support	7	45	
9/13/2005	SD		State	Human Services	Eligibility Workers for Processing LA DSS Clients (5)	8	5	
9/14/2005	77	NY	State	Fire - HazMat	TYPE II Fire Management Team from FDNY	14	10	
9/14/2005		VA	State	Fire - HazMat	Type I IMT	19	7	
9/14/2005		VA	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Mobile Command Post for LA SP for Baton Rouge PD	31	4	
9/14/2005		MN	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Travel Trailers for Port Authority in New Orleans	7	0	
9/14/2005		OK	State	Human Services	Eligibility Workers for Processing LA DSS Clients (50)		20	
9/14/2005		KS	State	Human Services	Eligibility Workers for LA DSS	8	22	
9/14/2005		AR	State	Emergency Management	Body Recovery Operations	7	3	
9/14/2005		VA	State	Emergency Management	NIMS/ICS IMT for EOC Support (City of New Orleans)	18	10	
9/14/2005		FL	State	Transportation & Highways	(1) Person to Aide in the Operations and Set-Up of a Helipad In New Orleans: Walter Houghton	7	1	
9/15/2005	460	CA	State	Emergency Management	Incident Management Team	16	19	
9/15/2005		NY	State	Fire - HazMat	130 Firefighters from FDNY	14	130	
9/15/2005		VA	State	Emergency Management	4 EOC Personnel	16	4	
9/15/2005		VA	State	Emergency Management	EOC Support Team for New Orleans		10	
9/15/2005		KY	National Guard		Medical Group Life Sustaining	19	3	
9/15/2005		WV	National Guard		Two (2) ARNG OH-58 RAID Aircraft with Crew	15	262	
9/15/2005		NE	National Guard		NG RAOC 30 PAX	28	29	
9/15/2005		CA	National Guard		562nd Air Force Band	30	3	
9/16/2005	186	MI	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team	15	2	
9/16/2005		ME	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	Law Enforcement Support	7	3	
9/16/2005		NJ	State	Agriculture & Forestry	20 Veterinarians	14	10	
9/16/2005		TN	State	Emergency Management	LS4 Personnel New Orleans City Hall EOC	14	4	
9/16/2005		IL	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	Illinois State Police Officer Team Replacement	13	148	
9/16/2005		VA	National Guard		One (1) C-12 Aircraft & Crew	14	3	
9/16/2005		AR	National Guard		AR NG Personnel and Supplies	14	16	
9/17/2005		NY	State	Fire - HazMat	130 Firefighters from FDNY	14	130	



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/17/2005	402	KS	National Guard		102 Military History Detachment	44	5
9/17/2005		GA	State	Transportation & Highways	14 Personnel to Supply the Louis Armstrong Airport	6	15
9/17/2005		UT	State	Emergency Management	Utah Dispatchers	6	16
9/17/2005		MD	State	Emergency Management	911 Dispatchers	10	2
9/17/2005		IL	National Guard		IL ARNG OH-58 RAID Aircraft	13	4
9/17/2005		IL	State	Fire - HazMat	MABAS Task Force	14	230
9/17/2005		CA	State	Transportation & Highways	1 Mobile Home Shelter		0
9/18/2005		321	NJ	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	153 Member Law Enforcement Team (extension)	22
9/18/2005	CO		State	Emergency Management	Base Camp Management Team (4th Team)	15	6
9/18/2005	WA		State	Emergency Management	ICS personnel LNO Louisiana EOC	5	9
9/18/2005	MI		National Guard		Two (2) CH-47 Helicopters and Four (4) Crew	42	8
9/18/2005	ME		State	Emergency Management	Dispatchers for Jefferson Parish	14	2
9/18/2005	NJ		State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	2 DECON Teams (replacement)	12	12
9/18/2005	NJ		State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Health & Hospitals Two (2) DECON Teams	12	32
9/18/2005	KY		National Guard		76 PAX & HUM Vs	42	76
9/18/2005	NV		National Guard		Two (2) Raid Helicopters, Two (2) 15 PAC Vans, Two (2) Humve's, Twenty-Three (23) Personnel, Various Extra Equipment and Vehicles	7	23
9/19/2005	109	VA	State	Emergency Management	Command Team for New Orleans EOC	5	2
9/19/2005		ME	State	Transportation & Highways	Master Electrician - Timothy Welch	9	1
9/19/2005		MN	National Guard		Three (3) UH-60 Helicopters and Crew (3)	41	9
9/19/2005		GA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Support GA	14	1
9/19/2005		IL	State	Fire - HazMat	81 Firefighters St Tammany Parish	8	21
9/19/2005		OH	National Guard		NG 25 E-Med Team & One (1) X-Ray Tech	14	26
9/19/2005		CA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Support CA	17	1
9/19/2005		OK	National Guard		NG TF Pelican, Eight (8) Soldiers, One (1) 6 PAX	30	8
9/19/2005		MD	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	1000 Units of Tetanus		0
9/19/2005		OH	State	Fire - HazMat	Six (6) Engine Companies, Two (2) Ladder Companies, One (1) Type I Incident Command Team		37
9/19/2005		TN	National Guard		Three (3) PAX from Engineer and Installation Squadron ANG	13	3
9/20/2005		646	GA	State	Fire - HazMat	Search & Recue Team Task Force 3	10
9/20/2005	ME		State	Law Enforcement	911 Dispatcher	30	1
9/20/2005	CA		State	Emergency Management	Operations and Maintenance Personnel for Airport	16	5
9/20/2005	SC		National Guard		Task Force - 169th Extension	1	595
9/21/2005	369	NM	State	Law Enforcement	NMSP Officers	29	20
9/21/2005		NY	State	Law Enforcement	Dispatchers from New York	29	4
9/21/2005		NY	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Corrections Officers and Emergency Supplies	14	14
9/21/2005		DE	State	Emergency Management	911 Call Takers	29	2
9/21/2005		OK	State	Human Services	31 WIC Competent Authorities	16	6
9/21/2005		NM	National Guard		Six Brand Inspectors	11	6
9/21/2005		MN	State	Fire - HazMat	1 Fire Chief Officer	15	1
9/21/2005		CO	State	Fire - HazMat	23 Firefighters & 2 Command Staff	15	25
9/21/2005		NV	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Support	14	11
9/21/2005		MI	State	Fire - HazMat	Three (3) Firefighting Personnel	7	3
9/21/2005		VT	State	Fire - HazMat	Two (2) Firefighters Covert Task Force 18	7	2
9/21/2005		AZ	National Guard		1 - Transport Company, 1 - Medical Platoon, 1- Medium/PLS Trans Company	43	264
9/21/2005		NJ	National Guard		National Guard Troops	26	11



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
9/22/2005	22	OH	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Three (3) Nurses Aide	14	3
9/22/2005		OR	State	Transportation & Highways	Seven (7) Operations Personnel	10	9
9/22/2005		MT	National Guard		1 Ground Safety Officer	34	1
9/22/2005		NM	State	Human Services	Five (5) WIC Trained Individuals	20	5
9/22/2005		MA	State	Fire - HazMat	Firefighters Covert Task Force 18	6	4
9/23/2005	26	AZ	State	Transportation & Highways	7 Operations Personnel to Support Recovery and Operations at the MSY Louis Armstrong Airport	7	15
9/23/2005		CA	State	Emergency Management	1- A-Team Member	15	1
9/23/2005		NJ	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	15	1
9/23/2005		MO	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	15	1
9/23/2005		UT	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	15	1
9/23/2005		SC	National Guard		Bio-Environmental Specialist	28	7
9/24/2005	1,200	OH	National Guard		Security Force - 4 Line Companies	30	1200
9/25/2005	553	MN	State	Transportation & Highways	One (1) Ramp Coordinator	30	2
9/25/2005		CA	National Guard		Task Force Pelican	31	400
9/25/2005		KY	National Guard		Six (6) Aviation Personnel	20	6
9/25/2005		NE	National Guard		One (1) J-4 Task Force Pelican	27	1
9/25/2005		MO	National Guard		1 C-23 from MO with 5 PAX for Belle Chase	38	5
9/25/2005		IN	National Guard		3-139 FA	25	138
9/25/2005		WA	National Guard		1 SPC Ellis Extension	84	1
9/26/2005	174	UT	National Guard		2 PAX from the JTF-HQ		2
9/26/2005		OH	National Guard		199th Prime Beef Civil Engineers	31	51
9/26/2005		AR	State	Emergency Management	Administrative Assistant Filled by Arkansas	57	1
9/26/2005		WA	National Guard		5 Each - 81st BDE 120 PAX	34	120
9/27/2005	424	WA	State	Human Services	Six (6) WIC Competent Authorities	16	6
9/27/2005		ME	State	Human Services	6 WIC Competent Authorities to Aid Statewide Clinics	15	6
9/27/2005		CA	National Guard		National Guard Troops		200
9/27/2005		AL	National Guard		Chaplin	57	1
9/27/2005		VA	State	Emergency Management	New Orleans Emergency Management Team	13	19
9/27/2005		CA	National Guard		NG - Two UH-1 w/4 PAX	31	4
9/27/2005		PA	National Guard		2 UH-60s w/8 PAX to Replace Other Aircraft Rotating Out of Duty		8
9/27/2005		KS	National Guard		35th Division - Relief Operations	15	2
9/27/2005	UT	National Guard		145th FA	35	178	
9/28/2005	498	AK	National Guard		One (1) E-6 NG TF Pelican USPFO IT	14	1
9/28/2005		VA	State	Fire - HazMat	One (1) Type II Command Team	17	0
9/28/2005		OH	National Guard		One Team from Ohio NG to Support Ground Operations at NAS Belle Chase	31	16
9/28/2005		KS	State	Law Enforcement	Security Force Team	34	18
9/28/2005		MA	National Guard		7 PAX from Massachusetts ANG 267th CBCS	31	7
9/28/2005		UT	National Guard		115th ENG	34	170
9/28/2005		UT	National Guard		MED COM	34	10
9/28/2005		PA	National Guard		JFHQ	31	1
9/28/2005		MO	National Guard		20th AVN	31	127
9/28/2005		MI	National Guard		1460th TRANS	7	16
9/28/2005		MI	National Guard		DT 1 CO. G. 105th AVN	11	13
9/28/2005		NE	National Guard		1618 QRF from Nebraska	32	119



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel	
9/29/2005	661	AR	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Department of Corrections: Personnel and Resources	14	13	
9/29/2005		SD	National Guard		National Guard Troops	34	258	
9/29/2005		NJ	National Guard		Security Forces	36	120	
9/29/2005		OK	State	Emergency Management	PIO from Oklahoma	17	1	
9/29/2005		NJ	State	Fire - HazMat	2 Decon Teams	15	18	
9/29/2005		IL	National Guard		1 OH-58 Helicopter	8	3	
9/29/2005		NY	State	Fire - HazMat	Fire Suppression Crews - FDNY	13	84	
9/29/2005		MO	National Guard		135th SIG BN	32	7	
9/29/2005		MO	National Guard		135 AVN BN - 77 PAX	33	77	
9/29/2005		VA	National Guard		B CO. 249th MED - 80 PAX	31	80	
9/30/2005		495	PA	National Guard		Replacement UH-80s	20	6
9/30/2005	CA		National Guard		NG - (2) CH-47 w/4 PAX for Belle Chasse	3	4	
9/30/2005	KY		State	Emergency Management	A-Team	8	2	
9/30/2005	CA		National Guard		One (1) UH-60 and 5 PAX from CA	5	5	
9/30/2005	FL		State	Emergency Management	Plaquemines Parish Emergency Management Request	22	6	
9/30/2005	KY		State	Fire - HazMat	Firefighters	-8	15	
9/30/2005	MN		State	Law Enforcement	4 LE Strike Teams, MN	5	106	
9/30/2005	ND		State	Emergency Management	A-Team Support	8	1	
9/30/2005	IN		National Guard		38th Division ARTY JOC	31	33	
9/30/2005	VA		National Guard		1032 TC	36	88	
9/30/2005	AZ		National Guard		111th MED	33	55	
9/30/2005	CA		National Guard		147th SEC	31	13	
9/30/2005	VA		National Guard		1246th FA-161 PAX	33	161	
10/1/2005	151		IL	State	Fire - HazMat	MABAS Task Force Personnel	13	118
10/1/2005			VA	National Guard		1 C-12 from VA with 5 PAX for Belle Chase	29	5
10/1/2005		DE	National Guard		NG Troops - Extension/Modification of # 0805-656	20	13	
10/1/2005		AK	State	Emergency Management	1 Admin Assistant from Arkansas		1	
10/1/2005		PA	National Guard		2 CH-47s with Crews from PA	30	3	
10/1/2005		CO	National Guard		140 SF	31	5	
10/1/2005		OR	State	Fire - HazMat	ARFF-Louis Armstrong Airport	15	6	
10/2/2005	227	KS	National Guard		National Guard Troops	59	200	
10/2/2005		DE	National Guard		UH-1 & 5 PAX for Belle Chasse, LA	29	3	
10/2/2005		AL	National Guard		1 C-12 Crew (2 PAX & Aircraft)	15	3	
10/2/2005		MI	National Guard		5 PAX from MI ANG, 110th MDG	29	4	
10/2/2005		DE	National Guard		6 PAX DE ANG 166th AW/MDG	16	6	
10/2/2005		OH	National Guard		11 PAX	14	11	
10/3/2005	37	MD	National Guard		37 PAX from 175 MDG ANG	43	37	
10/4/2005	340	IL	National Guard		One (1) Security Force Battalion	25	330	
10/4/2005		MS	National Guard		C-12 with PAX	27	4	
10/4/2005		VI	National Guard		5 PAX from Guam (2 O-3s, 2 E-8s, and 1 Chaplain)		5	
10/4/2005		OH	National Guard		1 PAX from Ohio ANG for Radiological Support	30	1	
10/5/2005	8	ND	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Support	15	1	
10/5/2005		IA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member	9	1	
10/5/2005		KY	National Guard		C23 Aircraft w/3 PAX	25	6	



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
10/6/2005	43	CA	State	Engineering	Building Inspectors	15	19
10/6/2005		MN	State	Fire - HazMat	24 Firefighters for 14 Day Assignment, Also Extension of Chief to 10-24-05	18	24
10/7/2005	4	CO	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	11	1
10/7/2005		ME	National Guard		Judge Advocate, Capt Smith	6	1
10/7/2005		IL	National Guard		Ministry Team	12	2
10/8/2005	36	OR	State	Emergency Management	Water Emergency Response Task Force	49	36
10/9/2005	4	FL	National Guard		C-23 Air Operations	22	4
10/10/2005	4	TN	State	Fire - HazMat	1 Chief Officer to Deploy to the NO FD City EOC	13	1
10/10/2005		VA	State	Emergency Management	3 Cadaver Dogs and Handlers	12	3
10/11/2005	3	NJ	National Guard		One OH-58 and 3 PAX to Provide Support to Belle Chase	18	3
10/12/2005	5	CO	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	8	1
10/12/2005		CO	State	Emergency Management	2 A-Team Members	8	2
10/12/2005		NV	National Guard		2 PAX Operations/Comm Personnel	5	2
10/13/2005	16	CO	State	Emergency Management	Type III Base Camp Management Team (4 personnel) Responsible for the Management of an Established 150 Person Base Camp	24	4
10/13/2005		MO	State	Search and Rescue	5 Cadaver Dogs and Handlers	14	5
10/13/2005		WA	State	Emergency Management	6 Dispatchers	15	6
10/13/2005		AK	National Guard		1 PAX Patrick Franklin	47	1
10/14/2005	7	MD	National Guard		Replacement PAO for JIC in New Orleans	14	1
10/14/2005		MA	State	Fire - HazMat	ARF Relief Firefighters	8	6
10/15/2005	36	NY	National Guard		1 CH-47 and Personnel	9	4
10/15/2005		TN	National Guard		Lt. COL. Janis Carter	35	1
10/15/2005		CA	National Guard		Ministry Team CA ANG		2
10/15/2005		IL	National Guard		National Guard Troops	31	10
10/15/2005		AR	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Inspection Trained Environmental Scientists	30	18
10/15/2005		MI	National Guard		110 MDG ANG 1 PAX	16	1
10/16/2005	20	CA	State	Engineering	48 Building Inspectors	39	17
10/16/2005		CO	National Guard		1 PAX 140th CO NG	14	1
10/16/2005		RI	National Guard		1 PAX from the BIOMED EQP	15	1
10/16/2005		ID	National Guard		1 PAX from 124th EMEDS	15	1
10/17/2005	2	VT	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team Member	15	1
10/17/2005		AZ	National Guard		1 Paralegal	61	1
10/18/2005	17	CO	State	Emergency Management	2 EMAC Personnel	8	2
10/18/2005		WV	National Guard		1 - ISISCS Team with Organic Equipment	28	15
10/19/2005	7	FL	State	Emergency Management	Two (2) Information Technology Specialist & Two (2) Data Processing to Support USPFO	14	4
10/19/2005		AL	National Guard		1 C-12 with Crew (3 PAX + 1 Aircraft)	2	3
10/20/2005	4	CO	State	Emergency Management	EMAC	12	1
10/20/2005		TN	National Guard		1 Chaplin to be Assigned to 159th Fighter Wing	15	1
10/20/2005		VA	State	Emergency Management	1 State PIO to Assist LA EOC	15	1
10/20/2005		PA	National Guard		1 PAX from 171 MDG PA ANG-4E071	30	1
10/21/2005	251	KY	National Guard		National Guard Troops	31	250
10/21/2005		UT	National Guard		Replacement PAO for JIC in New Orleans	14	1
10/22/2005		SD	National Guard		JAG-1PAX	15	1
10/22/2005		FL	State	Search and Rescue	6 Cadaver Dogs	8	6
10/22/2005		MN	State	Fire - HazMat	24 Firefighters for Plaquemines Parish	15	14



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
10/22/2005	62	AL	State	Search and Rescue	3 Cadaver Dogs with Handlers	5	3
10/22/2005		GA	State	Search and Rescue	3 Cadaver Dogs with Handlers	5	3
10/22/2005		ME	State	Fire - HazMat	10 FFs to Assist Tammeny Parish	29	10
10/22/2005		TX	National Guard		2 PAX, UTC 6KQT1 of 272 EIS and 6 PAX Truck	39	8
10/22/2005		PR	National Guard		17 PAX Aerial Port Team (UFBBS)	39	17
10/23/2005	5	CA	State	Engineering	5 Building Inspectors for St Bernard Parish	8	5
10/24/2005	13	WA	National Guard		1 ANG/CE Prime Beef Init	30	0
10/24/2005		TN	National Guard		1 ANG/CE Prime Beef Init	30	8
10/24/2005		VA	National Guard		1 Judge Advocate (! PAX CPT Carlos Hopkins, VA ARNG)	31	1
10/24/2005		AL	National Guard		1-Chaplain Debra Berry. Extension of Current Assignment to JTF Pelican		0
10/24/2005		WA	National Guard		2-UH-60 w/10 PAX to Provide TF Eagle w/Airlift and Transport Capability		0
10/24/2005		NY	State	Emergency Management	4 Dispatchers for Extension of REQ-A 0805-516 for 30 days	30	4
10/25/2005	13	AR	National Guard		1 UH-1 with 4 PAX	31	4
10/25/2005		WV	National Guard		1 Chaplin (John McDonough) to Support JTF Pelican	14	1
10/25/2005		WV	National Guard		2 UH-1s with 8 PAX	31	8
10/25/2005		WV	National Guard		Extension of Airman Roberts	14	0
10/26/2005	15	RI	National Guard		1 Ground Safety Officer	36	1
10/26/2005		KY	State	Emergency Management	1 EMAC A-Team Member	8	1
10/26/2005		OR	State	Fire - HazMat	10 FFs to Assist Tammeny Parish	25	10
10/26/2005		NM	National Guard		1 PAX	148	1
10/26/2005		MT	National Guard		1 PAX from 495th CSS BN MT ARN	120	1
10/26/2005		NC	National Guard		05 G4 Planner to Support JTF Pelican	42	1
10/26/2005		AZ	National Guard		2 PAX from C-111 Med Co., 9 PAX from NG, 5 PAX from 1404th Trans Co., 2 PAX from 220 Trans. Co.	35	0
10/27/2005	18	IA	National Guard		1 Judge Advocate	14	1
10/27/2005		MT	National Guard		Extension of 17 PAX	49	17
10/28/2005	3	MO	State	Veterinary - Animal Control	Cadaver Dog Team	18	2
10/28/2005		CO	National Guard		PAO for JIC in New Orleans	15	1
10/29/2005	16	IN	National Guard		3 UH-60s with 15 PAX	31	15
10/29/2005		CO	State	Emergency Management	1 EMAC A-Team Member	8	1
10/30/2005	769	WY	National Guard		One (1) GS Maint Company	1	60
10/30/2005		RI	National Guard		6 PAX from 143 MDG ANG	16	6
10/30/2005		WY	National Guard		1 PAX 153 MDG WY ANG	6	1
10/30/2005		CO	State	Emergency Management	1 EMAC A-Team Member (Steve Douglas)	8	1
10/30/2005		NC	National Guard		350 PAX Security and 350 PAX Logistics	31	700
10/30/2005		AZ	National Guard		1 PAX from 161 MDG AZ Ang	16	1
10/30/2005		PA	National Guard		2 PAX from PA NG	16	0
10/31/2005	1	NY	National Guard		1 PAX from 174 MDG NY ANG; LTC Dwayne Wilson	31	1
11/1/2005	211	CO	National Guard		1 Security Force Battalion (400 PAX)	19	200
11/1/2005		WA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member Jeanette Lomax	9	1
11/1/2005		MI	National Guard		10 PAX from MI ANG	59	10
11/2/2005	7	PA	National Guard		1 UTC 6KQC1 Cable/Antenna Install Team, 2 Person and QTY 1 UTC 6KQF4, 6 PAX	1	0
11/2/2005		TN	National Guard		7 PAX from TN ANG 134th MDG Extension of 0905-107	28	7



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
11/3/2005	14	PA	National Guard		1 Chaplin (Bob Humenay) of the 193 Special Operations Wing to Support JTF Pelican		1
11/3/2005		SD	National Guard		Extension of 10 PAX	33	10
11/3/2005		TX	National Guard		1 PAX from TX ANG to Backfill EMEDS to Join with JTF Belle Chase EMEDS	26	1
11/3/2005		PA	National Guard		2 PAX Requested from the PA ANG to Backfill EMEDS and Join Up with Belle Chase, LA	26	2
11/4/2005	15	ME	State	Emergency Management	Critical Care Nurses	15	15
11/8/2005	0	ND	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	4 Med/Surg Nurse Personnel	15	0
11/9/2005	0	AL	State	Fire - HazMat	21 FF & 1 Chief Officer	14	0
11/10/2005	10	IL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	RNs & LPNs	15	10
11/11/2005	8	DE	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member (Jon Schladen)	8	1
11/11/2005		ME	National Guard		1 PAX MAJ Michael Ripley	10	1
11/11/2005		VA	State	Emergency Management	Two Cadaver Search Teams w/Assistants & 2 Dogs (total 6 personnel)	12	6
11/13/2005	18	UT	National Guard		1 PAX AFSC 41A MAJ Boyd Woolsey	16	1
11/13/2005		VT	National Guard		1 PAX Capt. Keith Warren	16	0
11/13/2005		WY	National Guard		1 PAX Capt. Kevin Schrank	16	1
11/13/2005		NJ	National Guard		2 PAX Requested from NJ ANG to Backfill EMEDs Personnel	15	2
11/13/2005		NY	National Guard		3 PAX Requested from NY ANG to Backfill EMEDS Personnel to Join Up with JFT Belle Chase EMEDS LA	16	1
11/13/2005		AK	National Guard		5 PAX from 176 AK ANG	16	5
11/13/2005		CA	National Guard		2 PAX Patti Rusconi and Nancy Sumner	16	2
11/13/2005		CA	National Guard		1 PAX Michael Wong	16	1
11/13/2005		DE	National Guard		1 PAX Maj Robin Pollock	14	0
11/13/2005		DE	National Guard		SSG Maureen Mulrooney	14	1
11/13/2005		GA	National Guard		1 PAX LTC Richard Bright	16	1
11/13/2005		CA	National Guard		4NO71 TSG Joel Colinco	16	1
11/13/2005		GA	National Guard		2 PAX - 48G3 MAJ Christopher Ludlow & 4PO51 LTC Richard Bright	6	2
11/14/2005		6	AL	State	Fire - HazMat	Fire Team	11
11/16/2005	24	SC	National Guard		1 PAX SST Wayland Baker SC Ang	26	1
11/16/2005		WV	National Guard		21 PAX on ADSW Orders; JTF Pelican; Volunteered to Extend Tours	82	21
11/16/2005		ME	State	Emergency Management	Cadaver Search Teams	17	2
11/17/2005	2	IL	National Guard		1 Vehicle Mnt Craftsman & 1 Person & 1 Mobile Mnt Truck	79	2
11/18/2005	1	NJ	National Guard		1 PAX Col. William Dodson from 108 NJ ANG	2	1
11/19/2005	1	MI	National Guard		TF Pelican Extension of 1 Paralegal	34	1
11/21/2005	1	UT	National Guard		UTC 6KOT1, E1 Small Management, 1 Personnel	14	1
11/26/2005	6	OK	National Guard		EI Small Management Team. Equipment Included on This Request are 1 ea UTC 6KQF4 6 PAX Truck	30	6
11/27/2005	21	WY	National Guard		TF Pelican-I Flight Surgeon	16	1
11/27/2005		KY	State	Fire - HazMat	(1) 6-Man Fire Team	15	6
11/27/2005		DE	National Guard		1 PAX TSG Timothy Stoeckle	16	1
11/27/2005		WA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member (Jeanette Lomax)	20	1
11/27/2005		KY	State	Fire - HazMat	Task Force Pelican - LARNG-TF Crescent Guard - Kenneth Larson	15	6
11/27/2005		AL	State	Fire - HazMat	(1) 6-Man Fire Team - Camren, LA	15	6



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
11/28/2005	6	IL	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member	5	1
11/28/2005		GA	State	Search and Rescue	(2) K-9 Cadaver Teams - Wes & Bridgett Basey	14	2
11/28/2005		MO	State	Search and Rescue	K-9 Cadaver Teams - Pat Tuholski	14	1
11/28/2005		AZ	National Guard		1 PAX LTC Phyllis Click	14	1
11/28/2005		IL	National Guard		1 Person to Improve Cooper and Cabling	68	1
11/29/2005	1	MO	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	(1) ICU Nurse	29	1
11/30/2005	7	ME	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	5 Registered Nurses and 2 Nurse's Aids	15	7
12/1/2005	3	IA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Lab Testing & Services	30	0
12/1/2005		VA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	3 Med/Surg Nurses for Earl K Long Hospt-BR	43	3
12/1/2005		IA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Newborne Screening Testing	30	0
12/4/2005	9	IL	National Guard		4 Museum Curators & Assist	19	4
12/4/2005		UT	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member	10	1
12/4/2005		IL	National Guard		Textile and Flag Recovery--Museum Curator and Worker	19	4
12/8/2005	1	VA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Registered Nurse	15	1
12/22/2005	1	NY	National Guard		Ext. 1 Engineering Team TSGT. Theodore Speiss, NY	63	1
12/24/2005	1	IL	National Guard		1 (LTC Barry Kirby) Extension	42	1
12/27/2005	1	OK	National Guard		1 Ext. Oversee Communication at Gillis Long/Cdamp Beauregard - CMSGT. Dennis Mayo from OK	39	1
1/1/2006		IA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Infant Newborn Screening	30	0
1/2/2006	1	VA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	3 Nurses to Earl K. Long (Doris Sheets, Jenny Tasquantine, and Margarette Labbie)	13	3
1/4/2006	13	NY	National Guard		Cable/Antenna Install Team	31	7
1/4/2006		OK	National Guard		Truck Maintenance	31	1
1/4/2006		IL	National Guard		7 PAX Cable, Antenna, Maintenance 217th	31	0
1/4/2006		OK	National Guard		2 ea 6KQF4, 6 PAX Trucks/1 ea EI Cable/Antenna	50	2
1/4/2006		NC	National Guard		1 Legal Officer LTC Richard E. Faye	50	1
1/4/2006		OK	National Guard		1 6KQT1(CPT James Danscuk EI Mngmt Team)	31	1
1/4/2006		IL	National Guard		1 Vehicle Mnt Craftsman (Msgt. Richard Hand 32-Day Extension)	31	1
1/15/2006	6	MO	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	6-Man Police Team with Cruisers	4	6
1/17/2006	3	ME	State	Emergency Management	1 Cadaver Dog Team - Lt. Patrick Doran, Cpl. Roger Guay & Canine; Ofcr. Wade Carter & Canine		3
2/1/2006	0	IA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Iowa Infant Testing	27	0
3/1/2006	0	IA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Infant Testing	30	0
		MI	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	33 Law Enforcement Officers		33
		VA	State	Law Enforcement - State Police	4-Man Op Team and 40 ft Mobile Command Post		0
		NJ	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	5 Decon Units with 30 Support Personnel. 5 Transport Vehicles. 4 State Troopers, 2 Support Vehicles		0
		MN	State	Search and Rescue	Zodiac Boats and Motors		0
		KY	National Guard		9 PAX from the 123 MDG Company		0
		NH	National Guard		70 PAX from the 2/197th FA BDE		70
		AL	National Guard		Provide Aerial Surveillance, Photography		4
		WI	National Guard		35 PAX from the 64th ROC Co.		35
		KY	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	Correctional Officers & Emergency Supplies		0
		WA	National Guard		National Guard Troops		120
		IN	National Guard		815 PAX/38th Divarty, 2-150th FA, 2-152nd IN, 2-238th GASB, A/638 DASB, 203 LAT, TF 2-152 and 1 LOG TM		600
		IN	State	Law Enforcement	LE Commo Equipment		7
		VA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	7-Man IMT Team		7
		MO	State	Veterinary - Animal Control	1 Cadaver K-9 Logistics/Support Tech		1



Deployment Date	# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
		TX	National Guard		Helo Rescue Team		0
		WV	State	Search and Rescue	Cadaver Search Teams		2
		VA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	1 Nurse - George Roundtree		1
		TN	National Guard		7 PAX 2 Vehicles		7
		GA	State		1 Search Dog Team		2

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
2005 Hurricane Season Response After-Action Report

Mississippi





Mississippi-Katrina

# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel	
1	8/27/2005	KY	State	Emergency Management	A-Team EMAC Operations	13	1	
453	8/28/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	3 Department of Health Advisors	13	3	
	8/28/2005	FL	State	Search and Rescue	1 Type 1 S&R Team, 3 Type 2 S&R Teams, 2 Water Teams, 2 ALS Transports, 1 MARC, 1 FDOT, 1 Type 1 SIMT	7	450	
212	8/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	IMAT #1 - Harrison Co.	8	15	
	8/29/2005	MA	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team EMAC Member	4	1	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	200 Motor Homes, Laptops, Fuel Tankers, RV Repair	47	0	
	8/29/2005	AL	National Guard		31 Psnl, 117 ARW	61	31	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Fuel to Support TF FL Operations		0	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement	8 Member LE Strike Team		8	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Oxy, Printers, Cables, Medical Supplies	32	0	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 8 Supplies	32	0	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 8 Functions	32	44	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 8 Functions	32	75	
	8/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	9 Emer Mgmt Teams	32	38	
	1622	8/30/2005	AL	National Guard		2 UH-60 Helicopters w/Crews	31	6
8/30/2005		CO	National Guard		SAT Comm Site	15	7	
8/30/2005		AL	State	Search and Rescue	5 Heavy Rescue Team, 3 Water Rescue Teams	8	145	
8/30/2005		FL	National Guard		6 Man L&O Team	6	6	
8/30/2005		GA	National Guard		2 UH1 for Life Saving	7	6	
8/30/2005		MO	National Guard		2 C130 Aircraft w/Crews	3	10	
8/30/2005		PA	National Guard		SATCOM ISCS w/6 Personnel	14	6	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	IMAT #2 - Hancock Co.	7	15	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	1 PIO	14	1	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	175 Trucks of Water, 157 Trucks of Ice, 20 Material Handling Packages	4	370	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	Branch Director w/Personnel (Total of 4)	15	4	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Fire - HazMat	2 HazMat Assessment Teams to Harrison Co.	8	4	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Law Enforcement	L/E 325 Officers w/Vehicles	10	325	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	Type 2 USAR Team	10	35	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Search and Rescue	USAR L/E Support Team	10	125	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	Incident Management Team Type III	7	7	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	DOR Requests 2 Shelter Tents, 2 Tables, 6 Chairs, 2 Off Carts	7	3	
8/30/2005		KY	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	10	1	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	Activation of FL DOF	13	32	
8/30/2005		KY	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member - Extension to 9/9/05	10	0	
8/30/2005		AL	National Guard		2 CH47s w/Crews for SAR Missions	31	10	
8/30/2005		AL	National Guard		877th ENGR BN	31	264	
8/30/2005		AL	National Guard		23st MP BN	31	222	
8/30/2005		PA	National Guard		Co H, 104th AVC ATS	31	10	
8/30/2005		KY	National Guard		4 Comm and 5 LNO Psnl Camp Shelby	31	8	
8/30/2005		FL	State	Emergency Management	Water Bladders	31	0	
		8/31/2005	AR	State	Emergency Management	PIOs	14	2
		8/31/2005	GA	National Guard		CH47 w/Crew	10	9



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
1501	8/31/2005	MD	National Guard		MP Company for Security and Traffic Control	10	131
	8/31/2005	TN	National Guard		3 MP Companies for Security	15	240
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	50 ALS Ambulances w/2 Crew Members, 10 Team Leaders w/Vehicles	7	110
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Search and Rescue	Upgrade of USAR Task Force 4 & 5 from Type III to Type I	6	50
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	200 Cellular Units for SEOC	30	0
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	2 Additional Incident Mgmt Resource Mgmt Personnel, 2 Additional Logistics Personnel	6	2
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	1,000 Personnel Base Camp	30	50
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	20 Port-A-Lets and Hand Washing Stations for USAF Team 200+ for 30 Days	30	10
	8/31/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	5 Person Individual Assistance Team	14	5
	8/31/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	4 Person Logistics Team	15	4
	8/31/2005	DE	National Guard		MP Company to Work Security (ext 306)	14	100
	8/31/2005	AR	National Guard		Combat Engineer Co for Debris Removal	10	100
	8/31/2005	AR	National Guard		100 Soldiers to Work Hurricane Response	10	100
	8/31/2005	AR	National Guard		MP Company to Work Security	10	75
	8/31/2005	AR	National Guard		25 ea 5 Ton Trucks w/75 Soldiers for Debris Removal	40	75
	8/31/2005	AL	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Personnel and Equipment (see 360)	15	75
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Shelf Sustainable Meals for EMAC Team Deployed to MS		0
	8/31/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	Donations Manager	15	1
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	500 Body Bags		0
	8/31/2005	AL	National Guard		2 UH60s w/Crews for SAR	30	10
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Provide On-Site LP Refueling for 20 RVs		1
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	1500 Port-A-Lets, 1,000 Hand Washing Stations	60	10
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 8 Team	12	84
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Psnl to Support 6 Southern Counties - 2 Drivers to Drive Rental Trucks		2
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	6,000 Gal Water Tanker	30	1
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Immunizations to Protect Psnl Being Deployed for TF FL	30	0
	8/31/2005	AL	State	Law Enforcement	12 Additional Law Enforcement Off (Ext of #76)	15	12
	8/31/2005	TN	National Guard		Extension to #19 - 3 MP companies	30	240
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Supplies to Equip 20 Motorhomes	30	0
	8/31/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	EDICS Communications	23	2
	9/1/2005	AL	National Guard		NG Security Forces for 1500 (Ext #258) Duplicate #61	10	1500
	9/1/2005	FL	National Guard		4 UH60s w/Bambi Buckets	6	8
	9/1/2005	TN	National Guard		ATS Co. w/Tower, TTCS	21	6
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Catering and Portable Showers	29	10
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	2 Drivers for FL DOT for FL EMA Logistics Support Trailer	1	2
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement	L/E 200 Officers (Additional)	10	200
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Operation of PODS & Instruction of Local Volunteers & MS NG	29	90
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Baby Formula to Stennis NASA Center		1
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	EOC Logistics Chief	14	1
	9/1/2005	KY	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member	15	1
	9/1/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	15	1
	9/1/2005	TN	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member	15	1
	9/1/2005	OH	National Guard		Corps Support Approx 119 Soldiers and BG to Provide Security and Debris Cleanup	22	119



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
3011	9/1/2005	TN	National Guard		Engineer Battalion w/Veh Approx 380 Psnl for Debris Removal and Distribution Center Operations	14	380
	9/1/2005	OH	National Guard		3 ea 100 KW Generators	59	2
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Trucks of Water	5	500
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	CISM Team, Shelter Nurses, Environmental Health Team	2	28
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	DMORT Support for Hancock Co.		1
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Extend Catering Contract at N. Florida Fairgrounds for Deploying Psnl	6	10
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Environmental and Disease Resource Books	2	0
	9/1/2005	NC	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	MED-1 Team (with Log Support)	20	80
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Web-System of Licensed Health and Medical Care Volunteers	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	2,800 Gallon Fuel Tanker		2
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	10 All-Terrian, 4-Wheel Drive Vehicles	16	0
	9/1/2005	AR	State	Law Enforcement	52 Law Enforcement Officer w/Equip	4	52
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 4&9 Support Personnel, 2 Psnl for Harrison Co EOC, 1 Psnl for Hancock Co EOC	14	5
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	40 hand-held SAT Phones for Medical Personnel to Support TF FL	41	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Port-A-Let, Handwashing, Dumpsters	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Hitch System		0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Fuel, Gloves, Coolers	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Port-a-Lets, Trucks, Gators, Chairs, Laundry Detergent	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Public Works	Port-a-Lets, Showers	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Medical Supplies	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Port-a-Lets	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Health & Medical Supplies	29	0
	9/1/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Logistical Staging Area Support Force	27	11
	9/2/2005	KY	National Guard			50 2 1/2 Ton or 5 Ton Trucks w/150 Psnl	23
9/2/2005	MI	National Guard			MP Company for Security and Traffic Control	15	194
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		SLEMAC to Harrison Co.	14	2
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Jeff Milligan, Chuck Moneyham, Dennis Cook	14	3
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Mass Care Coordination Team to Task Force FL	9	5
9/2/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management		Community Relations Team GA #1	7	10
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		115 2-Way Radios & 150 CAB L	32	0
9/2/2005	OH	National Guard			Task Force, 1,300 Personnel to Provide Security and Debris Cleanup	29	1300
9/2/2005	OH	National Guard			Aviation Assets	20	65
9/2/2005	TN	National Guard			TALCE Support for Fixed Wing A/C Team	43	25
9/2/2005	DE	National Guard			100 Personnel to Provide Command and Control	28	100
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Additional Staffing for Resource Tracking and Other Tasks	13	7
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Clearing and Cleaning of Airport	13	10
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		SERT Liaisons	14	6
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Purchase and Delivery of 100 Trucks of Ice	14	100
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Logistics Requests Ryder Truck Rentals for Westward Movement of Resources	14	2
9/2/2005	FL	State	Fire - HazMat		Fire Assessments with EMT/Paramedic Staffing	14	200
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Volunteer and Donations Distribution Site Coordinator	11	1
9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management		Satellite Phones	61	0
9/2/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections		20 Correctional Officers	14	20



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
2694	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Meals	30	0
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	15 Cell Phones for Recovery Staff	62	0
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	4 SAT Phones	62	0
	9/2/2005	KS	National Guard		Psnl from 190th Air Refueling Wing to Provide EM Medical Assistance	29	4
	9/2/2005	KY	National Guard		25 Psnl for Base Support/Air Mobility Cmd Airlift for CRTC	43	25
	9/2/2005	KY	National Guard		Water Purification Equipment w/Operators	60	4
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Biomedical Waste Pickup at Hancock Regional Medical Center	89	1
	9/2/2005	ND	National Guard		2 ea Water Purification & Equipment w/Operators	59	2
	9/2/2005	NY	National Guard		8 UH6, 2 CH 47, 6 UH 1, & 130 Psnl	28	130
	9/2/2005	VA	National Guard		LT InfantryBN, 222 Psnl to Provide Security & Recovery Operations	21	222
	9/2/2005	OK	National Guard		25 Psnl for Base Supporting/Air Mobility Cmd Airlift for CRTC	43	51
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Transportation & Highways	1,100 Traffic Cones, 1,000 Barricades	28	5
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Baby Food and Formula		0
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Trucks of Pedisure and Ensure Liquid		4
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	MARC Communications for SAR	14	1
	9/2/2005	FL	National Guard		Logistics SSGT to Miss	14	1
	9/2/2005	GA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	DMORT Team	14	38
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Critical Incident Management Team (CISM)	28	4
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Temporary Micobial lab	28	1
	9/2/2005	TN	National Guard		Logistics Control Cell	32	102
	9/2/2005	KS	National Guard		Emergency Med Team to support TF AL	8	6
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	20 Additional ALS Units	9	44
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Mobilization Housing	13	0
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 8 Travel	28	0
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Tracstar Portable Satellite	28	0
	9/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Satellite Comms	28	0
9/2/2005	ND	National Guard		72 Psnl from 119th FW	44	72	
9/2/2005	CO	National Guard		50 Psnl from 140th	33	50	
9/3/2005	FL	National Guard		Infantry Battalion	70	450	
9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Meals for Florida Task Force		1	
9/3/2005	NY	State	Emergency Management	IMT #4 to Report to Pearl River Co.	14	15	
9/3/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	EOC Operations	13	4	
9/3/2005	OK	State	Emergency Management	Operations Staff	16	1	
9/3/2005	FL	National Guard		15 Cook Personnel	29	15	
9/3/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	2 IMT	28	15	
9/3/2005	IN	State	Law Enforcement	Indiana Task Force	61	148	
9/3/2005	MT	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	15	1	
9/3/2005	SC	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement / Fire / EMS (NO COST)	15	28	
9/3/2005	UT	State	Emergency Management	Admin to Assist in Tracking Costs	15	1	
9/3/2005	FL	State	Transportation & Highways	Tire Changing Equipment, Tires and Technician	27	1	
9/3/2005	MI	National Guard		Construction Engineers	42	45	
9/3/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	IMT	28	21	
9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Baby Diapers and Wipes		0	



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
2951	9/3/2005	GA	State	Fire - HazMat	50 Career Firefighters	21	50
	9/3/2005	TN	National Guard		3 ea OH-58 with Crew & Maintenance Support	21	9
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	PIO Team	7	2
	9/3/2005	OH	State	Fire - HazMat	Career Firefighters, 50 Psnl	21	50
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	384 Cases of Baby Diapers		10
	9/3/2005	NC	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement, 21 Psnl	13	21
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	LSA Manager	27	1
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	5 Landstar Trucks to Transport Food Products and Other Equipment		5
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement and First Responders Vehicle Replacement Lost or Damaged		0
	9/3/2005	FL	National Guard		OH-58 Crew	21	6
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Shelf Stable Meals for Evacuees		0
	9/3/2005	IL	State	Emergency Management	IMT	13	11
	9/3/2005	SC	State	Law Enforcement	118 Law Enforcement Personnel w/Equipment	15	118
	9/3/2005	GA	National Guard		1,500 Task Force	20	1528
	9/3/2005	KY	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement	15	5
	9/3/2005	PA	State	Fire - HazMat	Firefighters	7	5
	9/3/2005	MI	National Guard		EMEDS to Support 190th Air Refueling	14	2
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	15 EH Team Supplies		0
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Trucks of Ice		150
	9/3/2005	OH	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement, 150 Psnl	14	150
	9/3/2005	PA	State	Fire - HazMat	12 Fire Suppression Tanker Trucks with 2-Man Crews	14	24
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Search and Rescue	3 Airboats and 1 Additional Helicopter	7	5
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Planning Team (IDP)	5	6
	9/3/2005	KY	State	Law Enforcement	5 Law Enforcement Psnl (not needed)	14	5
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Psnl to Support Water Tanker	9	2
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Area Command Post Replacement	14	2
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Battalion Chief Relief Personnel for Florida State EOC	7	3
	9/3/2005	MO	State	Law Enforcement	12 Law Enforcement from Jefferson Co	15	12
	9/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Communications Personnel	27	4
	9/3/2005	TN	State	Law Enforcement	14 LE Officers & 8 LE Vehicles	1	14
9/3/2005	KY	State	Law Enforcement	5 Law Enforcement Officer & Vehicles Add On to REQ-A 149	15	5	
137	9/4/2005	SC	State	Emergency Management	State EOC Ops Support	14	2
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	SART IMT	14	5
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement	Road Ranger Services	26	1
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	EMAC ESF 8 Request 20 Hand Held GPS Units for Incoming Health & Medical Assessment Teams		0
	9/4/2005	WV	National Guard		1 ea Interim Satellite Support Comm Sys (ISCS) Team	45	6
	9/4/2005	CO	State	Emergency Management	Donations Manager	24	2
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Tracstar Satellite System for Hancock Co., MS	26	1
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Transportation & Highways	FDOT Advance Recon Team	14	10
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Respirators	2	0
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	PIO	15	2
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Material Purchase in Support of Logistics Operation in Each of the Six County EOCs, LSA, Cmd Post, etc.	26	0
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Transportation & Highways	200 Traffic Cones for Harrison Co		0



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel	
	9/4/2005	TN	National Guard		Mobile EOC	29	2	
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Resources Being Purchased to Support Operations - 15 Cell Phones w/Service	30	0	
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	16 Teams - Water/WasteWater Facility Teams	12	101	
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	1 Housing Coordinator	26	1	
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Personal Protective Equip	14	0	
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Laundry to be Cleaned	14	0	
	9/4/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Logistica Staffing	7	2	
	9/4/2005	KS	National Guard		2 ea Psnl 190th KS ANG: EMEDS	7	2	
1193	9/5/2005	IN	National Guard		JTF 2,300 Soldiers & 40 Tankers	26	0	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	3 Recovery Personnel, (1) PA Coordinator, (1) Deputy PA Officer, (1) Housing Coordinator	10	4	
	9/5/2005	GA	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Personnel & Equipment	13	20	
	9/5/2005	NV	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Officers w/Equipment	12	100	
	9/5/2005	VA	National Guard		225 Psnl Lt. Infantry	26	225	
	9/5/2005	TN	National Guard		1 Medical Flight Team	15	3	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Human Services Branch Personnel	14	3	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	200 ESF 8 Team Identifiers		0	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Replacement of PIO	7	1	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	20 Trucks of ice to Stennis NASA Center	5	20	
	9/5/2005	MD	National Guard	Human Services	Psnl to Provide S&R, Distribution of Ice and Water	29	104	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	TRAC-STAR Sys to be Installed at Pearl River, Stone, and George Counties	25	2	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	FLA Debris Specialist for Harrison Co.	14	1	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	25,000,000 lbs of Ice (500 Truckloads)	25	500	
	9/5/2005	KY	National Guard		1 ea Ministry Teams (4 Psnl Total)	15	4	
	9/5/2005	AL	State	Law Enforcement	Wildlife Officers	6	50	
	9/5/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	8 Person PA Team	13	8	
	9/5/2005	MN	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Strike Teams	15	40	
	9/5/2005	KY	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement	7	2	
	9/5/2005	DE	State	Fire - HazMat	P-4 Fire Crash Truck	14	4	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Comfort Bath Dry Bathing Products		0	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement - Corrections	87 Correctional Officers for Harrison Co Relief Staffing	14	87	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	NE IMT 1 St Johns Co Command Bus w/2 Techs to Harrison County	14	2	
	9/5/2005	NJ	State	Emergency Management	2 Donations Management Teams	25	2	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	2,000 Masks and 1 Case of Vicks Vapor Rub	14	0	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	1,017 Body Bags		0	
	9/5/2005	TN	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	1 Medical Flight Team (Vanderbilt Life Flight)	15	4	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Special Baby Formulas		1	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Fire - HazMat	1 2-Man HazMat Assessment Team - Harrison County	8	4	
	9/5/2005	FL	State	Human Services	2 Human Services Personnel	17	2	
		9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	IMT	7	15
		9/6/2005	KY	National Guard		Refueling, 24 Pers Team	29	24
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	1 State DRC Coordinator and 1 IA Specialist	14	2	
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	IMT to Assist Stennis	15	10	
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Volunteer Reception Center Management Team for Harrison Co EOC	14	2	



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
164	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Mass Care Coordination Team	9	7
	9/6/2005	CO	State	Emergency Management	IMT	16	19
	9/6/2005	GA	State	Fire - HazMat	2 Fire Engine Drivers	14	2
	9/6/2005	KS	State	Search and Rescue	4 SERT Psnl	18	4
	9/6/2005	TN	National Guard		EIS Communications Team (3 Psnl)	33	3
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Resources to be Purchased to Support Operations of the FL TF Supporting 6 Counties		0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Veterinary	3 4-Man Animal Control Officers	15	12
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Human Services	30,000 Blankets for Distribution to Area Shelters		0
	9/6/2005	MN	State	Emergency Management	8 Specialized Airport Technicians w/Instrumentation, Electrical and Environmental Systems	5	8
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Human Services	12 Human Services Psnl	12	12
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Veterinary	3 4-Man Animal Control Officer Teams	15	12
	9/6/2005	CA	National Guard		P-19 Fire Truck	24	6
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	911 Call Center Set Up to Provide Service to Hancock Co	30	1
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Veterinary	Rotation of (3) 4 Member Animal Control	15	12
	9/6/2005	KY	National Guard		7 Food Service Personnel	24	7
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Pallet Wrap		0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Blankets		0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Lime		0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Electric Extension Cords		0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Fuel Cans		0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	6 Truckloads Bleach		6
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Extension of Trucks (Water & Ice) - Stennis	24	0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Vaccines	24	0
	9/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 8 Lodging	24	0
151	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	4 Rolls, Plotter Paper for Creating Maps		0
	9/7/2005	AL	National Guard		7 Psnl Tactical Commo Planning, Engineering Installation Planning	29	7
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Engineering	Contractors to Build Floors on 15 Reefers	7	2
	9/7/2005	UT	National Guard		2 ea Ministry Teams	21	4
	9/7/2005	MN	National Guard		2 ea Ministry Teams (4 Psnl Total)	21	4
	9/7/2005	IL	National Guard		26 PAX Security Force	20	26
	9/7/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	County EOC Personnel	12	4
	9/7/2005	GA	State	Fire - HazMat	Type III Fire IMT	23	18
	9/7/2005	GA	National Guard		2 UH-1 for SAR Ext of #10	23	3
	9/7/2005	NE	National Guard		18 Security Force Psnl	23	18
	9/7/2005	MI	State	Emergency Management	50 DNR Officer w/24 4-Wheel Drive Vehicles	11	50
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	PIO Staff, Road & Bridge Supv, Senior Mechanic	7	3
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Hardee Co Response Team for Forrest Co	7	4
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Field Level Coordinator of Public Works and Fuel Missions	2	1
	9/7/2005	GA	National Guard		P-19 Fire Vehicle	23	4
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Baby Food		2
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Shrink Wrap		0
9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Equipment Support to EOCs Ad Field		0	
9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Jose Laguana to Assist Infrastructure	6	1	



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Transportation & Highways	Traffic Control Equipment	23	0
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Generators (170) Usage	23	0
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	3,000 AM/FM Radios		0
	9/7/2005	FL	State	Public Works	Sanitation Services	23	0
713	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	10 Trucks of Water to Stennis, LA	3	10
	9/8/2005	GA	State	Law Enforcement	4 Law Enforcement Psnl	6	4
	9/8/2005	NC	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Entomologist - Dr Harrison	5	1
	9/8/2005	WV	National Guard		167th Services Flight	29	8
	9/8/2005	ME	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Preventive Medicine Team	30	10
	9/8/2005	TN	National Guard		26 Psnl from the 134th ARW to Provide Security	21	26
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Additional ESF 11 Personnel to Assist USDA at Stennis NASA to Administor Inventory, Shipping, etc.	15	2
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Psnl to Support TF Florida		2
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Human Services	6 Additional Staff for Human Services from Area Cmd at Stennis	10	6
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	250 Trucks of Ice		250
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	300 Trucks of Water - Related to #132		300
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Self Heating Meals		0
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Additional Blankets		0
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Computer Lease FAC	25	0
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	FL Misc.	22	0
	9/8/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Municipal Mutual Aid	53	94
682	9/9/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	Community Relations Team	15	7
	9/9/2005	GA	State	Law Enforcement	20 Law Enforcement Officers w/Equipment	8	20
	9/9/2005	TN	State	Law Enforcement	100 Law Enforcement Officers w/50 Vehicles	10	100
	9/9/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	2 Psnl to Work DRC as Coordinators	36	7
	9/9/2005	TN	State	Emergency Management	2 CISM Teams	11	30
	9/9/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	4 PIO	14	4
	9/9/2005	TN	National Guard		1 ea B-2 Stand from 164th Avn	21	1
	9/9/2005	CA	National Guard		146th ACFT to Aircraft Maintenance	36	11
	9/9/2005	OH	National Guard		4 Aircraft Maintenance Psnl from 121st ACFT	36	4
	9/9/2005	NY	State	Emergency Management	3 PIOs	15	3
	9/9/2005	AL	State	Emergency Management	Mobile ALTF-1	3	30
	9/9/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	2 Drivers to Deliver Ryder Trucks	1	2
	9/9/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	Public Health Support to EMAC #190	12	7
	9/9/2005	FL	State	Agriculture & Forestry	6 Trucks to Ship USDA Commodities (Dup Entry)	2	6
	9/9/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement	Extension of 325 LE Officers	21	325
	9/9/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement	Extension of USAR Law Enforcement Sup Team	21	125
9/9/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	RV Rental	22	0	
9/9/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	ESF 8 Lodging	21	0	
9/9/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	FL Demob Costs	21	0	
	9/10/2005	IA	National Guard		Area Medical Support Bn (200 Psnl), 2 ROPUs	20	200
	9/10/2005	KS	State	Engineering	10 Building Inspectors	51	10
	9/10/2005	MO	State	Law Enforcement	50 Law Enforcement Psnl	13	50
	9/10/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	4 Backhoes, 4 Dump Trucks, 2 Mini Excavators, 2 Mud Pumps, 4 3/4t pu, 1 Roadway Paving Machine		0



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
362	9/10/2005	OK	State	Emergency Management	4 Community Relations Psnl	15	4
	9/10/2005	NM	State	Emergency Management	5 Community Relations Psnl	15	5
	9/10/2005	KS	National Guard		190th ARW - Fire Fighting Duties	51	6
	9/10/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	6 SERT Members	17	6
	9/10/2005	KY	State	Fire - HazMat	40 Fire Fighters to Jackson Co	15	40
	9/10/2005	KY	National Guard		3 Med Preventative Medicine Psnl	20	3
	9/10/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	CR Team	6	21
	9/10/2005	FL	State	Search and Rescue	3 Airboats, 1 Helicopter - Extension	20	4
	9/10/2005	FL	State	Transportation & Highways	250 Signal Light Heads	2	0
	9/10/2005	AL	National Guard		13 Personnel for EMED	51	13
435	9/11/2005	GA	National Guard		1-CH47 w/Crew	19	9
	9/11/2005	MT	National Guard		11 Psnl to Assist Public Affairs	14	4
	9/11/2005	CO	National Guard		MP ALW (Ext of #3)	19	8
	9/11/2005	MD	National Guard		115th MP & 175 ALW Law Enforcement/Security (Ext of #14)	19	131
	9/11/2005	PA	National Guard		1 Communications Site Set (Ext of #17)	19	0
	9/11/2005	AR	National Guard		B-5 Stand from 189th	19	0
	9/11/2005	FL	State	Agriculture & Forestry	State Vet Requests Rolls of Hay, 48-72 Rolls (Donated)		0
	9/11/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	Liaison between MEMA at Forward EOC	16	1
	9/11/2005	FL	State	Veterinary	4th Animal Control Team	15	12
	9/11/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	CISM Specialist	9	1
	9/11/2005	IA	State	Public Works	Water Utilities	17	14
	9/11/2005	ID	National Guard		Refueling Ops	23	14
	9/11/2005	PA	National Guard		193rd Food Service	19	20
	9/11/2005	FL	State	Human Services	Volunteer Reception Center Staff - Hancock County	7	11
	9/11/2005	FL	State	Law Enforcement	Extension of LE	19	210
1636	9/12/2005	AL	National Guard		TF AL (1450 Psnl) - Extension for #1	18	1500
	9/12/2005	AR	State	Law Enforcement	50 Wildlife Officers	13	50
	9/12/2005	WI	State	Human Services	Work Force Development Psnl	7	10
	9/12/2005	MN	National Guard		Mental Combat Stress	25	2
	9/12/2005	TN	National Guard		25T Loader Forklift	29	1
	9/12/2005	TN	State	Public Works	Nashville Public/Work Team	15	14
	9/12/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	Human Services Branch Manager	15	1
	9/12/2005	TN	National Guard		P-18 Fire Vehicle	18	0
	9/12/2005	OK	National Guard		P-19 Fire Vehicle	18	4
	9/12/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	CR Team #3	6	4
	9/12/2005	FL	State	Transportation & Highways	7 Member Bridge Recovery		7
	9/12/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Replacement IMT Harrison County	8	20
	9/12/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Replacement IMT Hancock County	8	20
	9/12/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Crane Rental		3
	9/12/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	911 Center Grounding	18	0
	9/13/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	IMT for Admin Issues	7	13
	9/13/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	EOC Ops	15	1
	9/13/2005	WA	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team Member	15	1



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
49	9/13/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	5 3 KW Gen, 20 300-500W UPS, 3 Fax Machines	17	0
	9/13/2005	UT	State	Emergency Management	Donations Manager	16	1
	9/13/2005	UT	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member Replacement	15	1
	9/13/2005	IA	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member Replacement	15	1
	9/13/2005	OH	National Guard		NG EIS Management Team	29	3
	9/13/2005	TN	National Guard		3-Person EIS Management Team	44	3
	9/13/2005	TN	National Guard		8 Psnl 241st EIS Repair Team	29	8
	9/13/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Shuttle Trucks - FI Blue Team	17	4
	9/13/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	School Recovery Teams - Hancock Co	39	13
146	9/14/2005	OH	National Guard		179th Food Service	16	14
	9/14/2005	FL	State	Veterinary	State Vet, Relief of ESF 17 Team		0
	9/14/2005	PA	State	Law Enforcement	20 Law Enforcement from Harrisburg, PA	13	22
	9/14/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member Extension	7	1
	9/14/2005	NJ	State	Emergency Management	Donations Manager	16	1
	9/14/2005	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Environmental Health Strike Team	14	9
	9/14/2005	FL	State	Agriculture & Forestry	Round Bales for Jim Watson		0
	9/14/2005	WV	State	Emergency Management	HazMat & Flood Plain Mgmt	14	1
	9/14/2005	MA	National Guard		Major Marchitelli - Med Liaison Off	32	1
	9/14/2005	AL	State	Law Enforcement	Alabama Troopers & Equipment	14	87
	9/14/2005	FL	State	Human Services	Extension of Human Services Team - Area Command in Stennis	8	6
9/14/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Four Replacement Personnel at Stennis	9	4	
527	9/15/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Community Relations Teams	15	22
	9/15/2005	DE	National Guard		MP Company for Security (Ext of #62)	15	67
	9/15/2005	WV	State	Fire - HazMat	Hancock Co FD - Structure Eng w/2 Crews	9	10
	9/15/2005	WI	State	Emergency Management	CR Personnel	15	3
	9/15/2005	AR	State	Emergency Management	CR Personnel	21	2
	9/15/2005	IL	State	Emergency Management	IMT Teams #2	15	12
	9/15/2005	CA	State	Emergency Management	IMT Team	15	16
	9/15/2005	TN	National Guard		Extension to #74 - Engineering Battalion	15	380
	9/15/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	5 Fax Machines - Hancock County		0
	9/15/2005	NC	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Replace Members of #398 - Public Health	42	3
	9/15/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	11 Staffmembers for Area Field Command	61	11
9/15/2005	AZ	National Guard		1 PAO - Old Mission Cleanup	15	1	
292	9/16/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	30 Community Responders with Elder Service Experience	29	30
	9/16/2005	KS	State	Law Enforcement	KBI, 11 Man TAC Team	20	11
	9/16/2005	MD	State	Public Works	Two Bucket Trucks	14	2
	9/16/2005	GA	State	Law Enforcement	50 LE Officers - Hancock County	15	75
	9/16/2005	MO	State	Fire - HazMat	12 Tankers w/2-Man Crews	14	24
	9/16/2005	FL	National Guard		1 Safety Officer	20	1
	9/16/2005	GA	National Guard		Copper/Fiber Repair Resources	43	0
	9/16/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	50 FF - NOVA Group	17	50
	9/16/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	30 Psnl IMT	14	32
	9/16/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	Extension of GBI Team - Mission 165	14	58



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
	9/16/2005	MD	State	Fire - HazMat	Battalion FF to Pass Christian, MS	31	9
	9/16/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	911 System		0
	9/16/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Extension of SLEMAC to Harrison Co	14	0
249	9/17/2005	MI	National Guard		Extension to #15 - MP Company	13	146
	9/17/2005	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Public Health Team	14	7
	9/17/2005	AR	State	Emergency Management	ESF 3 and ESF 11 Personnel	14	1
	9/17/2005	RI	State	Search and Rescue	Type II USAR Team w/Cadaver Dogs	14	40
	9/17/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Area Command Replacement	13	1
	9/17/2005	FL	State	Veterinary - Animal Control	4 Replacement Animal Control Officers - Hancock County	11	12
	9/17/2005	GA	State	Emergency Management	20 Person CR Team #4	6	20
	9/17/2005	AL	State	Law Enforcement	20 Mobile PD Officer for 24-Hour Staffing on Ship	30	20
	9/17/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Two Reefers for LSA at Stennis	13	2
71	9/18/2005	WI	State	Law Enforcement	Employment Security - Extension of 347	26	10
	9/18/2005	WA	State	Emergency Management	5 PA Personnel	16	5
	9/18/2005	AR	State	Law Enforcement	25 LE to Jackson Co	14	25
	9/18/2005	CA	State	Emergency Management	2 ESF 8 Personnel - Hancock County	14	2
	9/18/2005	OH	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	8	1
	9/18/2005	TN	State	Search and Rescue	Nashville #2 SAR	13	25
	9/18/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Logistics Personnel	9	3
55	9/19/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Extension Bart Frost	13	1
	9/19/2005	DE	State	Emergency Management	NFIP Coordinator	11	1
	9/19/2005	VT	State	Emergency Management	1 SHMO Ray Doherty	14	1
	9/19/2005	NC	State	Veterinary - Animal Control	Animal IMT	11	12
	9/19/2005	ME	National Guard		101st SFS to Provide Security	29	11
	9/19/2005	CA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member - Mike Staley, CA	15	1
	9/19/2005	FL	State	Veterinary - Animal Control	Three 4-Man Animal Control Teams	11	12
	9/19/2005	TN	State	Law Enforcement	16 LE Officers	14	16
	9/19/2005	FL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Body Bags	11	0
	9/19/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Equipment Rehab	11	0
175	9/20/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	DRC Tony Lemmo	12	1
	9/20/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	10 Member Massage Therapists & CISM Team	6	10
	9/20/2005	TN	State	Emergency Management	19 Man CISM	7	19
	9/20/2005	KS	State	Law Enforcement	67 LE Personnel		67
	9/20/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	32 VA Officers to Hancock County	17	47
	9/20/2005	KS	National Guard		1 Ministry Team - 2 Psnl	29	2
	9/20/2005	AL	National Guard		1 Ministry Team - 2 Psnl	30	2
	9/20/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	CISM - Extension to #366	5	1
	9/20/2005	RI	National Guard		143 APS to Load and Unload Aircraft (15 PAX)	29	14
	9/20/2005	WA	National Guard		5 Psnl - Med Support - Hancock Co	27	5
	9/20/2005	PA	National Guard		1 Med Support - Hancock Co	31	1
	9/20/2005	NJ	National Guard		5 Psnl - Med Support - Hancock Co	27	5
9/20/2005	DC	National Guard		Lt. John Obrien for EMEDS	14	1	
	9/21/2005	KY	National Guard		50 2 1/2 ton or 5 ton trucks w/150 Psnl - Extension #13	24	177



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
321	9/21/2005	WA	State	Human Services	4 PIOs	14	4
	9/21/2005	PA	State	Search and Rescue	6 Cadaver Dogs	13	6
	9/21/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	2 Computers - 1 Router for Hancock 911	9	0
	9/21/2005	NC	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Med 1 Hospital - Hancock Co - Ext to 190	39	92
	9/21/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	2 IT Psnl	7	2
	9/21/2005	TN	State	Law Enforcement	20 Officers - Pearl River Co	8	0
	9/21/2005	AL	State	Law Enforcement	18 Mounted Units	7	18
	9/21/2005	AZ	National Guard		1 Medical Support TSgt Lewis	15	1
	9/21/2005	MT	National Guard		2 ea 120 ANG MT NG - Med	14	2
	9/21/2005	PA	National Guard		19 Psnl from 111 Tag 171st for EMEDS	13	19
66	9/22/2005	OH	State	Fire - HazMat	15 FF from Cleveland	14	15
	9/22/2005	KY	State	Fire - HazMat	25 FF	14	25
	9/22/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	14 Person IMT	14	14
	9/22/2005	AL	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	1 Medical Doctor - Frazier - MS 603/HWY 90 Hospital	9	1
	9/22/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	Area Coordination Center	15	6
	9/22/2005	AL	National Guard		187th MSGT J Hornsby - Family Asst	44	1
	9/22/2005	NH	National Guard		2 ea 157th ANG NHNG - MED	15	2
	9/22/2005	OR	National Guard		2 ea 142 ANG ORNG - Med	39	2
1307	9/23/2005	OH	National Guard		Extension to #66 - Corps Support for Debris	7	1200
	9/23/2005	OH	National Guard		Extension to #68 - Aviation Assets	7	65
	9/23/2005	KS	State	Fire - HazMat	40 FF w/PPE - Jackson County	13	40
	9/23/2005	NE	National Guard		1 Priest - Lt Mark Bevard	29	1
	9/23/2005	FL	National Guard		UH60 Maintenance		1
16	9/24/2005	AL	State	Law Enforcement	15 Law Enforcement - Jackson Co	14	15
	9/24/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Leader	15	1
9	9/25/2005	KY	State	Emergency Management	Two 2K Tankers - Pearlington	31	2
	9/25/2005	CO	National Guard		4 ea Psnl 140th ANG - Med	9	4
	9/25/2005	MO	National Guard		3 ea Psnl 131st ANG - Med	22	3
21	9/26/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	DRC Jim Hampton	29	1
	9/26/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Generator for Hancock Co 911	4	0
	9/26/2005	GA	State	Law Enforcement	15 GBI Personnel for Missing Person Tracing	13	15
	9/26/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	Ops EOC - Don McGuire	14	1
	9/26/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	14 Donated Vehicles		0
	9/26/2005	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	1 Pharmacist	15	1
	9/26/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	2 Rental Vehicles for FFs	10	0
	9/26/2005	WI	National Guard		3 ea Psnl EMEDS	16	3
51	9/27/2005	SC	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Nurses to Mississippi State Hospital	13	28
	9/27/2005	KS	National Guard		1 Internist - Col D. Lawler	34	1
	9/27/2005	IA	State	Public Works	Water Utilities (ext of 367)	13	0
	9/27/2005	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Environmental Health Strike Team - Ext of 406	15	9
	9/27/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	5 CISM / 5 Massage Therapists - Ext 482	30	10
	9/27/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	CISM - 1 Person	6	1
	9/27/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	2 A-Team Members	11	2



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
51	9/28/2005	TN	National Guard		26 Psnl Security Force	29	26
	9/28/2005	CA	State	Emergency Management	6 Person IMT Team	14	6
	9/28/2005	SC	State	Emergency Management	Reimbursement for Self Dispatch, Horry Co, N. Myrtle Beach, City of Myrtle Beach and City of Conway	13	19
65	9/29/2005	OR	National Guard		Chief of Safety	29	1
	9/29/2005	NE	National Guard		Ground Safety Manager	29	1
	9/29/2005	AL	National Guard		Ground Safety Manager	29	1
	9/29/2005	OH	State	Engineering	25 Building Inspectors	14	12
	9/29/2005	GA	State	Fire - HazMat	Fire Incident Management Team	14	16
	9/29/2005	AZ	National Guard		13 Security Police	32	13
	9/29/2005	TN	State	Law Enforcement	20 LE Officers: Ext to 544	7	20
	9/29/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Replacement Housing Coord.	17	1
73	9/30/2005	NJ	State	Human Services	Donations Management Staff - Ext of 394	7	0
	9/30/2005	CA	State	Engineering	Building Inspectors	16	25
	9/30/2005	TN	State	Public Works	Ext to 383 14 Nashville Public Works	14	14
	9/30/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	9 Member SERT	15	9
	9/30/2005	DE	State	Human Services	3 PIOs	14	3
	9/30/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	12 Psnl IMT for Harrison Co.		12
	9/30/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Hauling Demob Equip		5
	9/30/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	Harford Co - 5 Psnl	6	5
494	10/1/2005	ME	National Guard		6 Copper/Fiber Cable Repair Psnl	29	6
	10/1/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	50 FF Rotation - NOVA	18	50
	10/1/2005	WA	State	Engineering	10 Building Inspections	15	10
	10/1/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	8 Tankers w/2 Pers Crews	14	16
	10/1/2005	CO	National Guard		Ext of SAR Comm Unit: EXT of Req-A #322	14	8
	10/1/2005	IN	National Guard		TF Nightfighter	29	400
	10/1/2005	CA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	CA ESF6 Roxann Baird EXT #463	7	1
	10/1/2005	CA	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	15	1
	10/1/2005	PA	State	Search and Rescue	2 Cadaver Dogs	7	2
85	10/2/2005	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Public Health - Ext #432	16	7
	10/2/2005	GA	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Extension of #419	13	48
	10/2/2005	KS	National Guard		EMEDS + 25 Package in Bay St. Louis	74	25
	10/2/2005	IA	State	Emergency Management	Incident Management Team	15	4
	10/2/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	DRC Coord. Extension	7	1
	10/3/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	SHMO - Stevens Randy Scrivner	11	1
	10/3/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	NFIP Roger Connell	11	1
	10/3/2005	DE	State	Emergency Management	SHMO Lloyd Stoebrese	25	1
	10/3/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	NFIP Joe Johnson	11	1
	10/3/2005	MA	State	Engineering	10 Building Inspectors	14	11
	10/3/2005	IN	State	Law Enforcement	60 Law Enforcement Personnel Ext for #90	14	60
	10/3/2005	KS	State	Law Enforcement	60 Law Enforcement Ext of 511	14	60
	10/3/2005	SC	State	Law Enforcement	30 Law Enforcement Officers	16	30
	10/3/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	Floodplain MGR Slaughter	11	1
	10/3/2005	AL	National Guard		1 ea TSgt Larry Cochran	14	1



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
225	10/3/2005	AZ	National Guard		2 ea Psnl 161st AZ ANG - Med Support	14	2
	10/3/2005	CA	National Guard		1 ea Psnl 129th CA ANG - Med Support	14	1
	10/3/2005	WY	National Guard		MSgt A. Smith for EMEDS	27	1
	10/3/2005	DE	National Guard		Maj. Angela Walker	14	1
	10/3/2005	MA	National Guard		SRA Reay & MSgt Harriman	14	1
	10/3/2005	NY	National Guard		5 ea Psnl 105th NY ANG for EMEDS	14	5
	10/3/2005	OH	National Guard		1 es Psnl SSgt Magan Sass for EMEDS	14	1
	10/3/2005	OR	National Guard		4 ea Psnl 142nd OR ANG for EMEDS	14	4
	10/3/2005	PA	National Guard		5 ea Psnl PA ANG 111st, 193rd, for EMEDS	14	5
	10/3/2005	VA	National Guard		1 ea TSgt Larry Cochran	14	1
	10/3/2005	MO	National Guard		EMEDS Staff	14	9
	10/3/2005	NH	National Guard		SRA Jody Young	14	1
	10/3/2005	NJ	National Guard		LTC Loeser	14	1
	10/3/2005	NJ	National Guard		SRA R. Cerzosimo	14	1
	10/3/2005	ID	State	Human Services	PIO Jamie Fuhrman	14	1
	10/3/2005	PA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	5 - Nurses for MS State Hospital	14	6
	10/3/2005	CA	National Guard	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	6 - Psnl for EMEDS	14	6
	10/3/2005	ME	National Guard		TSgt Lori Brown/SSgt Fagond	14	2
	10/3/2005	NH	National Guard		1 Lt Clark/SSgt Ellis	14	2
	10/3/2005	PA	National Guard		SRA Jessica Noble	14	1
	10/3/2005	WI	National Guard		SSgt Dunwiddie, TSgt Goodman, SRA Lemenadez, TSgt Reitz	14	2
	10/3/2005	IL	National Guard		Public Health Cfmn	31	1
10/3/2005	SC	National Guard		Bioenvironmental Engr. Cfmn	31	3	
42	10/4/2005	WA	State	Human Services	4 PA Personnel: Ext to 499	14	3
	10/4/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	39 Law Enforcement - Ext 514		39
	10/5/2005	KS	State	Fire - HazMat	15 Fire Fighters	14	15
	10/5/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	IMT Team - 14 Psnl	14	14
	10/5/2005	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Environmental Health Team	14	8
	10/5/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Municipal Assistance to Long Beach	8	18
33	10/6/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team MBR		1
	10/6/2005	MT	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team Leader	15	1
	10/6/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	KBI Team Ext.	16	10
	10/6/2005	CO	National Guard		10 Psnl - 140th Wing, CO ANG	24	13
	10/6/2005	NM	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member	9	1
	10/6/2005	WV	National Guard		167th WVANG	29	6
	10/6/2005	DE	National Guard		166th DEANG	29	1
	10/6/2005	PR	National Guard		156th PRANG	29	0
12	10/6/2005	GA	State	Fire - HazMat	2 Member Fire IMT	7	0
	10/7/2005	FL	National Guard		1 Safety Psnl, SMSGT J. Cleat	12	1
	10/7/2005	KS	State	Human Services	2 PIOs for FCC	14	2
	10/7/2005	ID	State	Human Services	PIO Catgt Koon	14	1
	10/7/2005	KS	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	8 Psn Mental Health	14	8
	10/8/2005	MD	State	Fire - HazMat	15 FF from St Leonard Fire Co	7	23



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
47	10/8/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	2 Member IMT	14	2
	10/8/2005	PA	State	Fire - HazMat	Cadaver Dogs - 2 w/Handlers	31	2
	10/8/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	20 LEOs w/Vehicles	15	20
5	10/9/2005	MO	State	Human Services	4 Unemployment Insurance Volunteers	7	4
	10/9/2005	ID	State	Human Services	PIO Mike Keckler	12	1
9	10/10/2005	ME	State	Human Services	PIO	14	1
	10/10/2005	IA	National Guard		Maj Leasha Schemmel, 132rd FW	5	1
	10/10/2005	PA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	5 - Nurses for MS State Hospital	14	6
	10/10/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	DRC Coord. Extension - Beatrice Macia	7	1
13	10/11/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	Ext. of Don McGuire (Ops)	2	1
	10/11/2005	GA	State	Search and Rescue	Cadaver Dog Team	13	12
23	10/12/2005	NC	National Guard		SSgt Wendall Phillips	31	1
	10/12/2005	CA	State	Human Services	VOAD Coord: Eddie Aguero	14	1
	10/12/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	8 Psnl IMT	14	8
	10/12/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Municipal Mutual Aid - Long Beach	8	13
4	10/13/2005	MD	State	Emergency Management	Ops Dept. Chief Thompson	15	1
	10/13/2005	CA	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member - Ken Worman	15	1
	10/13/2005	OK	National Guard		2 NG Personnel, TSG Burnesy, TSG Malkoch for CRTC backfill	33	2
15	10/14/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	2 Log/Combo - Hancock EOC	15	3
	10/14/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	4 Water Tankers & 9 Psnl	14	9
	10/14/2005	ID	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team	15	1
	10/14/2005	RI	National Guard		2 PAX	30	2
210	10/15/2005	NJ	National Guard		59 Psnl Prime Beef Team	32	59
	10/15/2005	VA	State	Fire - HazMat	53 Psnl FF Task Force - 3rd Rotation	21	53
	10/15/2005	NY	State	Engineering	23 Bldg Inspectors	16	22
	10/15/2005	WI	State	Emergency Management	11 Workforce Personnel	13	11
	10/15/2005	CO	State	Emergency Management	SATCOM - 1 Psnl	16	1
	10/15/2005	TN	State	Emergency Management	CISM Team - Extension of 610	17	20
	10/15/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	30 Debris Spotters	17	30
	10/15/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	DeAnn Konkel - Ext. of 624	14	1
	10/15/2005	OH	National Guard		CRTC	14	1
	10/15/2005	PA	National Guard		PAX for CRTC	29	2
	10/15/2005	AL	National Guard		1 PAX for CRTC backfill	29	1
	10/15/2005	VT	National Guard		2 PAX for CRTC Backfill	29	2
	10/15/2005	IL	National Guard		1 PAX for CRTC backfill	29	1
	10/15/2005	WI	National Guard		3 PAX for CRTC Backfill	29	3
	10/15/2005	KY	National Guard		1 NG Maintenance Support Person for Backfill	29	1
10/15/2005	MO	National Guard		TSG James Fisk & MSgt Charles Paxton	29	2	
	10/16/2005	AZ	National Guard		Capt. Kieth, MSgt Amporano, Copl. Beaty for EMEDS	14	3
	10/16/2005	CA	National Guard		MSgt Wong for EMEDS	14	1
	10/16/2005	MA	National Guard		LTC Faux, Capt. Sampsonis for EMEDS	14	2
	10/16/2005	NJ	National Guard		TSgt Simmons for EMEDS	14	1
	10/16/2005	MA	National Guard		MSgt Dennis St Jean	14	1



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
39	10/16/2005	AZ	National Guard		SSgt Harold Weaver	15	1
	10/16/2005	IL	National Guard		EMEDS Staff 14 Psnl	14	14
	10/16/2005	ID	National Guard		NG Support	14	2
	10/16/2005	KY	National Guard		KYNG Med & Health Care	14	3
	10/16/2005	NH	National Guard		Bioenvironmental Engr. Cfmn	14	1
	10/16/2005	OH	National Guard		2 Med Psnl	14	2
	10/16/2005	NJ	National Guard		Nurse & Bioenviromental Engr	14	2
	10/16/2005	VT	National Guard		Bioenvironmental Engr. Cfmn	14	1
	10/16/2005	CA	State	Engineering	2 NFIP/CFM Specialist	15	2
	10/16/2005	WA	State	Human Services	PIOs for JIC	14	3
	10/16/2005	ND	National Guard		NG Assets - CE Equipment Ext.	31	0
42	10/17/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	NFIP Dale Schmutzler	11	1
	10/17/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	Extension of 612 - 36 Law Enforcement - Ext 514	16	36
	10/17/2005	OH	State	Law Enforcement	4 LEOs w/Vehicles - Pearl River	13	4
	10/17/2005	PA	National Guard		Service Mgmt Team	106	1
82	10/18/2005	KS	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement	14	65
	10/18/2005	OH	State	Law Enforcement - Sheriff	8 LE Officers with Vehilces Configured as Follows: 2 Co. Patrol Officers, 4 Corrections Officers, 2 Co. Patrol Officers	14	8
	10/18/2005	KY	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	8 Person Enviromental Health Strike Team	16	8
	10/18/2005	NH	National Guard		Bioenvironmental Engineer	28	1
21	10/19/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	12 IMT - Ext of 724	16	10
	10/19/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	2 Person IMT	13	2
	10/19/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	City Support Team	13	9
12	10/21/2005	PA	State	Law Enforcement	Nurses - 6 Psnl	14	6
	10/21/2005	CA	National Guard		NG 1 Service Mgmt Team Member	102	1
	10/21/2005	WI	National Guard		Service Mangement Team	102	1
	10/21/2005	TX	National Guard		Service Mgmt Team & Services Follow Team to Support CRTC	71	1
	10/21/2005	KS	National Guard		CRTC Support	102	0
	10/21/2005	UT	National Guard		1 Service Mgmt. Team	102	1
	10/21/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	EMAC A-Team Member	14	1
45	10/24/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	25 State Legislators	4	25
	10/24/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	20 Law Enforcement Team	18	20
27	10/26/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	10 Person IMT	16	10
	10/26/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	9 Member Team Pre-Disaster Assistance; 1 Team Leader, 2 Field Personnel, 1 Desk Clerk, 2 IT Data Entry Database Maintenance, 2 Road Damange Assessment, 1 GIS	9	9
	10/26/2005	KY	State	Fire - HazMat	2 Tankers (2,000 gal min) with 4 Fire Fighters per Tanker	28	8
24	10/29/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	SHMO Deborah Mills	15	1
	10/29/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	2 Water Tankers, 4 Prsn	20	2
	10/29/2005	AL	National Guard		6 NG Assets, 48R3, 4AO51, 4NO17, SSG, 4NO71, 43E3A	17	6
	10/29/2005	NC	National Guard		7 Person Medical Team, 46N3E	17	7
	10/29/2005	KS	National Guard		NG Staff, 46N3 & 4TO71 & 47G3		1
	10/29/2005	VT	National Guard		Areo Med Service	17	1
	10/29/2005	NJ	National Guard		4Eo71, MSG Evelyn Modlin, 108th AW	17	1
10/29/2005	PA	National Guard		NG Staff, 4N07, 4A151,4N071		4	



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
	10/29/2005	WA	State	Emergency Management	1 A-Team Member	12	1
10	10/30/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	12 Person IMT	14	9
	10/30/2005	ID	State	Emergency Management	A-Team Member, Ext of 783	13	1
16	10/31/2005	MO	State	Emergency Management	NFIP George Reidel	11	1
	10/31/2005	IL	State	Emergency Management	SHMO Shawn Putnam	11	1
	10/31/2005	IL	State	Emergency Management	NFIP Paul Osman	11	1
	10/31/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	NFIP Rhonda Montgomery	11	1
	10/31/2005	WA	State	Emergency Management	SHMO Marty Best	7	1
	10/31/2005	KS	State	Fire - HazMat	10 Fire Fighters with Fire Fighting Gear	14	10
	10/31/2005	WY	National Guard		Bioenvironmental Engr	15	1
96	11/1/2005	VA	State	Emergency Management	One PE/CFM Corey Gagrolis	14	1
	11/1/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	30 Debris Spotters	14	30
	11/1/2005	PA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	10 Nurses, 1 Psy	14	11
	11/1/2005	KS	State	Law Enforcement	47 LE Officers	29	47
	11/1/2005	CO	National Guard		Interim Satcomm Incident Site Como	14	7
12	11/2/2005	KY	State	Emergency Management	6 Team Environmental Health Strike Team; 4 Environmentalists, 1 Water Supply & 1 Admin Specialist	14	6
	11/2/2005	FL	National Guard		1 Black Hawk Helicopter with Fire Fighting Capability & 6 personnel	15	6
41	11/3/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	Task Force 40 LE Officers	14	40
	11/3/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	1 IMT Leader for KS IMT	15	1
1	11/5/2005	MT	State	Emergency Management	1 EMAC A-Team Leader	13	1
69	11/6/2005	VA	State	Fire - HazMat	50 Firefighters Northern Virginia Reg Grp	20	50
	11/6/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	Intergovernmental Coalition to Provide Support to City of Pass Christian	5	19
13	11/7/2005	OH	National Guard		6 Psnl 179th AW OHANG	2	6
	11/7/2005	WA	State	Public Works	8 Bldg Inspectors	7	7
3	11/9/2005	OH	State	Engineering	3 Building Inspectors	14	3
40	11/12/2005	FL	State	Engineering	IT Team, Bldg Dept, Utilities, Team Leader	14	22
	11/12/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	Incident Management Team	14	10
	11/12/2005	FL	State	Emergency Management	1 Team Leader, 2 Desk Clerks, 4 IT Persons, 1GIS, Mission 10	7	8
26	11/13/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	16 LE Office, 16 LE Vehicle	13	16
	11/13/2005	VA	State	Engineering	10 Building Inspectors	15	10
52	11/15/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	47LE, Radio Techs, Command Post	15	49
	11/15/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	3 Debris Spotters	7	3
6	11/17/2005	PA	State	Health - Medical - EMT - Ambulance	Nurses, Direct Care Staff Working with the MR/DD	14	6
3	11/18/2005	ND	State	Emergency Management	3 Debris Spotters	14	3
5	11/19/2005	NC	State	Emergency Management	1 MT Leader	9	1
	11/19/2005	WA	State	Engineering	4 Building Inspectors Ext. of REQ-A 868	9	4
3	11/26/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	IMT Positions Needed	22	3
30	11/28/2005	KY	State	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement Assistance	20	30
0	11/29/2005	FL	State	Engineering	IT Team Bldg Inspectors Donated Resources	11	22
49	11/30/2005	VA	State	Law Enforcement	47 Law Enforcement & 2 Radio Techs	30	49
1	12/10/2005	KS	State	Emergency Management	Communications Person	12	1
19	12/11/2005	NC	State	Fire - HazMat	Debris Spotting Program	10	9
	12/11/2005	FL	State	Public Works	Utility Team	10	10



# of Personnel Deployed by Day	Deployment Date	Assisting State	Source	Discipline	Request	# of Days Deployed	# of Personnel
1	12/15/2005	IL	National Guard		Service Mgmt Team	47	1
30	12/18/2005	KY	State	Law Enforcement	30 Law Enforcement Officers	5	30
8	1/3/2006	IN	State		Building Inspectors	12	4
	1/3/2006	IN	State	Engineering	4 Bldg. Inspector	14	4
5	1/9/2006	FL	State		Incident Management Team	9	5
2	1/16/2006	TN	State		Cadaver Dog Teams	7	2
48	2/5/2006	SC	National Guard		Agriculture Supplies	28	48
20	2/13/2006	NC	State		ESF 8 Support		20
2	2/27/2006	TN	State		2 Cadavier Dog Teams	4	2
		PA	National Guard		100 KW Generator		0
		FL	State	Emergency Management	Municipal Mutual Aid - Pass Christian		19
		CA	State	Human Services	1 Donation Warehouse Manager		1
		KY	State	Law Enforcement	20 L/E w/Transportation		20

Annex D

Acronyms and Definitions





Acronyms and Definitions

Acronyms

The following are acronyms used throughout this After-Action Report.

24/7	24 hours a day, 7 days a week
AAR	After-Action Report
AO	Area of Operations
AR	Authorized Representative
ASPCA	American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
A-Team	Advance Team [an EMAC coordinating component]
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
ATV	All-Terrain Vehicle
BERT	Bluegrass Emergency Response Team (Kentucky)
CDT	Central Daylight Time
CISD	Critical Incident Stress Debriefing
CISM	Critical Incident Stress Management
DC	Designated Contact
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMORT	Disaster Mortuary Response Team
DoD	Department of Defense
EDT	Eastern Daylight Time
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
e-mail	Electronic Mail
EMI	Emergency Management Institute (DHS/FEMA)
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ESF	Emergency Support Function
ETF	Executive Task Force
FAQ	Frequently Asked Question
fax	Facsimile
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FDNY	Fire Department of New York
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAAP	Generally Accepted Accounting Practices
GETS	Government Emergency Telephone System
GPS	Global Positioning System



HazMat	Hazardous Material(s)
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HSUS	Humane Society of the United States
IAP	Incident Action Plan
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICMA	International County and City Managers Association
ICS	Incident Command System
ID	Identification
IMT	Incident Management Team
JFO	Joint Field Office
JTF	Joint Task Force
LSR	Lead State Representative
LSU	Louisiana State University
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
mph	Miles per Hour
MRE	Meal, Ready-to-Eat
NCG	National Coordination Group [an EMAC coordinating component]
NCT	National Coordinating Team [an EMAC coordinating component]
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NEMA	National Emergency Management Association
NEOC	National Emergency Operations Center
NIC	NIMS Integration Center
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOFD	New Orleans Fire Department
NOPD	New Orleans Police Department
NRCC	National Response Coordination Center
NRDC	National Resources Defense Council
NRP	National Response Plan
NWS	National Weather Service
PFO	Principal Federal Official
PIO	Public Information Officer
POC	Point of Contact
RCT	Regional Coordinating Team [an EMAC coordinating component]
REQ-A	Request for Assistance [EMAC Inter-State Mutual-Aid Request]
RRCC	Regional Response Coordination Center
SART	State Animal Response Team
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SITREP	Situation Report
SPCA	Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals



TO	Theater of Operations
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
US&R	Urban Search and Rescue
USNS	United States Naval Ship
USS	United States Ship
VMAT	Veterinary Medical Assistance Team
VOIP	Voice Over Internet Protocol
WMD	Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction
WPS	Wireless Priority Service



EMAC Dictionary

Terms and acronyms used by EMAC members and in the arena of mutual aid are defined below.

- A -

Area of Operations (AO)

The jurisdictional area for which a deployed coordinating team element is responsible. For example, a State is the AO for a State emergency management organization. A Federal region can consider one or more States within that region as being in their AO. EMAC personnel deployed to a local area would refer to that area as his or her AO.

Article

An Article defines a binding agreement among parties that is enforceable by law—the terms and conditions of a contract or law.

Assisting State

An Assisting State is any EMAC Member State providing assistance to another Member State requesting aid using the EMAC Request for Assistance (REQ-A) process. Once a Member State duly executes the REQ-A with a Requesting State, that Member State is referred to as an Assisting State until the terms of the REQ-A have been completed and the resources being provided have been released and demobilized.

A-Team

An A-Team normally consists of two persons from any Member State who are knowledgeable about and prepared to implement EMAC procedures in their own State or any other Member State. At the request of a Member State, an A-Team is deployed to the Requesting State's EOC to facilitate EMAC requests and assistance between Member States. The A-Team assists the Requesting State with requests for assistance, tracks the location and status of the assistance accepted and deployed to the Requesting State's locations, and assists the deployed personnel as needed and required while they are deployed. When deployed, the A-Team becomes the primary point of contact for requesting and acquiring assistance provided under EMAC.

Authorized Representative (AR)

The Authorized Representative is the person empowered to obligate State resources and expend State funds for EMAC purposes. In a Requesting State, the AR is the person who is legally empowered under Article III.B. of the Compact to authorize a request for, and accept an offer of, assistance under EMAC. In an Assisting State, the AR is the person who can legally obligate State resources and authorize a request to provide assistance under EMAC. State Emergency Management Directors are automatically Authorized Representatives. The director can delegate this authority to other emergency management officials within the organization as long as they possess the same obligating authority as the director.



– B –

Broadcast

The EMAC Broadcast is an e-mail sent to all member EMAC States when a request for assistance or other important information needs to be shared. It is the primary means used to alert EMAC States of an impending or occurring emergency event or to request assistance and is sent via the EMAC Web site.

– D –

Demobilization

This is the process of releasing assets (personnel and/or equipment) whose mission is completed or no longer needed to support a specific mission within an event. The process involves debriefing personnel, returning issued equipment, completing and submitting required paperwork, arranging return travel, and tracking released assets back to their home duty station in the Requesting State in a safe and timely manner.

Designated Contact (DC)

This person is very familiar with the EMAC process and serves as the point of contact for EMAC in their State and can discuss the details of a request for assistance. The DC is not usually legally empowered to execute an EMAC request or authorize EMAC assistance unless the DC and the AR are the same person.

– E –

EMAC

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an inter-State agreement that enables entities to provide mutual assistance during times of need.

EMAC Executive Task Force (ETF)

These are the EMAC Member State personnel who conduct the day-to-day activities on behalf of the other Member States.

EMAC Member State

The term applies to the States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and all U.S. Territorial possessions whose governors have signed the Compact into law. It is used on a daily basis to refer to States during periods of non-emergency activity. See definition of the **Requesting** and **Assisting State** used when denoting EMAC Member State's roles during activation of the EMAC.

EMAC Operations Subcommittee

The subcommittee, under the leadership of the Chair, that is responsible for ensuring that the Operating Protocols, Operations Manual, Standard Operating Procedures, and the Field Guide are kept in a current state of readiness. It is comprised of a representative from each EMAC Member State.



- I -

Intra-State

Intra-State refers to anything within that Member State, but not between States. Inter-State refers to anything between States.

- J -

Joint Field Office (JFO)

This facility is used to house State, Federal, and volunteer agency personnel who administer State and Federal recovery assistance programs and manage recovery operations within each State declared a major disaster by the President.

- L -

Lead State Representative (LSR)

A member of the EMAC Executive Task Force (ETF) appointed for a 2-year term to represent the EMAC Member States in each of the 10 FEMA Regions.

- N -

National Coordinating Team (NCT)

In the event the National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) is activated at FEMA Headquarters in Washington, DC, and a coordinating team is needed to maintain overall coordination among the deployed EMAC components, FEMA will request the NCG to deploy an NCT to the NEOC. Costs for deploying and maintaining an NCT are reimbursed by FEMA through NEMA/Council of State Governments (CSG).

National Coordination Group (NCG)

Comprised of members from the State of the Chair of the EMAC Operations Subcommittee and Executive Task Force. They are the nationwide EMAC point of contact during normal day-to-day, non-emergency periods. The NCG is prepared to activate EMAC on short notice by coordinating with the EMAC Authorized Representatives or Designated Contacts of the other Member States.

National EMAC Coordinator

The NEMA staff person designated national EMAC point of contact and responsible for coordinating the annual work plan in cooperation with the NEMA Executive Director, the EMAC Senior Advisor, the EMAC Committee, and the ETF.

National EMAC Senior Advisor

The EMAC subject matter expert contracted by NEMA to perform specific tasks and projects identified in the annual work plan and serve as advisor to the NEMA Executive Director, the National EMAC Coordinator, the EMAC Committee, and the ETF.



National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC)

Renamed in the National Response Plan as the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the facility in Washington, DC, used by DHS/FEMA to coordinate Federal response and recovery operations. Federal Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are co-located at the NRCC to provide resource support to State counterparts through the Regional Response Coordination Centers.

National Incident Management System (NIMS)

The system used to conduct incident management as specified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5. NIMS established a national standard methodology for managing emergencies and ensure seamless integration of all local, State, and Federal forces into the system.

National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)

The facility in Washington, DC, used by DHS/FEMA to coordinate Federal response and recovery operations. Federal Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are co-located at the NRCC to provide resource support to State counterparts through the Regional Response Coordination Centers. This was formerly called the NEOC and was changed in the National Response Plan.

– O –

Operations Manual

These are the written standardized process to ensure each Member State understands the EMAC agreement, is adequately prepared to participate in the agreement, and follows the same standardized procedures while implementing EMAC. This manual sets forth the terms of the EMAC agreement and establishes the EMAC procedures that all Member States are to follow.

– P –

Point of Contact (POC)

The person or entity who is the main contact.

Providing Entity

Any local government political subdivision, organization, or State agency of an Assisting State, other than the State emergency management organization, that is providing an EMAC requested resource on behalf of the Assisting State to fulfill an official EMAC REQ-A mission requirement.

– R –

R-1 Form

The form used to summarize the costs of all inter-State assistance requested and provided by an Assisting State. A single R-1 should be completed and submitted to the Requesting State by each Assisting State that provided assistance. All of the costs for providing assistance under the REQ-A(s) are totaled. Copies of receipts and payment vouchers are attached to the R-1. The R-1 is signed and sent to the Requesting State for reimbursement.



R-2 Form

The form used to summarize the costs of all intra-State assistance requested and provided by an agency, municipality, county, or other organization within a State providing assisting to another State under EMAC. A single R-2, accompanied by copies of receipts, payment vouchers, and other costs supporting documents, should be completed and submitted to the Assisting State for each agency, municipality, county, or other organization who provided assistance. The R-2 is used to reimburse for mutual aid provided by any public entity that performed an EMAC mission at the direction of an Assisting State. The R-2 is prepared, signed, and sent along with payment vouchers and supporting documents to the Assisting State for reimbursement. The Assisting State attaches copies of the R-2 and all supporting documents to an R-1 and forwards, along with a cover letter of instructions, to the Requesting State for reimbursement.

Regional Coordinating Team (RCT)

If the disaster event involves more than one State in a single Federal region or multiple States in multiple regions, FEMA may request that an RCT be deployed to the Federal Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) to coordinate with A-Teams deployed to Requesting States. The RCT supports the A-Teams within their Area of Operations (AO) but does not directly acquire resources from other Member States without approval of the NCG. The RCT prepares regional Situation Reports and channels information up to the NCT.

Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC)

The Federal facility from which Federal personnel coordinate response operations and provide resource support to States within each Federal region. RRCCs usually stand-down once a Joint Field Office (JFO) is operational in the affected State(s) within the region.

Reimbursement

The process of submitting documented eligible costs by an Assisting State to a Requesting State in order to receive financial compensation for providing assistance specified in the REQ-A and in accordance with the EMAC.

REQ-A Form

The EMAC Request for Assistance (REQ-A) Form is used to officially request assistance, offer assistance, and accept assistance. The use of the single form simplifies and streamlines the paperwork necessary to request and receive assistance from Member States. It is important to remember that when duly executed by the Authorized Representative of both the Requesting and Assisting State(s), the REQ-A becomes a legally binding agreement between the Requesting and Assisting State(s) under EMAC.

Requesting State

Any EMAC Member State whose governor has declared a state of emergency pursuant to the Compact and has informally or formally requested inter-State assistance using any of the systems established by EMAC for this purpose.



- S -

Situation Report (SITREP)

At least once daily, and sometimes more frequently, this status report that is prepared by an A-Team and posted on the EMAC Web site. It details the current status of the emergency operation and the response to that emergency event. The purpose of the SITREP is to ensure all parties involved in the response effort are thoroughly informed of every facet of the current operation.

- T -

Theater of Operations (TO)

Applies to an EMAC operation in its totality whereby A-Teams and Regional Coordinating Teams focus on affected jurisdictions. The control of the EMAC TO falls under the purview of the NCG with support from the NCT. An EMAC TO is comprised of potentially many Areas of Operations.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT (EMAC)

